

MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES APPROPRIATIONS FOR 2012

THURSDAY, MARCH 10, 2011.

NAVY AND MARINE CORPS FY 2012 BUDGET

WITNESSES

ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD, CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

GENERAL JAMES AMOS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN CULBERSON

Mr. CULBERSON. The Subcommittee of Appropriations for Military Construction and Veterans Affairs will come to order. It is a privilege to welcome everybody to this hearing today on the military construction and family housing requirements for the Navy and Marine Corps.

The total fiscal year 2012 request for the Department of the Navy military construction and family housing is \$3 billion, and this amount includes continued military construction funding at \$2.4 billion to support the growth of the Marine Corps and a Commandant's goal of eliminating inadequate barracks by 2014. For the Navy this amount includes \$1.1 billion in military construction as well as \$469 million to support family housing for both Navy and Marine Corps, and \$17.2 million for reserve component military construction.

It is also worth noting that this will be the third year of major funding for the realignment of Marine forces from Okinawa to Guam. The projects requested for this initiative total \$368 million.

Before we proceed I do want to recognize Mr. Bishop for any opening remarks he would like to make, the gentleman from Georgia.

OPENING REMARKS OF CONGRESSMAN BISHOP

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I want to add my words of welcome to the both of you. Admiral Roughead and General Amos, I want to thank you for your years of service to our country.

Today we find ourselves at a very interesting crossroads. The war in Iraq is winding down and Afghanistan—if the situation on the ground is good we will start to withdraw forces in July.

Both of you are in very unique situations.

Admiral, as you said a couple of days ago, everyone wants to stay in the Navy, and you are having trouble getting your end-strength goal.

And General, in a year or so you will be asked to reduce the size of the Marine Corps.

In addition, both of you are still waiting for your full fiscal year 2011 funding and further delay could put your fiscal year 2011 construction programs in jeopardy. I believe that the fiscal year 2012 budget request is a reflection of all of these changing dynamics, and so I look forward to your testimony today.

While all of this is very serious, you should be assured that everyone on this subcommittee will do everything that we can possible do to help you get through these tough times. We will do our dead level best to make sure that you and our troops and their families have everything they need to carry out the missions that we have given to them.

And with that, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

I will now formerly introduce our witnesses.

It is an extraordinary privilege for us to be here to help both of you and our men and women in uniform perform the difficult job that they do every day for all of us. It is a great privilege to introduce both of you.

Admiral Gary Roughead, Chief of Naval Operations, has served 37 years of active service, including six operational commands.

And I see that you are a 19th century graduate of Annapolis and became chief of naval operations on September 29th of 2007.

Admiral Roughead's previous assignment was as Commander of Fleet Forces Command, and you have also served as Deputy Commander of PACOM, Naval Chief of Legislative Affairs, commandant of the Naval Academy, and it is a real privilege to have you here with us today, sir.

I also want to introduce, before we start, General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Amos assumed the duties of commandant of the Marine Corps on October 22nd of 2010.

And your command tours, sir, have included Marine—Commander of the Marine Wing Support Squadron 173 from 1985 through 1986; Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312, which is a component of Carrier Air Wing 8 aboard the USS *Theodore Roosevelt*, from 1991 to 1993.

General Amos also commanded the Marine Aircraft Group 31 from 1996 to 1998, the Third Marine Aircraft Wing in combat during Operations Iraqi Freedom I and II from 2002 to 2004, and the II Marine Expeditionary Force from 2004 to 2006.

Additionally, Admiral Roughead was assigned to NATO as Deputy Commander Naval Striking Forces of Southern Europe, based in Naples, Italy, where he commanded NATO's Kosovo Verification Center and later served as Chief of Staff for the U.S. Joint Task Force Noble Anvil during the air campaign over Serbia, and also commanded—General Amos commanded a battalion landing team in Desert Storm and is a native of Wendell, Idaho.

Admiral and General, both of your written statements will, of course, be included as a part of the record, and—but of course, please feel free to summarize your testimony for today's hearing.

It is my privilege to recognize you, and I would like to begin with Admiral Roughead.

Thank you so much, sir, for your service and your testimony here today.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you very much, sir. And Chairman Culberson, Representative Bishop, and members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you in my fourth year as the Chief of Naval Operations, representing more than 600,000 Sailors and Navy civilians operating globally. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about our Navy's shore infrastructure, which enables our operations and is vital to the quality of life and quality of work of our sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.

Your firm support has permitted us to continue to provide the shore infrastructure the Navy needs for fleet operations, warfighting capabilities, family services, and shore energy improvements. It has enabled us to add bachelors' quarters through our Homeport Ashore program, which remains on track to provide for our junior unaccompanied sailors by 2016 and to complete our efforts by the end of the year to expand childcare by 7,000 spaces in support of the family readiness we deem essential for combat readiness.

Our fiscal year 2012 budget request leverages the opportunity presented by the Secretary of Defense's initiatives to reduce excess overhead and provide well-balanced shore infrastructure investments, including 29 projects to increase warfighting and joint capabilities, enhance nuclear weapons security, support energy initiatives, and improve sailor quality of life; a slight increase over last year's request to sustain, restore, and modernize mission-critical facilities, which for us are airfields, hangars, piers, and dry docks, for barracks recapitalization, and energy efficiency upgrades, and it sustains funding for fleet operations, family programs, child development and youth services, and bachelor housing through our Base Operating Support Program.

High operational demands, rising manpower costs, and an aging fleet, however, continue to cause us to assume risk in shore readiness, specifically the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of our shore infrastructure. The continuing resolution for 2011 compounds that risk by limiting our ability to issue contracts for new construction and facility sustainment and has forced us to limit several contracts for base operating support, slow civilian hiring, and delay awards for new construction.

A year-long continuing resolution would negatively impact our ability to support our sailors, our Navy civilians, and families, and I greatly appreciate your support in passing an appropriation to address these impacts.

Our MILCON and quality of life programs demonstrate a commitment to our sailors and Navy civilians. Thank you for your continued support of our Navy's shore readiness programs and for everything you do to support the men and women of the United States Navy, our enduring global force for good.

I look forward to your questions, sir.

[Statement of Admiral Roughead follows:]

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
VETERANS AFFAIRS, and RELATED AGENCIES
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL GARY ROUGHEAD

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION,
VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

10 MARCH 2011

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UNTIL RELEASED BY THE HOUSE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
VETERANS AFFAIRS, and RELATED AGENCIES
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

Chairman Culberson, Representative Bishop, and esteemed members of the committee, I am honored to appear before you representing the dedicated Sailors and civilians of the United States Navy. I appreciate the opportunity to testify about our Navy's shore infrastructure, which enables our operational and combat readiness and is essential to the quality of life and quality of work for our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.

High operational demands, rising manpower costs, and an aging Fleet of ships and aircraft continue to cause us to take deliberate risks in shore readiness, specifically in the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of our shore infrastructure. With your unwavering support, we continue to provide the necessary shore infrastructure for our Fleet operations, combat capabilities, family services, and shore energy improvements. Your support has enabled us to increase child care spaces, add bachelors quarters through our Homeport Ashore program, and ensure nuclear weapons security. We are taking risk in other areas ashore, which will result in additional maintenance, sustainment, restoration, and modernization requirements, and higher total ownership costs over the lifecycle of our facilities. Accordingly, our future shore readiness, particularly the recapitalization of our facilities infrastructure, remains at high risk.

The Continuing Resolution (CR) for FY 2011 compounds that risk by limiting our ability to issue contracts for new construction and facilities sustainment, restoration, and modernization, and it negatively impacts our ability to support our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families. The CR has forced us to take mitigation measures that include limiting numerous contracts for base operating support, slowing civilian hiring, and delaying award of new military construction contracts. If we are still under a CR in March, we will delay at least six Navy and Navy Reserve MILCON projects in Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Virginia, and Washington. If the CR lasts all year, we will have no choice but to make permanent these mitigations and others, impacting additional projects in California, Florida, Louisiana, and Rhode Island, and significantly reducing the operation, recapitalization, and sustainment of our facilities. Your support in passing an appropriation to address these impacts is appreciated greatly.

Our FY 2012 budget request deliberately targets our shore infrastructure investments to deliver greatest impact on achieving our strategic and operational objectives. Our shore investment strategy provides shore infrastructure that is properly sized and aligned to enable warfighting and Joint capabilities, minimizes the decline of critical mission-essential and quality of life infrastructure, and optimizes warfare enterprise outputs and quality of service. Our investments ashore facilitate our ability to meet Initial Operational Capability of new ships, aircraft, and systems, support our Navy's operational readiness and Combatant Commander initiatives, yields shipyard efficiencies, and enhance quality of life and quality of work for our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families.

Our FY 2012 Military Construction (MILCON) budget requests \$1.1B for 29 projects, Planning & Design, and Unspecified Minor Construction. These investments will increase our warfighting capability, enhance nuclear weapons security, support energy initiatives, and improve Sailor quality of life. We have paused our facilities demolition program while we refine a plan that optimizes our shore footprint.

Our FY 2012 budget request includes \$2B for the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of our shore infrastructure, a slight increase over last year's request. This investment is directed toward our mission-critical facilities, including airfields, hangars, piers, dry docks, barracks recapitalization, and energy upgrades. To maximize our support for warfighting readiness and capabilities, we reduced our facilities sustainment posture to 80 percent of the Department of Defense (DOD) Facilities Sustainment Model; Joint Bases are funded to 90 percent of this model. The Naval Academy, Naval War College, and Naval Postgraduate School are funded to 100 percent of this model. We have minimized operational impacts and ensured the safety of our Sailors and civilians by prioritizing projects that address facilities with the lowest quality rating first.

I remain committed to sustaining Fleet operations, family programs, child development and youth services, and bachelor housing through our Base Operating Support (BOS) program. We fully funded joint basing standards and our shore energy program, and reduced risk in air and port operations; however, we took risk in other BOS functions, funding them at significantly lower common output levels. To maximize the impact of our BOS funding, we continue to pursue and realize more cost effective ways of providing base support functions in areas such as emergency services, installation planning and management, facility services, human resources, information technology, and administration.

MILCON Program

Of the \$1.1B in our FY 2012 MILCON budget request, \$42.5M is allocated for planning and design and \$21.5M is allocated for unspecified minor construction. We also request \$17.2M in MILCON Navy Reserve funding, including \$1.5M for planning and design and \$2M for unspecified minor construction. We continue to benefit from lower construction prices and have reduced the overall cost of our FY 2012 projects to reflect current market conditions.

Our FY 2012 MILCON program prioritizes our operational readiness for current and future mission requirements and focuses on:

- Eliminating nuclear weapons security deviations
- Enhancing capabilities to support Combatant Commander requirements
- Supporting new mission and new system requirements
- Recapitalizing critical shore infrastructure
- Improving Sailor quality of life and increasing Homeport Ashore housing
- Upgrading Mayport to be a nuclear carrier homeport
- Increasing energy security and generating energy savings

Appendix I provides a brief overview of Navy projects funded by the FY 2012 Military Construction Program. Highlights follow.

We continue to place a priority on the security of our nuclear weapons at our two Strategic Weapons Facilities, and have programmed the capital investments necessary to mitigate nuclear weapon security deviations as soon as possible. Our FY 2012 budget requests four projects that will mitigate current deviations; additionally, we are requesting the first increment of funding for construction of a second explosives handling wharf for our strategic weapons on

the West Coast. This new wharf, located at Naval Base Kitsap in Bangor, Washington, is needed to sustain our Trident D5 strategic weapons system in the Pacific and is critical to nuclear weapons surety and our national security. We are incrementally funding this \$715M project from FY 2012 through FY 2015. I request your support for this project over the next four years.

Our FY 2012 MILCON request enhances operational capabilities in Bahrain and Djibouti to support U.S. Central Command and U.S. Africa Command, respectively. As the site of our Naval Forces Central Command/U.S. Fifth Fleet headquarters, our facilities in Bahrain enable our Navy's forward maritime presence and enable rapid response to crises. I remain committed to our Navy's presence in Bahrain. Our MILCON budget includes six projects in Bahrain over the FYDP to support new facilities that enhance shore infrastructure which supports Fleet operations.

We are requesting funding for seven projects that will provide new and/or improved hangars, training, and maintenance facilities. Specifically, we are requesting \$180M in FY 2012 to support joint operations and initial operational capability requirements for P-8A, BAMS, E-2D, and MH-60R/S. These investments will ensure our shore infrastructure is ready and capable to support new ships, aircraft, and systems as they enter the Fleet.

We continue to support the recapitalization of our critical infrastructure. Our FY 2012 budget request includes \$145M for recapitalization, including the construction of a depot-level maintenance facility in Norfolk, Virginia and integrated dry dock water treatment capabilities in Bangor, Washington, and the modernization of water plant facilities in Diego Garcia.

Our Homeport Ashore initiative remains on track to provide accommodations for our junior (E1-E4) unaccompanied Sailors by 2016. Through this initiative, Navy will construct sufficient bachelor quarters for all our junior single Sailors to have berthing ashore while their ships are in homeport. Our FY 2012 budget requests funding for one bachelors quarters project in Norfolk in support of Homeport Ashore.

We continue to focus on achieving the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review direction to upgrade the carrier port of Mayport. Much like the dispersal of West Coast aircraft carriers between California and Washington, a second homeport on the East Coast to maintain aircraft carriers is prudent in the event of a natural or man-made disaster in Hampton Roads. The dredging project funded in FY 2010 is underway and will ensure unimpeded access to Mayport. Our FY 2012 budget requests funding for the Massey Avenue corridor improvement projects. We plan to request funding for the Wharf F recapitalization in FY 2013, and the remaining projects within the FYDP, to establish Naval Station Mayport as nuclear carrier-capable homeport by 2019.

The Secretary of the Navy and I are committed to advancing our energy security. Energy is an operational imperative and I established the Navy's Task Force Energy more than two years ago to improve combat capability, assure mobility, green our footprint, increase our energy security, and meet legal mandates. We have reduced our energy use ashore by more than 14 percent since 2003 as a result of our energy efficiency efforts, which include energy efficient building upgrades, energy management systems, procurement of alternative fuel vehicles, and achievement of sustainable building standards for all new construction and major renovation projects. Our continued investments in advanced metering and energy audits will help identify

further opportunities for efficiency gains and alternative energy use. Our approach remains focused on integrating the right technology at the right time in the right place while transforming Navy culture and behavior for long term sustainability. Our FY 2012 budget requests \$1.8B across the FYDP to fund shore energy initiatives.

BRAC and Infrastructure Reduction

The Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) legislation helps us align our infrastructure with our operational needs, take advantage of joint basing opportunities, and reduce excess and underutilized infrastructure that increases our sustainment requirements and total ownership costs. We are on schedule to achieve all statutory BRAC 2005 milestones by Sept. 15, 2011; however, we continue to experience significant challenges in relocating Navy organizations from leased facilities in the National Capital Region to DoD-owned spaces. To date, we have completed 328 of 485 realignment and closure actions and we have awarded 118 of 118 planned BRAC construction projects, totaling about \$2B. This progress represents an increase of 13 projects and about \$200M since this time last year, and includes the realignments of Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, which concluded on Oct. 1, 2010. Our FY 2012 budget requests \$26M for ongoing environmental restoration, caretaker, and property disposal costs at BRAC 2005 installations, and \$129M for environmental cleanup, caretaker operations, and property transfers for productive re-use at prior-round BRAC installations.

We suspended our demolition program starting in FY 2012 so we could develop a comprehensive plan to optimize our shore infrastructure that deliberately pursues the recapitalization of existing facilities in lieu of new footprint construction. Consolidating our facilities and divesting of excess infrastructure will allow us to reduce our footprint ashore and lower our sustainment requirements and total ownership costs.

Housing Program

Quality housing has a significant impact on Sailor retention, productivity, and individual and mission readiness. With your support, we continue to make progress in our housing program. Our FY 2012 budget request continues our commitment to improve living conditions and to provide safe, affordable, and comfortable housing for our Sailors and their families. We are pursuing a three-part housing strategy:

1. Reliance on the Private Sector: We make every effort to house our Sailors in the local community first. Proper resourcing of our Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) ensures our Sailors have the opportunity to buy or rent homes of their choosing in the communities in which we operate and live. In FY 2010, local communities housed approximately 76 percent of our family population and 44 percent of our single Navy Sailors.

2. Public/Private Ventures (PPV): Approximately 97 percent of our family units in the United States are privatized. PPV has improved greatly the quality of housing for our Sailors and their families and it allows us to sustain these units at the lowest life-cycle cost. We continue to provide enhanced oversight of our PPV projects to ensure Navy Sailors and their families benefit from quality housing and services. Our portfolio management program collects and analyzes

financial, occupancy, construction, and resident satisfaction data to ensure our PPV projects are optimized and performing as required and the services provided meet expectations.

3. MILCON: We continue to rely on MILCON funding for bachelor and overseas family housing. We are committed to ensuring our junior single Sailors are afforded the opportunity to have housing ashore when they are in homeport through our Homeport Ashore initiative.

Our FY 2012 budget requests \$75M for family housing construction, improvements, planning, and design. We have awarded all FY 2010 overseas family housing projects and we are prepared to execute the FY 2011 projects. We are also requesting \$341M for the operation and maintenance of approximately 10,000 Navy-owned homes and 3,000 leased homes.

We have privatized approximately 97 percent of our family housing units in the U.S. and these units are considered adequate or will be adequate after the end of the initial development period; however, only 63 percent of our government-owned family housing units, most of which are overseas, are classified as "adequate" (Q1/Q2) by OSD standards. We are steadily improving the condition of our family housing units and I am committed to achieving the Secretary of Defense's goal of having 90 percent of our family housing inventory rated as "adequate". We will not meet the Secretary's timeline of 2012, but we have programmed projects across the FYDP to reach this goal by 2015. Our family housing program supports the readiness of our Naval forces by providing Sailors and their families suitable, affordable, and safe housing worldwide.

Our Public Private Venture program has been tremendously successful in leveraging public funding to generate private sector investment in family housing by a ratio of about 19:1; we have funded \$268M in family housing projects and secured \$5.2B in private sector investments. When the PPV transition is complete, we will own less than 100 homes in CONUS and Hawaii, but will retain ownership and management of all foreign assets. We continue to receive very positive feedback from our Navy families living in privatized family housing.

Our bachelor housing investments are focused on completing our Homeport Ashore program by 2016, and achieving an "adequate" (Q1/Q2) rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2022. New barracks at Naval Base Coronado will be completed in the spring of 2012 and will provide berthing for more than 1,000 Sailors. Our FY 2012 budget requests funding for one bachelors quarters in Norfolk and we have programmed the final three Homeport Ashore construction projects in FY 2013 and FY 2014. We will not meet the Secretary of Defense's goal for achieving an adequate rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2017; however, we are increasing our annual restoration and modernization investment to improve the condition of our Q3 and Q4 barracks from \$125M to \$195M across the FYDP, which will allow us to meet the Secretary's goal by 2022. We planned to renovate barracks during FY 2011 in Milton, FL; Atsugi, Japan; Ventura, Lemoore and San Diego CA; Whidbey Island and Bremerton, WA; and Pearl Harbor, HI; however, the CR prevents us from awarding those contracts. We will continue to follow our policy of not assigning Sailors to rooms with serious environmental, health, or safety concerns.

Construction of our Bachelor Housing PPV pilot projects in San Diego, CA, and Hampton Roads, VA is complete and these facilities are providing high-quality market-style quarters for 6,600 Sailors. Thank you for your support of these PPV pilot programs.

Family Readiness & Quality of Life

Family readiness and quality of life programs enable individual and mission readiness. We provide a network of services, programs, commands, agencies, and individuals that support and advocate for our Navy families and enhance their quality of life. Our Fleet and Family Support Centers offer Sailors and their families access to deployment support, relocation and transition assistance, personal financial management, life skills education, new parent support, family employment, sexual assault prevention and response services, and child and domestic abuse prevention and response services. We have an active ombudsmen program connects commands with Sailors and their families, and we continue to use social media and off-base sites to reach out to active duty and reserve Navy families in remote or isolated locations.

We remain committed to providing our Sailors and their families a comprehensive continuum of care that addresses all aspects of medical, physical, psychological, and family readiness. Navy Safe Harbor initiative is at the forefront of Navy's non-medical care for all seriously wounded, ill, and injured Sailors, Coast Guardsmen, and their families; and we continue to provide exceptional, individually tailored assistance to a growing enrolled population of more than 600 individuals. Our Warrior Transition Program (WTP) and Returning Warrior Workshops (RWW) are essential to our post-deployment reintegration efforts and facilitate the reintegration of deployed Sailors with his or her spouse and family.

We continue to provide high-quality childcare and developmental youth programs for Navy children six weeks to 18 years of age. These programs enable our Navy families balance competing demands of mission readiness and family responsibilities. All of our programs are operated in accordance with the Military Child Care Act and are DoD-certified and nationally accredited. By the end of this year, we will complete our efforts, started in 2006, to expand child care by 7,000 spaces; this increase in child care capacity will allow us to meet the Secretary of Defense's goal of providing childcare to meet at least 80 percent of the potential need. Our child care and youth programs are highly valued by our Sailors and their families. I thank you for your continued support of these programs.

Conclusion

You can be extremely proud of our Sailors. They are extraordinary men and women. Our naval installations are key to our warfighting readiness. Our MILCON and quality of life programs deliver flexible, agile, and scalable capabilities that support our Navy's warfighting mission and our people. Thank you for your continued support of our Navy's shore readiness programs; your unwavering commitment to our Sailors, Navy civilians, and their families; and for all you do to make our United States Navy an effective and enduring global force for good.

APPENDIX I
FY 2012 MILCON-NAVY (MCN) AND NAVY RESERVE (MCNR) PROJECTS

Combatant Commander Capabilities

\$190M for five projects supporting operational capabilities and quality of life enhancements for Africa Command, Central Command, and Transportation Command:

- Al Jufayr, Bahrain: Waterfront Development, Phase IV
 - Climate-Controlled Warehouse, Combat Vehicle Warehouse, Water Storage and Distribution System, and Fleet Recreation Facility
- Al Jufayr, Bahrain: Bachelor Quarters
- Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Taxiway Enhancement
- Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Aircraft Logistics Apron
- Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti: Bachelor Quarters

Nuclear Weapons Security

\$208M for five projects supporting enhancement of nuclear weapon security and mitigation of all nuclear weapon security deviations:

- Kitsap, WA: Explosives Handling Wharf-2 (Increment 1 of 4)
- Kitsap, WA: Explosives Handling Wharf Security Force Facility
- Kitsap, WA: Waterfront Restricted Area Vehicle Barriers
- Kings Bay, GA: Waterfront Restricted Area Land/Water Interface
- Kings Bay, GA: Crab Island Security Enclave

Mayport

\$15M for one project supporting the establishment of Naval Station Mayport as a nuclear carrier-capable homeport by 2019:

- Mayport, FL: Massey Avenue Corridor Improvements

Energy

\$195M for four projects supporting elimination of antiquated centralized steam systems and increasing operational reliability at Pacific Missile Range Facility (PMRF):

- Norfolk, VA: Decentralize Steam System
- Indian Head, MD: Decentralize Steam System
- Great Lakes, IL: Decentralize Steam System
- PMRF, HI: North Loop electrical Distribution System Replacement

Quality of Life / Bachelor Housing

\$128M for two projects supporting elimination of Homeport Ashore deficit by 2016 at Interim Assignment Policy (two Sailors per room), and recapitalization of a fitness facility. Additionally, \$99M for two Bachelor Quarters projects supporting Combatant Commander capabilities (shown above):

- Norfolk, VA: Bachelor Quarters
- Coronado, CA: Fitness Center

New Systems / New Missions

\$180M for seven projects supporting initial operational capability requirements for fixed wing and rotary aircraft and joint operations:

- Jacksonville, FL: Broad Area Maritime Surveillance Training Facility
- Jacksonville, FL: P-8A Trainer Facility
- Jacksonville, FL: P-8A Hangar Upgrades
- Coronado, CA: MH-60 R/S Maintenance Facility
- Point Mugu, CA: E-2D Aircrew Training Facility
- Patuxent River, MD: Aircraft Prototype Facility, Phase II
- Eglin AFB, FL: EOD Course Applied Instruction Facility

Infrastructure Recapitalization

\$145M for five projects supporting recapitalization efforts on Naval Shipyard maintenance facilities, a forward-deployed water plant, communication facility, and Reserve training facility:

- Norfolk, VA: Controlled Industrial Facility
- Kitsap, WA: Integrated Dry Dock Water Treatment, Phase I
- Pearl Harbor, HI: NIOC Operational Fleet Electronic Support Facility
- Diego Garcia, IO: Potable Water Plant Modernization
- Pittsburgh, PA: Armed Forces Reserve Center (MCNR)

Mr. CULBERSON. Admiral Roughead, thank you very much, sir, for your statement.

And General Amos, we are pleased to recognize you, sir.

General AMOS. Thank you, Chairman Culberson, Ranking Member Bishop, ladies and gentlemen of the committee. It is my honor to appear before you today for the first time as the Commandant of the Marine Corps to articulate what is happening with regards to the needs of our Corps today.

Today the Corps serves as America's expeditionary force in readiness, a balanced air-ground logistics team of 202,000 active, 39,000 reserve, and 35,000 civilian Marines. Our ability to serve as our nation's principle crisis response force is due in large part to this committee and Congress' continued strong support.

Today there are roughly 32,000 Marines who are deployed around the world. As we sit here, 20,000 of our young men and women are engaged in full-spectrum combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Forward deployed and forward engaged, we remain partnered with the United States Navy.

This past year alone our afloat forces conducted humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines. They recaptured the pirated ship, Magellan Star, from its Somali pirates and partnered with allied forces in engagement missions throughout the Pacific, Latin America, Africa, and Eastern Europe.

Right now over 400 Marines from the 1st Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, who deployed last week from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, within 20 hours of notification, are embarked aboard two amphibious ships with a full complement of fixed and rotary wing assets. These Marines are poised in the Mediterranean, prepared to do our nation's bidding.

As you can see, your Corps serves as a versatile middle-weight force, a crisis response force that is comfortable operating at the high and the low ends of the threat spectrum or the ambiguous areas in between.

This year's budget submission was framed by my four service-level priorities: number one, continue to provide the best-trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan; rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future, and aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations; number three, better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments; and number four, keep faith with our Marines, our sailors, and our families.

The Marine Corps maintains a commitment to facilities and infrastructure, supporting both operations and quality of life. Our military construction and family programs are important to success in achieving and sustaining our force structure and maintaining our readiness.

In keeping with our frugal nature, our fiscal year 2012 military construction budget request is \$1.4 billion, an amount half of that asked for in fiscal year 2011. With these requested funds we will provide over 800 new spaces for bachelor enlisted quarters at Quantico and at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

As you know, for many years we have funded only our most critical facility needs. As a result, our installations were challenged to

properly house and operate the additional forces required to meet our end-strength increase.

However, the robust funds we received from Congress since fiscal year 2007 have helped to provide new quality of life facilities to modernize our barracks, some of which were 50 years old, and to get them on par with that of the other services. We are nearing completion of this BEQ Modernization plan and require your continued support to see this priority through to completion.

Our fiscal year 2012 MILCON request also addresses much-needed aviation support facilities to keep pace with our modernization efforts, and improvements to facilities supporting quality of life, utilities, and infrastructure. Additionally, we will use monies for improvements to existing housing units and funding for the operations, maintenance, and leasing of 1,100 units worldwide and oversight of over 22,000 privatized units.

A firm believe that we educate in time of war so that we—excuse me, in time of peace so that we can win in time of war, your Corps is on a path to turn the Marine Corps University, down at Quantico, into a world-class learning institution. We have programmed approximately \$125 million in MILCON between fiscal year 2011 and 2012 for new academic facilities for the Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, the School of Advanced Warfighting, and the expansion of the Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy at our main campus in Quantico, Virginia.

These funds represent a down payment on a larger commitment to double the size of the university campus and to upgrade our enlisted academies worldwide. Detailed documentation of costs associated with this critically noble effort are ongoing; however, we estimate that approximately \$400 million is needed to complete the master plan outlined in our 2006 Officer Professional Military Education study.

We are devoting more resources to our energy investment program than ever before. These funds will be used to install efficient systems and reduce overall energy consumption. Our new facilities will continue to incorporate the latest technology in energy sustainability and in efficiency.

Our nation has been at war for a decade, placing unprecedented burdens on Marines, sailors, families, wounded warriors, and the families of our fallen. They have all made tremendous sacrifices in the face of danger. We expect and demand extraordinary loyalty from our Marines and we owe them that in return.

Our Wounded Warrior Regiment continues to provide nonmedical care management services to wounded, ill, and injured Marines and their families. With the help of this committee we cut the ribbon just this past week on a 100-room wounded warrior bachelor enlisted quarters at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.

This state-of-the-art facility serves as an anchor for two other buildings soon to be completely. Collectively they will become our first ever wounded warrior complex.

We are in the planning stages right now to improve the Marine Corps Transition Assistance Management Program. To that end, we are developing an end-to-end process improvement plan that will begin early in a Marine's career and continue through separation.

We will help Marines navigate the V.A. benefit entitlements, especially as it relates to education benefits. As we gain momentum we will continue to change the transition assistance program to a process that reintegrates Marines into the civilian sector with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to leverage and communicate their Marine Corps time and experience.

Finally, I would like to discuss what impact the current continuing resolution has had on our operations and our programs. As of today, \$567 million in military construction contracts have not been awarded. \$2.4 billion of MILCON is at risk for the remainder of this year.

These projects impact the lives of Marines and the local economies of communities around our bases and stations, given that 63,000 jobs are at stake from the Carolinas to California to Hawaii. If the continuing resolution extends throughout the entire fiscal year, 13 projects, equally 5,000 spaces within our Bachelor Enlisted Quarters Modernization program, will be impacted, an amount that would accommodate eight Marine infantry battalions.

In closing, you have my promise that these challenging times ahead the Marine Corps will only ask for what it needs, not for what it might want. We will make the hard decisions before coming to Congress and we will redouble our efforts towards our traditional culture of frugality.

As has been the case for 235 years, your Marine Corps is ready to respond when the nation calls. Once again, I thank each of you for your continued support and I am prepared to answer your questions.

[Statement of General Amos follows:]


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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

STATEMENT OF
GENERAL JAMES F. AMOS
COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
BEFORE THE
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION
AND
VETERANS AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
ON
THE 2011 POSTURE OF THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
March 10, 2011

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General James F. Amos
Commandant of the Marine Corps



On October 22, 2010 General James F. Amos assumed the duties of Commandant of the Marine Corps. General Amos was born in Wendell, Idaho and is a graduate of the University of Idaho. A Marine Aviator, General Amos has held command at all levels from Lieutenant Colonel to Lieutenant General.

General Amos' command tours have included: Marine Wing Support Squadron 173 from 1985-1986; Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312 - a component of Carrier Air Wing 8 onboard USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) - from 1991-1993; Marine Aircraft Group 31 from 1996-1998; 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing in combat during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM I and II from 2002-2004; II Marine Expeditionary Force from 2004-2006; and Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command and Deputy Commandant, Combat Development and Integration from 2006 to July 2008. Additional operational tours have included Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons 212, 235, 232, and 122.

General Amos' staff assignments have included tours with Marine Aircraft Groups 15 and 31, the III Marine Amphibious Force, Training Squadron Seven, The Basic School, and with the MAGTF Staff Training Program. Additionally, he was assigned to NATO as Deputy Commander, Naval Striking Forces, Southern Europe, Naples Italy where he commanded NATO's Kosovo Verification Center, and later served as Chief of Staff, U.S. Joint Task Force Noble Anvil during the air campaign over Serbia. Transferred in 2000 to the Pentagon, he was assigned as Assistant Deputy Commandant for Aviation. Reassigned in December 2001, General Amos served as the Assistant Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations, Headquarters, Marine Corps. From 2008-2010 General Amos was assigned as the 31st Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps.

General Amos' personal decorations include the Navy Distinguished Service Medal, Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit with Gold Star, Bronze Star, Meritorious Service Medal, Joint Service Commendation Medal, and the Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal.

America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness

The Marine Corps is America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness — a balanced air-ground-logistics team. We are forward-deployed and forward-engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies. We create options and decision space for our Nation's leaders. Alert and ready, we respond to today's crisis, with today's force ... TODAY. Responsive and scalable, we team with other services, allies and interagency partners. We enable and participate in joint and combined operations of any magnitude. A middleweight force, we are light enough to get there quickly, but heavy enough to carry the day upon arrival, and capable of operating independent of local infrastructure. We operate throughout the spectrum of threats — irregular, hybrid, conventional — or the shady areas where they overlap. Marines are ready to respond whenever the Nation calls ... wherever the President may direct.

-General James F. Amos

America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Today, your United States Marine Corps is foremost America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Established originally by an act of the Second Continental Congress on November 10, 1775, your Marine Corps has evolved over 235 years into a balanced air-ground-logistics team that is forward deployed and forward engaged: shaping, training, deterring, and responding to all manner of crises and contingencies.

Through the ongoing support of Congress and the American people, your Marine Corps is a cohesive force of 202,100 Active Duty Marines; 39,600 Selected Reserve Marines; and 35,000 Civilian Marines. At any given time, approximately 30,000 Marines are forward deployed in operations supporting our Nation's defense.¹ This year, as our Nation recognizes a decade since the tragic events of 9/11, your Marine Corps has been conducting Overseas Contingency Operations for an equal amount of time. From Task Force 58 with 4,400 Marines launching from six amphibious ships to secure critical lodgments in Afghanistan in late 2001 to our counterinsurgency efforts in the Al Anbar province of Iraq and to our current operations in the Helmand River Valley of Afghanistan, your Marines have been forward deployed in the service of our Nation.

Yet, during this time the Marine Corps has not been confined solely to major combat operations and campaigns. From our rapid response aiding fellow Americans and enabling joint and interagency relief efforts following Hurricane Katrina's floods, to our non-combatant evacuation operation of 14,000 American citizens from Lebanon in 2006, to our numerous and ongoing security cooperation missions with nations of Africa, Eastern Europe, the Pacific Rim, and Latin America, the United States Marine Corps continues to demonstrate the agility and flexibility expected of America's principal crisis response force. Over the course of the past year alone, your brave men and women who wear the Marine uniform and who bring a diversity of talent in service to our Nation, have simultaneously:

- Waged an aggressive full-spectrum counterinsurgency operation in Afghanistan while concurrently increasing combat power nearly two-fold (i.e. from 10,600 to 19,400) in accordance with the President's December 2009 Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy;

¹As of December 2010, there were approximately 20,700 Marines in Afghanistan including Marines serving in external billets (e.g. transition teams and joint/interagency support, etc.); 6,200 at sea on Marine Expeditionary Units; and 1,600 Marines engaged in various other missions, operations and exercises. The 30,000 statistic excludes over 18,000 Marines assigned to garrison locations outside the continental United States such as in Europe, the Pacific, etc.

- Successfully completed our mission in Iraq, bringing stability to Al Anbar province. This achievement was not without sacrifice and suffering in that 1,022² Marines gave their lives and 8,626 Marines were wounded in action;
- Partnered with allied forces in engagement missions throughout every Geographic Combatant Commander's Area of Responsibility;
- Conducted foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines;
- Participated in maritime security operations to ensure freedom of navigation along vital sea lines of communication, to include the recapture of the vessel *Magellan Star* and rescue of its crew from Somali pirates; and
- Rapidly reinforced U.S. Embassies in Port au Prince, Haiti; Conakry, Guinea; Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan; and most recently Cairo, Egypt to assist and protect diplomatic personnel amidst crises in these foreign capitals.

Their actions align with the functions of our Corps as seen in the new Department of Defense Directive 5100.01, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, and are a critical link to the continued prosperity and security of our Nation and the survival of our friends, allies and partners. The performance of your Marines on the global stage adds to our storied legacy of sacrifice and success — under even the most adverse conditions — inspiring a sense of pride and confidence in the American public that their Marines are able to respond quickly, ensuring the Nation's interests will be protected.

Future Security Environment. Public law, defense policy, our doctrine and operating concepts, and the future security environment shape how we organize, train, and equip our forces. As we look ahead, we see a world of increasing instability, failed or failing states, and conflict characterized by:

- Poverty, unemployment, urbanization, overpopulation, and extremism;
- Competition for scarce natural resources; and
- Rapid proliferation of new technologies to include capabilities to disrupt cyber networks, advanced precision weaponry, and weapons of mass destruction.

These troubling socio-economic and geopolitical trends converge in the littorals — regions along the world's coastline where the sea joins with the land. The majority of the world's population lives near the sea. The trend towards accelerated birth rates in the developing world, coupled with ongoing migration from rural to urban landscapes, results in hyper-populated coastal regions, burdened by the cumulative stressors of criminality, extremism, and violence.

Littoral cities increasingly may assume what some have called feral qualities, raising the potential for conflict, providing a measure of sanctuary for our adversaries, and posing challenges to governmental sovereignty and regional security. It is in this complex environment that your United States Marine Corps will operate. We stand optimally postured to conduct a

² 1022 deaths = 851 killed in action (hostile) and 171 deceased (non-hostile).

range of operations for Joint Force commanders, bridging the gap between operations at sea and on land.

Nonetheless, we are committed to the prevention of conflict as we are to responding to it. Indeed, 21st Century security challenges require expansion of global engagement — facilitated through persistent forward naval presence — to promote collective approaches to addressing common security concerns. Accordingly, forward deployed Marine forces will increasingly conduct theater security cooperation activities and will build partnership capacity through security force assistance missions with our allies and partners around the globe. The goal of our engagement initiatives is to minimize conditions for conflict and enable host nation forces to effectively address instability as it occurs.

Role of the Marine Corps. The United States is a maritime nation with global responsibilities. With a naval tradition as the foundation of our existence, we remain firmly partnered with the U.S. Navy. Forward deployed, we retain the ability to come from the sea rapidly to conduct missions across the range of military operations. Our persistent forward presence and multi-mission capability present an unparalleled ability to rapidly project U.S. power across the global commons — land, sea, air, space, and cyber.

Amphibious forces with robust and organic logistical sustainment provide a maritime Super Power significant advantages, including the ability to overcome the tyranny of distance and to project power where there is no basing or infrastructure — a strong deterrent capability for our Nation. To Marines, ‘expeditionary’ is a state of mind that drives the way we organize our forces, train, develop and procure equipment. By definition, our role as America’s crisis response force necessitates a high state of unit readiness and an ability to sustain ourselves logistically. We must be ready to deploy today and begin operating upon arrival, even in the most austere environments. The United States Marine Corps affords the following three strategic advantages for our Nation:

- **A versatile “middleweight” capability to respond across the range of military operations.** We fill the gap in our Nation’s defense as an agile force capable of operating at the high and low ends of the threat spectrum or the indistinct areas in between.
- **An inherent speed and agility that buys time for National leaders.** Our flexibility and rapid response capability present unique opportunities to develop strategic options, shape the environment, and set conditions to deploy the full capabilities of the Joint Force and other elements of National power.
- **An enabling and partnering capability in joint and combined operations.** Our unique forward posture aboard amphibious ships, manned by well trained, uniformed sailors, positions us to be the ‘first to fight.’

USMC Priorities. My four service level priorities informed this year’s budget submission. These priorities were influenced by and derived from a number of factors to include our understanding of the 21st Century battlefield based on lessons learned over nearly a decade at war, our examination of the future security environment, our doctrine and operating concepts, and our current and future budgetary and programmatic requirements.

These priorities are aligned with the principal recommendations of the *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review*, meeting its end state of ensuring that the Marine Corps is able to “prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and preserve and enhance the All-Volunteer Force.” My priorities also support America’s four enduring strategic interests as identified in the *2010 National Security Strategy*.³ To that end, we will:

- *Continue to provide the best trained and equipped Marine units to Afghanistan;*
- *Rebalance our Corps, posture it for the future, and aggressively experiment with and implement new capabilities and organizations;*
- *Better educate and train our Marines to succeed in distributed operations and increasingly complex environments; and*
- *Keep faith with our Marines, our Sailors and our families.*

The above priorities guide my long-term plan for the Marine Corps; however, there are pressing issues facing our Corps today that give cause for concern.

- **Equipment:** Our equipment abroad and at home station has been “heavily taxed” in the nearly 10 years of constant combat operations. We require funding to reset equipment being utilized overseas and to reconstitute home-station equipment and modernize for the future. This is critical to maintaining readiness throughout the Corps.
- **The Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing F-35B Joint Strike Fighter:** The F-35B is vital to our ability to conduct combined arms operations in expeditionary environments. Continued funding and support from Congress for this program is of utmost importance.
- **Amphibious Combat Vehicle:** We will begin the development of an affordable and capable amphibious combat vehicle to replace the recently-cancelled Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. The capability inherent in a ship-to-shore connector is critical to our expeditionary nature, as affirmed by the Secretary of Defense.
- **End Strength:** The drawdown of our active component from 202,100 to 186,800 must be conditions-based, and only after completion of our mission in Afghanistan. We must keep faith with our Marine Corps family by allowing appropriate time and support for those departing the force and to ensure the resiliency of our units still engaged in war.
- **Family Readiness Programs:** Like our equipment, Marines and their families have been “heavily taxed” since 9/11. We will continue to fund family readiness and family support programs that are vital to the health and welfare of our entire Marine Corps family.
- **Amphibious Ships:** The Navy and Marine Corps have determined a minimum force of 33 ships represents the limit of acceptable risk in meeting the 38-ship amphibious force

³ 1) Security of the United States, its citizens, and U.S. allies and partners 2) A strong, innovative, and growing U.S. economy in an open international economic system that promotes opportunity and prosperity 3) respect for universal values at home and around the world 4) and an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through stronger cooperation to meet global challenges. *2010 National Security Strategy* Pg. 7.

requirement for the Assault Echelon. Marines are best postured to engage and respond to the Nation's security interests from amphibious ships.

The Marine Corps needs the continued support of Congress in confronting these critical issues and the many others discussed below. My promise to Congress is that we will do our part by continuing to be good stewards of our taxpayers' dollars.

FY 2012 Budgetary Submission. The Marine Corps maintains a longstanding tradition in the Department of Defense as being "Penny Pinchers." *A prime example of our many noteworthy cost-saving measures is our practice of units deploying to Afghanistan utilizing equipment sets maintained and repaired in country — a measure saving significant funds annually on costs associated with the cycle of deployment and redeployment.* Our institutionalized culture of frugality, streamlined business practices, lean structure, and multi-mission capability, position us as the "best value" for the defense dollar. This fiscal year we are seeking over \$40 billion⁴ to fund ongoing operations, provide quality resources for our Marines, Sailors and their families, conduct reset of equipment stressed from nearly ten years at war, and prepare our forces for future missions. *For approximately 8.5%⁵ of the annual Defense budget, the Marine Corps provides the Nation approximately 31% of its ground operating forces (Combat, Combat Support and Combat Service Support), 12% of its fixed wing tactical aircraft, and 19% of its attack helicopters.*

During these times of constrained resources, the Marine Corps remains committed to streamlining operations, identifying efficiencies, and reinvesting savings to conserve scarce public funds. At the direction of the Secretary of Defense in June 2010, the services conducted an efficiencies review and our FY12 budget is the result of a thorough study of all of our business activities. Already one of the most economical of the military services, we achieved our DoD efficiency goal. We captured overhead efficiency savings by focusing on three main efforts:

- Buying smarter through acquiring platforms more intelligently
- Streamlining our operations
- Being more efficient in the way we use, produce, and acquire energy

This effort has had a marked impact on our overall budget, allowing us to invest more in our core warfighting missions and enhancing our acquisition plans. The efficiency initiative drove adjustments to our programs and ensured restoration of funding in areas where needed most. Additionally, we used funds realized from efficiencies to support programs originally not funded. We re-invested savings into critical war fighting programs to enhance readiness. We anticipate unit equipment readiness to increase by FY14 through the purchase of additional equipment beginning in FY12. This readiness increase will allow the Marine Corps to equip, train, and prepare units earlier in the pre-deployment cycle. Other expansions that we were able to address include enhancing funding for facilities with direct operational impact, energy and water

⁴ This sum includes both "Blue in Support of Green" funding, Overseas Contingency Operation funding, and other Navy funding for USMC needs (e.g. chaplains, medical personnel, amphibious ships, etc)

⁵ Based on provisions of the FY10 National Defense Authorization and Appropriation Acts.

investments at bases and installations, command and control and logistics programs, and equipment modernization.

In addition to our frugality and aggressive pursuit of finding efficiencies to enhance our warfighting capacity inherent in our budget request, your Marine Corps remains the first and only military service whose financial statements have been deemed audit ready. We are continually striving to be good stewards of the public trust and know the on-going financial audit will serve to both strengthen our financial management practices and give us actionable business intelligence to support our decision-making process in supporting our operational forces at home, abroad and in harm's way.

Priority # 1: Continue to Provide the Best Trained and Equipped Units to Afghanistan

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. We have made great progress in Afghanistan; this effort remains our number one priority until we attain our National objectives. At present over 20,000 Marines are deployed in Afghanistan. This mission ultimately involves almost 60,000 Marines, or just under one-third of our active duty force, factoring in deployment, redeployment, training cycles and other direct support. We will continue providing forces in Afghanistan capable of full-spectrum combat and counterinsurgency operations, while balancing our capabilities to perform what the Nation will likely ask of us in the future. We will ensure that Marines, Sailors, and the units in which they serve, receive the best possible training and equipment to succeed in the many types of missions we are conducting in this complex, dynamic environment.

Our successes within Helmand Province are paving the way for economic development and governance. Marine commanders on the ground and Afghan officials indicate that freedom of movement for the local populace has improved. Bazaars and markets are flourishing; critical infrastructure projects are underway. Today, 10 of 13 districts in Helmand Province are under the control of the Afghan central government. Daily, 135,000 children attend school, which is more than a 60 percent increase from 2008 levels. Formerly dangerous places like Marjah, Now Zad, and Garmsir, un-trafficable due to improvised explosive devices just one year ago, now have significant activity occurring in commercial centers. Yet, other challenges remain as we now seek to capitalize on our 2010 successes. We are currently expanding battle-space northward into other hostile locations such as the district of Sangin, where our forces are going “head-to-head” with Taliban resistance.

As America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we are ready to execute any mission assigned in support of crisis and contingency response. In addition to our Afghanistan commitment, we continue to source forward-based and deployed forces to meet Geographic Combatant Commander requirements. In light of our operational demands, and through the support of Congress in authorizing our end strength of 202,100 active duty forces, our combat units are beginning to realize an approximate 1:2 dwell time.⁶ Other units vary at more favorable dwell time levels depending on their mission. We anticipate the 1:2 dwell ratio for combat units to remain relatively stable provided current deployed force levels are not increased; however, increased operational demands in Afghanistan or elsewhere may result in dwell times inconsistent with fostering a resilient Total Force.

Some Marines in select military occupational specialties continue to fall into what is known as a high-demand, low-density status. This is a key indicator that the combat demand for Marines with these skills does not match, or exceeds, the current manpower requirement and/or inventory. In addition, there are currently 14 of 211 occupational specialties where the on-hand number of Marines is less than 90 percent of what is required.⁷ Our recently completed force structure review addressed all these concerns. We are working actively to recruit, promote, and retain the

⁶ Infantry battalions will continue to remain just below 1:2 dwell time due to relief in place/transfer of authority requirements.

⁷ Our most stressed occupational specialties based on percentage of Marines beyond a 1:2 dwell are 1) Geographic Intelligence Specialist, 2) Imaging Analyst/Specialists, 3) Signals Collection Operator/Analyst, 4) Unmanned Aerial Systems Operator/Mechanic, and 5) European, Middle East, and Asia-Pacific Cryptologic Linguists.

right number of Marines in the right occupational specialties thus promoting resiliency of our Total Force.

Training for Full Spectrum Counter-Insurgency Operations. Our comprehensive training program conducted at our premiere desert training base in Twentynine Palms, CA, has been credited by leaders throughout the Corps with providing a dynamic environment that replicates the many tasks, challenges, and requirements required of units in a counterinsurgency setting. Our newly-instituted Infantry Immersion Trainers are realistic, reconfigurable, and provide comprehensive training environments that develop small unit tactics and individual skills for deploying infantry squads. The Infantry Immersion Trainer supports essential training such as control of supporting arms, language, improvised explosive device recognition and defeat measures, human terrain understanding and close quarters battle. Introducing battlefield effects simulators, culturally appropriate role players, and interactive avatars at the Infantry Immersion Trainers teaches Marines to make legally, morally, ethically, and tactically sound decisions under situations of great stress. It also contributes to reducing the effects of combat stress. I view this training program to be of vital importance to our Operating Forces.

Equipping for the Afghan Effort. Marine units are operating in Afghanistan with high rates of ground equipment readiness. Through the generosity of Congress, we have received funds for the rapid fielding of urgent need items in support of our Afghanistan effort. The Mine Resistant Armor Vehicle Program continues to meet urgent requirements while we actively pursue vehicle upgrades to outpace emerging threats, enhance mobility, and improve vehicle performance. We can accomplish this goal through engineering changes and capability insertions in current production, planned orders, and fielded vehicles. We have a requirement for 3,362 vehicles in the family of Mine Resistant Armor Protected vehicles, including 1,454 Mine Resistant Armor Protected All Terrain Vehicles. To date, we have fielded 1,214 Mine Resistant Armor Protected All Terrain Vehicles to our units in Afghanistan and have met the theater requirement.

To date, we have fielded 34 Assault Breacher Vehicles, five of which are in Afghanistan, to enhance the mobility of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF). We plan to field a total of 52 Assault Breacher Vehicles. Production of the remaining eighteen vehicles remains on schedule and is fully funded with final delivery scheduled for the second quarter of FY12.

In our continuing efforts to find improvised explosive devices by all possible means, we are tripling our successful Improvised Explosive Device Dog Detection program and are also undertaking a research and development effort to train dogs with improved detection capabilities with fielding expected this fall. This year, we will have fielded 647 specially trained Labrador Retrievers who work off-leash, supporting our infantry units in ground combat operations. We also have fielded a wide array of intelligence collection sensors and analytic and processing systems to include the Multimedia Archival Analysis System, the Ground Based Observational Surveillance System, the Tactical Remote Sensor System, the Communication Emitter Sensing and Attacking System, and improvements to the Tactical Exploitation Group, to name a few.

Lastly, in December 2010, we deployed a reinforced company of 17 M1A1 Main Battle Tanks to join our efforts in Regional Command SouthWest to provide increased force protection and firepower. Today, these tanks are fully integrated with our forces operating in our most

highly-contested regions, and are rapidly proving their utility in this environment by enabling our Marines to increase operational tempo. They also demonstrate the commitment of Coalition Forces to the security of Southern Afghanistan.

Priority # 2 Rebalance the Corps, Posture for the Future, and Aggressively Experiment with and Implement New Capabilities and Organizations

Posture for the Future and Force Structure Review. The Marine Corps has deployed MAGTFs in support of irregular warfare missions such as our counterinsurgency effort in Afghanistan, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts in Pakistan, Haiti, and the Philippines, and engagement missions such as our theater security cooperation exercises in support of every Geographic Combatant Commander.

Despite these and many other operational successes over the past decade, new challenges await us requiring the same spirit of innovation and institutional flexibility that have been the bedrock of our Corps for 235 years. The *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review* highlights an expanding need over the next two decades for military forces skilled at countering irregular threats,⁸ and the *2010 National Security Strategy* signals a need for increased engagement activities. Both of these thrusts necessitate Marines who are not only fighters, but also trainers, mentors, and advisors. The *2011 National Military Strategy* advances the idea that “strengthening international and regional security requires that our forces be globally available, yet regionally focused.”⁹ Likewise, Geographic Combatant Commanders have continued to register their growing need for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis response.¹⁰

This past fall, we conducted a detailed force structure review to develop the optimum mix of capabilities for our role as America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness in the post-Afghanistan security environment. The force structure review addressed 21st Century challenges confronting our Nation and its Marine Corps, aiming to build on our historic role as the Nation’s crisis response force. The review sought to provide the “best value” in terms of capability, cost, and readiness relative to the operational requirements of our forward-engaged Geographic Combatant Commanders. The results of that effort provide for a strategically mobile, “middleweight” force optimized for forward-presence and rapid crisis response. We will be light enough to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious ships, yet heavy enough to accomplish the mission when we get there. Sea-based forces, in particular, will be invaluable for discreet engagement activities, rapid crisis response, and sustainable power projection.

Our review also aimed for a force structure that provides capability and capacity across the range of military operations, while simultaneously providing for resiliency in our Total Force. With likely reductions in forward basing and strategic transportation, the importance of regionally-focused headquarters and forces, both forward-postured and immediately deployable with a minimum of strategic lift, is paramount. We have thus built a Joint Task Force capable headquarters at several Geographic Combatant Command locations. *As we aim to implement signature outcomes of the force structure review, Marines on a day-to-day basis will be forward-deployed and engaged, working closely with our joint and allied partners. When crises or*

⁸ “The wars we are fighting today and assessments of the future security environment together demand that the United States retain and enhance a whole-of-government capability to succeed in large-scale counterinsurgency, stability, and counterterrorism operations in environments ranging from densely populated urban areas and mega-cities, to remote mountains, deserts, jungles, and littoral regions.” *2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, Pg 20.

⁹ *2011 National Military Strategy of the United States*, pg 10.

¹⁰ In the past 20 years, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises and contingencies 114 times — a response rate double that during the Cold War.

contingencies arise, these same Marines will respond — locally, regionally, or globally if necessary — to accomplish whatever mission the Nation asks of us.

To best meet Geographic Combatant Commander needs and ensure optimal configuration as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness, we require Congressional support to reset our equipment, develop new organizational structures, and begin implementing initiatives from our force structure review. These measures ultimately will improve our ability to function within the Joint Force, execute distributed operations, command and control in complex environments, and conduct persistent engagement missions. *As we are entrusted with the resources and funding to posture ourselves for the future, we will continue to conduct responsible examination required of a disciplined force to ensure that we implement every refinement — from the smallest to the most sweeping — in a manner that provides the Nation with a lean force, capable of rapidly projecting the Nation's power and strategic influence.*

EQUIPPING

Reset of the Total Force. Resetting the Marine Corps for the future after nearly a decade at war is my number one equipping priority. This past year, we completed our mission in Iraq, effecting the retrograde of more than 25,000 Marines,¹¹ 382,000 items of equipment, 10,800 short tons of aviation support equipment, and nearly 11,000 containers from Al Anbar province via Jordan and Kuwait to the U.S. and elsewhere. This drawdown of equipment over the course of one year was a significant logistical and operational achievement. We also accomplished the rapid shift of critical equipment from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the deployment of the 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade. This shift of materiel within a theater of operation became one of the largest redeployments in U.S. history, both in terms of equipment moved and distances involved.

The Marine Corps is currently sourcing highly-trained and ready forces to meet global combatant commander requirements.

- *Approximately 98% of deployed units report the highest levels of readiness for their assigned mission.*

However, high deployed-unit readiness has come at the expense of home-station, non-deployed units, which have sourced organic equipment and personnel to meet the needs of our deployed forces.

- *Approximately 68% of non-deployed units report degraded levels of readiness. The largest contributing factor is equipment; approximately 37% of non-deployed forces report degraded levels of equipment supply. This lack of equipment impacts the ability of non-deployed forces to respond rapidly to other potential contingencies and represents lost core training opportunities early in the deployment cycle in preparation for Overseas Contingency Operations.*

The equipment redeployed from Iraq to Afghanistan in support of the 2009 surge included most of our deployed medium tactical fleet, the majority of our fleet of Mine Resistant Armor Protected vehicles, light armored reconnaissance vehicles, other hard-to-move equipment, and

¹¹ At present, approximately 100 Marines remain in Iraq serving in individual augment, transition team and other miscellaneous billets.

theater-specific items. While shifting this equipment directly to Afghanistan enabled the Marine Corps to meet critical operational timelines, it resulted in the deferment of previously-planned post-Operation Iraqi Freedom reset actions. These same assets comprise a significant portion of the Marine Corps' total reset liability and depot maintenance costs. Thus, a consequence of delaying reset actions on this equipment is the acceptance of considerable risk in the long-term readiness and future availability of our ground equipment. In addition, increased usage rates of our ground equipment and harsh operating environments over these many years at war have resulted in our ground equipment far exceeding planned peacetime usage rates by a factor of six.

It is vital that we reset our equipment from nearly 10 years at war to maintain the necessary levels of readiness to posture ourselves for the future.

- *We estimate the cost of reset for the Marine Corps to be \$10.6 billion. \$3.1 billion has been requested in FY-11 to reduce this liability, leaving a \$7.5 billion deficit. \$5 billion of the \$7.5 billion reset liability will be incurred upon termination of the conflict in Afghanistan. (Note: \$2.5 billion has been requested for reset in FY12. These estimates assume no reset generation beyond FY12 and thus do not include any reset requirements for FY13 and FY14.)*

This funding will support the depot-level maintenance of our Operation Enduring Freedom equipment, procurement of combat vehicles and major weapons systems, engineering equipment, ammunition expenditures, and combat losses. The reset estimate is based on current circumstances and will change as operational requirements are re-evaluated. Moreover, as long as the war continues, our costs for reset will grow accordingly.

Reconstitution of Equipment. Our experiences in combat operations over the past decade have shown us that our legacy 20th Century tables of equipment are inadequate with regard to the demands of the modern battlefield. As we move towards finalizing our force structure review by conducting a thorough Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel, and Facilities assessment, we will finalize determination on the costs associated with modernization of equipment sets necessary to support our future operations.

- *However, at this time, our initial estimate of reconstituting our tables of equipment is \$5 billion, which is an amount entirely separate from our reset costs. We have begun to address our reconstitution shortfall by requesting \$253 million in FY12 for equipment procurement.*

As our force structure review is implemented, we will continue with deliberate assessments of the modernization requirements for equipment that optimizes our post-Afghanistan posture while simultaneously reinforcing our frugal and responsible roots. Our Service Reconstitution Equipment Strategy will guide the identification of emerging requirements for refining the capabilities of our status as a middleweight force, our support to the Geographic Combatant Commanders, our service level prioritization, and resource allocation.

Marine Aviation. We are transitioning our entire inventory of fixed and rotary wing aircraft to support our future force and require ongoing support from Congress for this comprehensive aviation modernization effort. The continued development and fielding of the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B Joint Strike Fighter remains the centerpiece of this effort. The capability inherent in a STOVL jet facilitates our maneuver warfare doctrine and fills our need

for close air support in the many austere conditions and locations where we will likely operate in the future. Around the world, there are 10 times as many 3,000-foot runways capable of handling a STOVL jet as there are 8,000-foot runways required of conventional fighter aircraft. Additionally, we maintain the organic ability to build an expeditionary 3,000-foot runway in a matter of days in support of aviation operations. The capabilities of the STOVL F-35B enable the Marine Corps to replace three legacy aircraft types — F/A-18, EA-6B, and AV-8B — which once fielded will save the Department of Defense approximately \$1 billion per year in operations and maintenance costs. *The F-35B program has made significant progress to date including 22 successful vertical landings so far this year which is more than double that achieved all last year. I am confident that we will field this aircraft in accordance with responsible timelines. This matter has my unwavering attention, and I am personally overseeing this program. With a fully-fielded fleet of F-35Bs, the Nation will maintain 22 capital ships — 11 carrier and 11 amphibious assault — with fifth generation strike assets aboard — a significant deterrent and response capability for our Nation.*

Our legacy aircraft supporting operational missions are consuming service life at a rate up to three times faster than scheduled. Averaged across our complete fleet, we are consuming aircraft service life at a rate 1.85 times faster than planned. This reality results in compressed timelines between re-work events and in earlier retirement of aircraft than originally programmed. The majority of our legacy platforms are nearing the end of their service lives, and most production lines are closed. New aircraft with low average ages and robust service life projections are the future of our aviation force and its support of Marine Corps and joint operations. As we transition to these new capabilities, we are mindful of the need to ensure a fully-integrated and networked force to provide Marine aviation to the MAGTF and the Joint Force.

We are exploring the viability of transformational platforms such as the Cargo Unmanned Aircraft System. The Cargo UAS will facilitate the delivery of logistics to remote locations when weather or threat systems preclude manned aviation sorties or overland resupply convoys.

Our new aircraft will provide increased range, speed, standoff, time on station, lift capability, and will be critical to tomorrow's MAGTF. By 2020, we will transition more than 50 percent of our aviation squadrons to new aircraft and complete fielding of the tilt-rotor MV-22 Osprey assault support aircraft and the upgraded UH-1Y Huey utility helicopter. We will field new close air support platforms such as the AH-1Z attack helicopter and the STOVL F-35B. We also will have new platforms for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and an entirely new family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Lastly, we will introduce greater lifting power to the MAGTF with a new model of the heavy-lift CH-53 cargo helicopter.

Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy. The priority for our Ground Combat Element is our ship to shore tactical mobility. The seamless transition of our Operating Forces from the sea to conduct sustained operations ashore, in particular to support three balanced Marine Expeditionary Brigades (i.e. two sea-based Joint Forcible Entry Marine Expeditionary Brigades reinforced by a third Maritime Prepositioning Force-based Marine Expeditionary Brigade) as well as for conducting irregular warfare missions, necessitates an appropriate mix of ground combat vehicles. We are focusing our efforts on developing and fielding a family of vehicles with a balance of performance, protection, payload, transportability, fuel efficiency, and affordability that supports the rapid concentration and dispersion of combat power, supports strategic deployment concepts and meets our world-wide operational commitments.

Our Ground Combat and Tactical Vehicle Strategy is currently in its third phase of development. Its overall goal is to field a ground combat vehicle portfolio structured to support the ground combat element. Vehicles in this portfolio include the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Marine Personnel Carrier, and a new amphibious combat vehicle.

In the complex future security environment, the execution of amphibious operations requires the use of the sea as maneuver space. An amphibious combat vehicle is essential to our ability to conduct surface littoral maneuver and seamlessly project ready-to-fight Marine units from sea to land in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. As the Secretary of Defense affirmed earlier this year, the cancellation of the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle is by no means a rejection of the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission.

The standing, validated requirement for, and development of, an amphibious combat vehicle will ensure we continue to develop the right platform — at the right price — to support rapid ship to shore movement. To that end, we are now pursuing an integrated new vehicle program with three components, crafted from inception for affordability and leveraging the investment made in the EFV. We intend to mitigate risks associated with a new vehicle program and to maximize value by use of an integrated acquisition portfolio approach. This approach will have three synchronized efforts:

- Acceleration of the procurement of Marine Personnel Carriers
- Investment in a service life extension program and upgrades for a portion of the existing amphibious assault vehicles
- Development of a new amphibious combat vehicle

We intend to manage these complementary capabilities, requirements and acquisitions from a portfolio perspective.

NAVY SUPPORT

The Navy Marine Corps Team. As part of the Joint Force, the Marine Corps and the Navy partner to leverage the significant advantages provided by amphibious forces — a point reinforced by joint doctrine.¹² The Navy and Marine Corps team will be postured and engaged forward to be most operationally relevant to the needs of our Nation. Together, we provide the capability for massing potent forces close to a foreign shore while maintain a diplomatically sensitive profile. And, when needed, we are able to project this power ashore across the range of military operations at a time of our Nation's choosing, collectively demonstrating the essence of naval deterrence.

¹² "Timely response to crisis situations is critical to U.S. deterrent and warfighting capabilities. The timeliness of U.S. response is a function of U.S. forward deployed forces and prepositioned forces with adequate organic movement capability...." Joint Publication 3-35, *Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations*, 7 May 2007, pg 1-8.

Amphibious Shipping. The Marine Corps' requirement to deploy globally, rapidly respond regionally, and train locally necessitates a combination of tactical airlift, high-speed vessels, amphibious ships, maritime preposition shipping, organic tactical aviation, and strategic airlift. The inherent flexibility and utility of amphibious ships is not widely understood, as evidenced by the frequent — and erroneous — assumption that “forcible entry capabilities” alone define the requirement for amphibious ships. *The same capabilities that allow an amphibious task force to deliver and support a landing force on a hostile shore enables it to support forward engagement and crisis response. In fact the most frequent employment of amphibious forces is for steady state engagement and crisis response.* The Geographic Combatant Commanders have increased demand for forward-postured amphibious forces capable of conducting security cooperation, regional deterrence, and crisis response reflecting the operational value of amphibious forces for missions across the range of military operations.¹³ In an era of declining access and strategic uncertainty, I anticipate that this upward demand trend will continue.

Our principal contribution to U.S. Global Defense Posture is our “rotationally responsive” forces aboard amphibious ships. These forces combine the advantages of an immediate, yet temporary, presence, graduated visibility, and tailored, scalable force packages structured around the MAGTF. Rotational Amphibious Ready Groups/Marine Expeditionary Units forward deployed in three Geographic Combatant Command areas of responsibility, not only provide the capability for crisis response, but also present a means for day-to-day engagement with partner nations. Rotational forces also offer additional flexibility for decision makers in the event that forces are required to rapidly re-deploy across divergent regions and conflicts.

In January 2009, the Navy and Marine Corps agreed that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade lift is 38 total amphibious assault ships. In light of the fiscal constraints, the Department of the Navy agreed to sustain a minimum of 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This number gives a capability needed for steady state operations and represents the minimum number of ships needed to provide the Nation with a sea based power projection capability for full spectrum amphibious operations — including the amphibious assault echelon of two Marine Expeditionary Brigades.

The Marine Corps is committed to the spiral development of the America Class LHA (R), which is 27 percent complete. We expect the Navy to take delivery of LHA-6 in FY14 with availability to deploy beginning in FY17. In terms of LHA-7, we anticipate the contract award in late FY11 with fabrication commencing the following year. *These two ships are maximized for aviation, and I believe it is essential that a well-deck be reintroduced in LHA-8 as currently planned.* The ongoing procurement and commissioning of the final two of our planned eleven San Antonio Class LPD-17 “Common Hull Forms” is critical to providing the lift capacities and operational capabilities to support the full range of military operations up to and including forcible entry.

Maritime Prepositioning Assets. The Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) program exists to enable the rapid deployment and engagement of a Marine Air Ground Task Force anywhere in the world in support of our National Military Strategy. The current MPF force, which has been employed 55 times since 1985, is composed of a fleet of 16 ships divided into three Maritime Pre-Positioning Ships Squadrons located in the Mediterranean Sea, Indian Ocean (Diego Garcia),

¹³ Since 9/11 U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises and contingencies at least fifty times, a response rate more than double that of the Cold War.

and Pacific Ocean (Guam and Saipan). With the restructure of the Maritime Prepositioning Force-Future, the Marine Corps and Navy have focused on an interim solution to enhance current MPF with three new ships to enable future sea-basing concepts. The addition of three Mobile Landing Platforms (MLP) and three T-AKE auxiliary dry cargo ships to the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons, coupled with existing Large, Medium-Speed, Roll-On, Roll-Off (LMSR) cargo ships, will enable the MPS squadrons to conduct at-sea, sea-state three, selective offload of vehicles, personnel, and equipment without complete reliance on fixed ports ashore. The introduction of MLPs, T-AKEs, and LMSRs provide the Navy and Marine Corps team a substantial step in enhancing our current sea-basing capabilities.

The Department of the Navy is currently funding the full MPF program of 16 ships through FY12; however, the DoN POM-13 places one Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (six ships) in a Reduced Operational Status beginning in FY13. We will continue to optimize the MPF program to remain responsive and relevant to Geographic Combatant Commander requirements.

Naval Surface Fire Support. The Marine Corps has an enduring requirement for fire support from naval vessels in the range of 41-63 nautical miles to support amphibious operations in the littorals. These fires are needed by tactical commanders to maneuver towards battlefield objectives once ashore, contributing to joint doctrine for assured access. They serve as a component of the balanced and complementary joint triad of fires. Yet, unlike tactical aviation and ground fire systems, naval surface fires are unique and vital for their volume, lethality, accuracy and all-weather capability.

Planned reductions in the procurement of certain naval ships along with cancellation of specific weapons programs over the past few years have led to a deficiency in systems available for naval surface fires. Completed in 2009, the Joint Expeditionary Fires Analysis of Alternatives identified the optimum U.S. Navy programs to support Marine Corps naval surface fire support requirements. This study established the baseline capabilities of the current naval surface fire support program of record (13nm projectile of the 5-inch gun and the Advance Gun System of the DDG-1000) to be insufficient in mitigating fire support gaps. The study determined that extended range 5-inch munitions would serve as a complementary alternative to the three DDG 1000s. Dramatic improvements in 5-inch projectiles can extend the naval surface fire support maximum range, across the 106 guns in the surface fleet, from 13 to 52 nautical miles with precision, high angle attack for use in operations in urban terrain, and potential effectiveness against moving targets. We also support ongoing research and development of transformational technologies like the Electro-Magnetic Rail Gun with its potential to revolutionize the reach, coverage, and responsiveness of ship-based naval gunfire to ranges in excess of 200 nautical miles.

Assured Access. We remain vigilant of burgeoning anti-access/area denial threats proliferating around the globe, particularly in the Pacific Rim. The family of guided rockets, artillery, mortars, missiles and subsurface systems like mines and quiet submarines, pose a challenge to the power projection capability of seaborne expeditionary forces and threatens DoD's ability to prevent and deter conflicts and prepare for a wide range of contingencies.

Marine Air Ground Task Forces ashore and aboard amphibious shipping will support operations to ensure the freedom of action of U.S. and Allied forces by establishing expeditionary bases and airfields or defending advance bases. Marine Short Take-off and Vertical Landing aviation assets will be of particular value in overcoming adversary anti-access and area denial capabilities

since they can operate from short or degraded airfields, can be rapidly dispersed, and can utilize both large carriers and amphibious ships for attack, maintenance, force protection, and dispersal purposes. The Joint Force Commander can leverage these unique capabilities to ensure the sea control necessary for the conduct of subsequent joint operations, whether they be power projection, forcible entry, or freedom of navigation.

In this regard, we are partnered with the joint community to develop an overarching concept to attain operational access. This year, we will employ our war-gaming capability in Expeditionary Warrior 2011 to examine operations designed to overcome anti-access challenges. We are partners with the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Air Force in the development of the Air-Sea Battle Concept aimed at integrating capabilities to defeat these advanced weapon systems in maritime areas of strategic interest. We also continue to participate in the U.S. Army's Joint Forcible Entry Warfighting Experiment, examining capabilities to conduct airborne and amphibious forcible entry operations.

PERSONNEL & ORGANIZATIONAL INITIATIVES

People. Today's Marine Corps represents less than 1/10 of 1 percent of the US population, and the individual Marine remains our most valuable asset. Our 202,100 Active Duty and 39,600 Selected Reserve end strength allow us to meet current operational commitments while promoting resiliency throughout our Total Force. In FY10 Marine Corps Recruiting Command accessed 1,703 officers (100.18 percent of the 1,700 officer goal). Our FY11 accession mission is 1,650 active duty officer accessions with the same goal projected in FY12. In terms of enlisted accessions, we are exceeding our internal quality standards of 95 percent enlisted recruits entering the Marine Corps possessing a high school diploma and 63 percent qualifying in the DoD I-III mental group categories (DoD quality standards are 90 percent and 60 percent respectively). We will achieve our mission of 31,500 enlisted active component non-prior service recruits in FY11. Enlistment Bonuses remain vital to meeting the continuing requirement for high demand skills. We are continuing to experience unprecedented retention in both first-term and career Marines.

We will continue to shape our Total Force to provide the ideal grade and military occupational specialty mix needed for sustainment. Our force structure review developed ways to increase unit readiness within our operating forces to ensure 99 percent manning of enlisted billets and 95 percent manning of officer billets. At the close of the Future Years Defense Program, we will work with the Secretary of Defense on a responsible drawdown of our end strength that is aligned with the future mission demands of a post-Operation Enduring Freedom security environment. I am determined to "keep faith" with our Marines and their families by designing and executing a responsible drawdown from our current 202,100 end strength such that we avoid reduction-in-force actions and early retirement boards.

The Marine Corps is committed to making concerted efforts to attract, mentor, and retain the most talented men and women who bring a diversity of background, culture and skill in service to our Nation. Our diversity effort is structured with the understanding that the objective of diversity is not merely to achieve representational parity, but to raise total capability through leveraging the strengths and talents of each and every Marine. The success of our pioneering Female Engagement Team program in Afghanistan, which is an offshoot of a similar effort we

employed in Iraq, is one way that the Marine Corps utilizes diversity within our ranks for operational benefit.

We are currently developing a comprehensive, Service-wide strategy on diversity, an effort facilitated through our standing Diversity Review Board and a Diversity Executive Steering Committee chartered to establish the foundations for diversity success in the Total Force. The Marine Corps has established minority officer recruiting and mentoring as the highest priority in our recruiting efforts. Along with the other Services, we have provided timely input to the Congressionally-sanctioned Military Leadership Diversity Commission and look forward to release of the Commission's final report scheduled for March 2011.

Marine Air Ground Task Force Enhancements. To further posture ourselves for the future, we are evaluating the internal workings of our MAGTFs to account for the distributed operations, decentralized command and control, dispersed forces and diffuse threats inherent on the modern battlefield. We are implementing a diverse suite of command and control systems within all elements of the MAGTF. We continue to work to build the capacity of new organizations like the Marine Corps Information Operations Center to achieve non-lethal effects in today's irregular and complex environments. We are ensuring the rapid analysis, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence down to the tactical level by continuing implementation of the Marine Corps Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Enterprise. We also aim to reorganize our intelligence collection and exploitation capabilities, increasing the ratio of resources to users. We will also capitalize on the capabilities of unmanned aircraft systems via an increase in capacity.

We are developing regionally-focused Marine Expeditionary Brigade command elements that are joint task force capable, with habitually aligned subordinate elements, to improve Geographic Combatant Commander effectiveness and speed of response. We have recently stood up one such element in Bahrain in support of U.S. Central Command. To better standardize operations and training for units and staff in our ground combat element, we established the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group, which reached full operational capability in May 2010. Among other measures, this organization's mission is to support the refinement of our doctrine, including how our infantry companies will fight in the future. Building on the successes of the Marine Corps Tactics and Operations Group for the ground combat element, we are also developing and establishing a Marine Corps Logistics Operations Group capability for the Logistics Combat Element along with reorganizing Marine Logistics Groups to establish standing Combat Logistics Battalions habitually aligned to specific Marine Expeditionary Units and infantry regiments.

Over the past decade, we have become more reliant on equipment sets resulting from the emergence of new threats, perhaps most notably the improvised explosive device. This trend has resulted in the acquisition of some resources that are incompatible with the ethos of an agile, expeditionary force. To that end, we have begun an effort known as "*Lightening the MAGTF*," a measure aimed at reducing the size, weight, and energy expenditure of our forces from the individual rifleman to wholesale components of the MAGTF.

Sustained combat operations and worldwide theater security cooperation and training commitments over the last decade point towards an essential requirement for the Marine Corps Reserve to continue focusing at the operational, rather than strategic level of warfare. Since 9/11, our Marine Corps Reserve has engaged continuously in combat operations as well as in

regional security cooperation and crisis prevention activities in support of the Geographical Combatant Commanders. This operational tempo has built a momentum among our war fighters and a depth of experience throughout the ranks that is unprecedented in generations of Marine Corps Reservists. In fact, today's Marine Corps Reserve is more highly trained, capable, and battle-tested than at any time since the Korean War.

The transition in utilization of the Marine Corps Reserve from a strategic to operational Reserve, as affirmed by our force structure review, expands our ability to perform as America's Expeditionary Force in Readiness. Sharing the culture of deployment and expeditionary mindset that has dominated Marine Corps culture, ethos and thinking since our beginning more than two centuries ago, the Marine Corps Reserve is optimally organized, equipped, and trained to perform as an operational Reserve.

Institutions for Irregular Warfare. Irregular operations (e.g. Counterinsurgency, Stability Operations, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare and Counterterrorism) often occur in response to crisis and are executed in austere conditions — situations often entailing employment of Marines. Our experiences countering irregular threats in “Small Wars” is a result of responding to complex crises involving a mix of security, economic, political, and social issues — usually under austere physical conditions. Our approach to irregular warfare is based on the understanding that people, ideas and organizations — not platforms and advanced technology — are the keys to success in operating in complex and irregular warfare environments. Naval forces conducting theater security operations and security force assistance to build partnership capacity also provide the Nation the potential for immediate crisis response capability and options for escalation or de-escalation. *Building on our lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are developing options to re-organize, consolidate, and strengthen our institutions that emphasize our irregular warfare and multi-mission capability such as the Center for Advanced Operational Culture and Learning, the Security Cooperation Training and Education Center, and the Center for Irregular Warfare. The objective is to gain unity of effort, increase effectiveness and efficiency, and reduce redundant capacity.*

We established the Marine Corps Training and Advisory Group (MCTAG) within the past five years to train, equip, and deploy Marines for Security Force Assistance missions in support of Geographic Combatant Commander theater security cooperation plans. The MCTAG provides conventional training and advisor support to Host Nation Security Forces. This organization also offers planning assistance to Marine regional component commands in developing and executing partner nation training programs. The MCTAG is scheduled to reach full operating capability in September 2011 and to date has directly trained more than 180 Marines and Sailors and assisted in the training of more than 600 Marines and Sailors, who themselves have conducted in excess of 150 deployments to more than 50 countries worldwide. The MCTAG has also developed programs of instruction to train joint service advisors/trainers deploying on theater security cooperation missions as well as programs of instruction to train light infantry battalions from the Republic of Georgia in executing combat operations in Afghanistan.

Because the Marine Corps functions in an integrated fashion throughout all traditional domains — land, sea, air, and space — it is a logical step forward for us to be optimally organized, trained and equipped to operate synergistically on the modern battlefield, which now includes the cyber domain. As U.S. Cyber Command matures and sponsors initiatives to

increase cyber operational capacity, we are taking deliberate steps to build additional Marine Corps cyber capability and capacity to meet joint and service-level demands.

We see the continued development of organic cyber capabilities, capacities, and awareness as a critical element to retain speed, precision, and lethality across the entire spectrum of operations. We are working to incorporate scenarios into our exercises to increase opportunities for Marines to leverage cyber capabilities while also training Marines to operate where cyber-enabled warfighting capability may be degraded and/or contested. Additionally, we are integrating tailored cyber education into our officer and enlisted professional education programs. *We are continuing to examine our options for recruiting, training and retaining our cyber workforce. This is especially challenging given the highly specialized skill sets and the competition for such in both the Federal and Private sectors.*

Formed in 2006, Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) is currently conducting an internal reorganization into three mirrored battalions. Upon completion of this reorganization in FY14, Marine Special Operations Command will have one regiment consisting of three battalions, 12 companies, and 48 Marine Special Operations Teams. Since December 2009, MARSOC has maintained an enduring battalion-level Special Operations Task Force headquarters and two companies in Afghanistan along with persistent Marine Special Operations Team engagements in other high priority regions.

Since its inception, the Marine Corps has resourced Marine Special Operations Command with significant investments in military construction for training facilities, barracks and headquarters. In the near term, MARSOC will have 2,678 personnel. Our force structure review recently evaluated ways to increase the number of combat support and combat service support Marines (e.g. logisticians, intelligence personnel, etc.) enabling MARSOC's operations. I intend to add 1,001 Marines to MARSOC, which will increase its capacity by 44 percent. These Marines, who are above and beyond the planned FY14 personnel increase, will better enable it for effective special operations.

The Marine Corps serves as the Department of Defense Non-Lethal Weapons Executive Agent responsible for developing program recommendations and stimulating non-lethal weapons requirements. Non-lethal effects are part of the Department of Defense portfolio of capabilities that enhance the Joint Force Commander's ability to act in a timely manner to detect, deter, prevent, defeat, or, if necessary, mitigate the effects of an attack. Non-lethal capabilities provide the Joint Force the ability to selectively target hostile threats, covered or concealed by civilian assets, while avoiding collateral damage. Geographic Combatant Commands are registering increased demand for non-lethal weapons options to include items such as arresting nets, dazzler lasers, acoustic hailing devices, electric stun guns, blunt impact munitions, and non-lethal warning munitions. The Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program continues to support joint and combined non-lethal weapons research, development, training and exercises in support of all Geographic Combatant Commands.

Expeditionary Energy. The Marine Corps is leading the development of expeditionary energy solutions for DoD and the Department of the Navy — reducing energy demand in our platforms and systems, increasing the use of renewable energy, and instilling an ethos of energy and water efficiency in every Marine. *Our priority is force protection — saving lives by reducing the number of Marines at risk on the road hauling fuel and water. We also aim to help Marines*

travel lighter and move faster through the reduction in size and amount of equipment and the dependence on bulk supplies.

In February 2011, we issued a “Bases to Battlefield” Expeditionary Energy Strategy Implementation Planning Guidance, which sets goals, performance metrics, and a plan for implementation by 2025. This strategy supports Congressional and Department of the Navy goals to increase energy security through the use of alternative fuels and energy efficiency. Since 2009 we have aggressively pursued renewable energy and energy efficient capabilities that will make Marine units more energy self-sufficient, and ultimately increase our combat effectiveness.

Within a year, we stood up an Experimental Forward Operating Base, sourced commercial and government technologies, trained an infantry company with renewable energy technology, and deployed them to Afghanistan in the winter of 2010 where they operated two patrol bases entirely on renewable energy. As a result, our forces required less fuel and batteries, reducing risk to Marines and saving money. This year, the Experimental Forward Operating Base will focus on the requirements of a major battlefield energy user — the Command Operations Center and the Command Element — and will evaluate a second round of energy technologies to support expeditionary operations.

In FY12 we are devoting more resources — in current programs and new areas — to build a foundation to achieve our goals for increased energy efficiency and renewable energy by 2025. As a starting point, we anticipate savings of petroleum over the Future Years Defense Program in our Overseas Contingency Operations of 100,000 to 150,000 barrels. For example this year, we are procuring mobile electric power sources to achieve 17 percent fuel efficiency using U.S. Army funded development and Marine Corps funded procurement monies. We are also fielding Enhanced Efficiency Environmental Control Units to achieve 15-30 percent power efficiency improvements.

Installation Energy. We are also devoting more resources to our Energy Investment Program than ever before. These funds will be used to implement the results of recent and ongoing energy audits at our installations; install more efficient systems and reduce overall energy consumption. Additionally, new facilities will continue to incorporate the latest energy sustainability and efficiency features. This effort aboard our installations complements our Corps-wide initiative to develop an energy ethos and culture of conservation.

TRAINING

Training MAGTFs. We are utilizing our Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan as a roadmap to strengthen and maintain our core competencies and to ensure we remain America’s Expeditionary Force in Readiness well into the future. This effort also will help synchronize our Service level security cooperation activities in support of national strategy and guide the type of training and exercises we must conduct, in particular at the Marine Expeditionary Brigade level.

Our amphibious core competency figures prominently in our Service Campaign Plan, and as a result we have undertaken an array of exercise planning in this critical skill area. We will soon be conducting a MAGTF Large Scale Exercise that will refine our capability to conduct amphibious power projection and sustained operations ashore in a joint and inter-agency

environment. In late-2010 we conducted *Exercise Bold Alligator 2011*, the first large-scale amphibious training exercise with the Navy on the East Coast in almost 10 years. This synthetic training event practiced planning for forcible entry operations against conventional and asymmetric threats and a large scale non-combatant evacuation operation. We will take lessons learned from this exercise and build upon them for the next iteration of this important exercise with the U.S. Navy scheduled in the coming year.

We are reviewing the core functions of our organizations and, where appropriate, adding irregular warfare capabilities to reflect the full spectrum of possible employment options as a core task set for the Marine Expeditionary Brigade. We view integration with other government agencies and coordination with non-government organizations as essential to our success in irregular warfare and have significantly increased interagency participation in numerous exercises and training venues such as Expeditionary Warrior-09/10, Emerald Express, Joint Urban Warrior-09, and Joint Irregular Warrior-10. We aim to capitalize on our current theater security cooperation and partnership capacity building activities with our allies and partners in all operational environments providing our National leaders with strategic options to shape outcomes, prevent and deter conflicts, strengthen "at risk" states, and deny enemy safe-havens.

Priority #3 Better Educate and Train our Marines to Succeed in Distributed Operations and Increasingly Complex Environments

Professional Military Education and Small Unit Leader Development. We are planning more investments in the education of our non-commissioned officers and junior officers, as they have assumed vastly greater responsibilities in both combat and garrison. This focus on education will better train them for decision-making during distributed operations against more diffused threats over broader areas of the battlefield. The primary initiative to address this priority is to increase markedly their opportunities to attend resident professional military education. We are currently evaluating ways to increase throughput at resident professional military education courses with options for both constrained and unconstrained manpower and resource increases. We are evaluating traditional paradigms relative to course lengths and instructional methodology, with the specific objectives of tripling throughput at the Expeditionary Warfare School (Career level) and doubling resident Command and Staff College (Intermediate Level) throughput.

These key leaders also impact unit cohesion and our overall effectiveness in combat. Introducing these leaders into a unit at the right time and stabilizing them in a life cycle continuum of a unit positively impacts a unit's effective training, performance and resiliency during pre-deployment training and post combat. These leaders are in the best position to influence our cultural ethos with its emphasis on intangible qualities such as esprit de corps, integrity, and "service to country during time of war." We are currently reviewing manpower policies and models and will ensure these key leaders are present and able to lead a cohesive unit throughout its life-cycle continuum, including rigorous pre-deployment training and post deployment actions. This effort will ready our units for any fight, whether irregular or combat.

We also intend to infuse Values Based Training, rooted in our core values of Honor, Courage and Commitment, at all levels of professional development to foster resilience and to enable effective operations, especially in complex irregular environments. *Our overall goal is to institutionalize efforts to develop more mature, educated, and capable non-commissioned officers and maneuver unit squad leaders. As these concepts mature, there will be costs in terms of military instruction and facilities for which we will require Congressional support.*

Regionalization and Specialization. The increased call for engagement, as seen in our force structure review and in strategic guidance, requires Marines with improved cultural and language skills and formal education. To develop better specialization for anticipated future missions and operating environments, we will expand our Foreign Area Officer and Regional Affairs Officer programs, as well as opportunities to send more officers through graduate level training, fellowships and research opportunities — ideas supported by findings and recommendations of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Independent Panel Report.¹⁴ This effort will extend to our "Whole of Government" approach toward irregular warfare as we seek greater exchanges and fellowships with the elements of the Interagency.

Marine Corps University. We are continuing to implement recommendations of our 2006 Officer Professional Military Education Study (*the Wilhelm Report*) and are making significant strides in terms of resources and facilities enhancing the campus of the Marine Corps University

¹⁴ 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, pg 54; 2010 QDR Independent Panel Report, pgs 75-77.

(MCU). We have programmed approximately \$125 million in Military Construction between FY11-FY12 for new academic facilities for the Marine Corps War College, Command and Staff College, and the School of Advanced Warfighting. In addition, we will expand the Staff Noncommissioned Officer Academy at the main campus in Quantico. These funds represent only a down payment on a larger commitment to double the size of the University campus and to upgrade our enlisted academies world-wide. Completion of the MCU master plan will require the demolition and relocation of tenant units aboard the campus. Detailed documentation of costs associated is on-going; however, we estimate over \$400 million is needed to complete the master plan. Our ultimate goal is to develop the MCU into a premier institution with world-class faculty, facilities, students, and curricula; we will require the assistance of Congress in this goal.

Priority #4 Keep Faith with our Marines, our Sailors and our Families

Keeping Faith. We expect and demand extraordinary loyalty from our Marines — a loyalty to Country, family, and Corps. Our Nation has been at war for a decade, placing unprecedented burdens on Marines, Sailors, families, Wounded Warriors, and the families of the fallen. They have all made tremendous sacrifices in the face of danger. We owe them all a reciprocal level of loyalty. Our approach to caring for their needs is based on the same unwavering faithfulness they have demonstrated to the Marine Corps. We will ensure their needs are met during times of deployment and in garrison by providing the services, facilities, and programs to develop the strength and skills to thrive on the challenges of operational tempo. When needed, we will restore them to health. We will also transition them back to civilian life, and in the cases of our fallen Marines, we will support and protect their surviving spouses and dependents. We will do this by focusing on several areas this fiscal year.

Combat Stress, Resiliency, Medical and Mental Health Care. We continue to advocate for the highest quality medical care and facilities for our service members, retirees, and their families. To ensure the Department can continue to provide the finest health care benefits in the country to our beneficiaries, we fully support the medical efficiencies and adjustments in TRICARE included in the President's budget proposal.

The evolving security environment requires a physically and mentally resilient Marine able to endure extended exposure to ambiguous, stressful, and ever-changing situations. Young leaders find themselves on the vanguard of a protracted war, adapting to a variety of situations and scenarios. To improve their resilience, we are working aggressively and creatively to build a training continuum that better prepares them for the inevitable stress of combat operations and to equip them with the necessary skills required to cope with the challenges of life as a Marine.

Instruction founded and focused on our core values helps provide some of this resilience, especially in irregular warfare and complex environments. A program combining the “best practices” of mental, emotional and physical fitness will best instill in our Marines the resiliency needed to endure the stressors of combat and enhance their ability to perform effectively across the range of military operations. *We are developing a comprehensive program to improve the resiliency of our Marines both in garrison and in combat.*

We are partnered with the Navy to address the nation-wide dearth of qualified mental health care providers, which challenges our ability to provide care at some of our bases and stations and, in some cases, to our reservists in remote locations. During Calendar Year 2010, we saw a nearly 30 percent decrease in the number of suicides within our Total Force.¹⁵ We are too early in our suicide studies to identify what specific initiative(s) have resulted in this dramatic turnaround. However, we have implemented a number of measures on multiple fronts. Some of these include the following:

- **Evocative Peer-led Training Program:** “Never Leave a Marine Behind” suicide prevention program for non-commissioned officers and Junior Marines. We are expanding this training to include staff non-commissioned officers and commissioned officers this year.

¹⁵ CY10 suicides = 37 whereas CY09 suicides = 52.

- **DSTRESS Line Pilot Program with TRICARE West:** “By Marines-For Marines” call center designed to assist with problems at an early stage. The call center is staffed by veteran Marines, providing anonymous service to all current Marines, veteran Marines, their families and loved ones.
- **Combat and Operational Stress Control and Operational Stress Control and Readiness Teams:** Utilizing unique training programs across the Total Force and ensuring the presence of mental health professionals in front-line units as a primary prevention tool to help Marines identify and mitigate stress.
- **Marine Resilience Study to Assess Risk and Resilience:** We are participating in a longitudinal research study that will examine risk across three domains: biological, psychological and social. The outcome of this study will inform our future work in the area of building and maintain resiliency across the Corps.

We will continue advocating to the medical community for better diagnostic and increased treatment options for Marines with severe injuries including Post Traumatic Stress and Traumatic Brain Injury. In collaboration with the other services, we developed a set of events-based parameters, mandating that our leaders search out Marines who have experienced a concussive event. This measure no longer relies on identification of impacted service members solely on their willingness to seek help on their own initiative. These protocols are in place now in Afghanistan, and we are already seeing a culture change in the attitude of Marines about being treated early for a Traumatic Brain Injury.

We have established an in-theater Restoration Center that brings comprehensive concussion diagnosis and management as close to the front lines as possible to ensure that appropriate care is available as quickly as possible. We are currently developing policy and applications to track Traumatic Brain Injury from “point of injury” to “return to full duty” separately but in parallel with medical documentation. These measures will empower commanders with the information they need to monitor the health of a Marine who has suffered a concussive event and intervene appropriately for the duration of a Marine's career and long after the initial injury.”

Transition Assistance. We believe transition assistance should be a process not an event. We have established a goal to make the Marine Corps Transition Assistance Management Program more value added for our departing Marines. From 2009 to 2010, we conducted functionality assessments of the Transition Assistance Management Program and the Lifelong Learning Program and noted many deficiencies. In response, we established two Transition Assistance Operational Planning Teams in 2010 to assess existing programs. We have developed an “end to end” process improvement plan that will begin at the point of initial accession into the Marine Corps and continue through post separation. We are initiating actions and integrating existing capabilities that will most directly improve the quality of support provided to Marines within six months prior to separation and those who have been separated at least six months.

Marines have expressed a desire for assistance navigating Department of Veterans Affairs benefit processes such as in cases of enrollment for and access to education benefits. We will modify existing websites to improve access and enhance opportunity for separating Marines to speak directly to Marine Corps support personnel who are trained to remove administrative benefit processing barriers. We will improve networking opportunities to help Marines find

meaningful employment and are adapting our current job fairs to support increased networking opportunities that will allow them to meet mentors and employers.

Marines have asked for an opportunity to connect with employers and learn how to translate their intangible and tangible attributes. Our transition workshops will be overhauled to address these needs. Marines are also seeking help to simplify enrollment processes for the Post 9/11 Montgomery GI bill and to gain access to academic institutions that will provide the quality and level of business education and skills private industry demands. We have initiated a Leader-Scholar Program, which includes academic institutions who value Marines' service commitment and pledge special enrollment consideration. While the support varies from school to school, we now have 75 participating institutions with the goal of an additional 25 by the end of this year. As we gain momentum, we will continue to change the transition assistance program from its current event focus to that of a process that reintegrates Marines into the civilian sector with the knowledge, skills, and abilities to leverage and communicate their Marine Corps time and experience.

Family Readiness Programs. We increased baseline funding for family support programs beginning in FY10 to ensure appropriate wartime footing. Programs benefitting from this measure include the Unit, Personal and Family Readiness Program; Marine Corps Family Team Building Program; Exceptional Family Member Program; School Liaison Program; and other miscellaneous Marine Corps Community Services Programs supporting remote and isolated commands, deployed Marines, and independent duty Marines and families. We are currently conducting a complete review to ensure effectiveness and efficiency of these programs. Our goal is to determine where expansion may be needed to further assist our families and where programs can be streamlined to reduce redundancy.

Wounded Warrior Care. Marines continue to suffer numerous wounds, trauma, and injuries during operations in combat and during training missions. Many of these brave heroes with significant injuries are convalescing at military treatment facilities here in the National Capital Region and across our Nation at other major military treatment facilities. Our Wounded Warrior Regiment provides non-medical care management services to wounded, ill, and injured Marines and their families. The Wounded Warrior Regiment continues to improve existing programs and add new support mechanisms. We have increased support to wounded, injured, and ill reserve Marines through additional Recovery Care Coordinators, enhanced family support at military treatment facilities, and one-on-one orientation sessions. We also provide Integrated Disability Evaluation System Support through Regional Limited Duty Coordinators and Wounded Warrior Attorneys. We have also initiated a mandatory Warrior Athlete Reconditioning Program. Outreach is an important aspect of the Regiment's non-medical care delivery and management. The Sergeant Merlin German Wounded Warrior Call Center extends support to Marines and families through advocacy, resource identification and referral, information distribution, and care coordination, 24 hours a day, seven days per week.

The comprehensive care coordination provided by the Wounded Warrior Regiment throughout the phases of recovery has been highly successful. The results of internal assessments have substantiated that creation of the Wounded Warrior Regiment has had a positive impact on the support offered wounded, injured and ill Marines and families. The Marine Corps will continue to honor the commitment to our Wounded Warriors and to help them return to full duty or successfully reintegrate into their communities.

Behavioral Health Integration. Behavioral health needs since 9/11 have become increasingly complex with individuals often requiring assistance in a number of areas at one time. Marines with more than two deployments have been identified as a higher risk population. According to the Joint Mental Health Assessment Team, psychological health problems remain steady at 11 percent of Marines for the first and second deployments, but increase to 22 percent for those who have deployed three or more times. Sixty-five percent of Marines are under 25 years old. Associated with this young force are high-risk factors that include communication and coping skills, isolation, combat-related wounds and substance abuse. Drawdown of end strength following Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and return to garrison life will likely result in additional behavioral healthcare requirements as Marines redeploy and adjust to the garrison environment. We continue to move forward with our integration of prevention and intervention programs initiated in 2009. We have established a Behavioral Health Branch at our headquarters for Manpower & Reserve Affairs. Headquarters Marine Corps Health Services also has created and filled a new billet for a Director of Psychological Health.

Military Construction. The Marine Corps maintains its commitment to facilities and infrastructure supporting both operations and quality of life. Our military construction and family programs are important to success in achieving and sustaining our force structure and maintaining readiness. For many years, we funded only our most critical facility needs. As a result, our installations were challenged to properly house and operate the additional forces required to meet our planned end strength increase. Between FY07-FY10, we received \$6.9 billion in new construction and design. With this funding, we are providing new quality of life facilities, improved operational and training facilities, and more modern utility infrastructure systems.

Our FY12 military construction budget request is \$1.4 billion. With these requested funds, we will provide Bachelor Enlisted Quarters, aviation support facilities, and improvements to quality of life, utilities and infrastructure, and professional military education facilities. Additional family housing efforts in FY12 include improvements to existing housing units and funding for the operations, maintenance, and leasing of 1,100 units worldwide and oversight of 22,000 privatized units.

Conclusion

The United States Marine Corps remains the Nation's crisis response force-of-choice. Our continued success in Afghanistan and throughout the globe is made possible by the loyal sacrifice of our incredible men and women in uniform, Civilian Marines, and our Marine Corps family. The personnel, equipment, and training that have given us success over the nearly past 10 years at war has come through the ongoing support of Congress and the American people. I promise that your Marine Corps understands the value of each dollar provided and will continue to provide maximum return for every dollar spent.

In the coming year, we will begin a deliberate transformation into a force optimized for the likely threats of the next two decades. We understand and appreciate the contribution that each Marine has made for this great Nation, and we recognize the heavy burden it has placed on their loved ones. We remain "Always Faithful" to our Marine Corps family, to Congress, to our chain of command and to the American people.

Mr. CULBERSON. General Amos, Admiral Roughead, thank you so very much. Your complete statements will be entered into the record, of course, and we will want to dive into, in a minute, the effects of the continuing resolution and the urgency of Congress acting quickly to ensure that your logistical chain is not interrupted. But in light of the extraordinary depth and breadth of the experience that you both bring to the table here today and the concern that all of us have—all of our constituents have about what is going on in the Middle East I did want to ask you a little bit about—for your personal opinions about what is taking place over there.

Forty-five minutes ago the A.P. wire reported that the Saudi Kingdom has opened fire at a rally; they have begun shooting their own people in Saudi Arabia at a rally. And the French have now—Sarkozy has just formally—France has become, in a major diplomatic victory for the Libyan opposition—and this is just literally about an hour and a half old—in a major diplomatic victory for the Libyan opposition France has become the first country to formally recognize Libya's rebel leadership, pledging to exchange ambassadors between Paris and the Libyan opposition stronghold of Benghazi. And Sarkozy—President Sarkozy has asked, also—there are reports that he has authorized air strikes on the—on Gaddafi's forces.

MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY MOVEMENTS

Could you talk to us a little bit about—this is obviously—these are extraordinary changes taking place very rapidly. What is driving these uprisings?

I am convinced a lot of it is Facebook. I am convinced, you know, what a powerful force this is here in America; I know that is what triggered the Tea Party here. What is going on in the Middle East, and what effect is this going to have on our missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and the safety, security of our forces there, and frankly, the safety and security of our oil supplies if there is a revolution in Saudi Arabia?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I wasn't privy to some of these more recent announcements that you mentioned. But clearly the changes that are taking place in the Middle East I think are quite historic.

For me personally there is also a personal dimension, since my family lived there for decades. And in fact, I had the opportunity as—in my younger years to live in Libya, and I know many of the towns and cities that they are talking about.

But I think that they are triggered by the desire of people everywhere to be free, to be able to express themselves, and then clearly there are some economic issues that are an undercurrent in all of this and I think the pace and the way the changes are sweeping are clearly reshaping the Middle East. We, in the Navy and Marine Corps, know the region well. We have been operating over there—well, just refer to the Marine Corps Hymn and it gives you an idea of how long we have been operating off the coast of Libya.

But we know the region well. We have forces there. As General Amos mentioned, our amphibious ships were moved into position and the Marines joined up with them.

If you go into the Middle East, the Central Command area of operations, we have more ships there to include our aircraft carrier. That region will remain critical to our security. The oil supplies are not just important to us, but I could argue even more important to Asia, because they pull more of their energy out of the Middle East than we do.

So critical resources—we are very interested in how those changes take place. It is important that the violence not be perpetrated on the citizens of the countries.

But we also have interests there. For example, our Fifth Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and I am in daily contact with our commander there, and we continue to watch events and negotiations that take place in the Kingdom of Bahrain, but I can assure you that our people are safe. The families are going about their daily lives.

We are very mindful of areas that need to be avoided, but none of the animosity or frustration has been focused, targeted, or even inferred upon, or implied on our people who are there. We watch it carefully, and it clearly is a time of change.

POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF MIDDLE EAST UNREST

Mr. CULBERSON. In your opinion—and General Amos, yours as well—it appears to me, from reading all the press accounts and listening and paying attention, very widespread, spreading very rapidly, and primarily it—literally it appears to be results of social media and the ability to communicate on an individual basis immediately and transmit, of course, live pictures. I remember Ronald Reagan sent video cameras into Afghanistan; you know, now you can do it with Facebook and live transmission on services like qik.com.

But it appears to be spreading very rapidly, and very widespread, and if you could just talk to us a little bit about what—in your professional opinion, how far is this likely to go? And what could possibly the effect be on not only the safety and security of our troops overseas but on the economic security of the United States if there is a full-scale revolution over there and the oil supplies, particularly in Saudi Arabia, become endangered? What effect does that—what do you see the future looks like?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Well, in a previous testimony this week, Mr. Chairman, I—with my experience in the Middle East one of the things I have kind of learned is not to predict the Middle East. It is a challenging area, to be sure, particularly in these times.

But I think even without an interruption in the oil flow, simply the disorder that exists—we have already seen the effect on energy prices globally. And so I think that the volatility in those prices will continue, and the more unrest and the wider that unrest spreads, I think you are going to see that volatility continue.

Mr. CULBERSON. General Amos, could you give us any guidance in your opinion, sir? Again, just personal opinion based on your experience about what the future holds and how—what the effects might be of this, and how widespread it is likely to be.

General AMOS. Chairman, I would like to just go back to—and I will come back to that in a second—I would like to go back to your concern, or your question about the safety and security of our

men and women overseas. My sense is that they are fine. We don't know this—we don't know what the future is going to hold, and I think—is absolutely correct. Very unpredictable. It is complex.

To sit down and kind of sort our way through what is happening in Libya, then what is happening in Tunisia, and then what is happening in Egypt and where it might—you know, almost every day you read the headlines and there is a—it seems as though there is another nation that is experiencing this. So it is complex. We don't know where it is going or where it will end up.

I was with Secretary Shultz—George Shultz—just a little bit ago and we were talking about the Reagan years and about the fall of the wall, and the Soviet Union. And this may very well be just the next extension of people seeking freedom that began back in the latter part of the last century. This may very well be an extension—a natural extension.

And I would agree with you. The ability to fuel this in cyberspace is unparalleled. And it is not only what we face as—or what we see today, but we also—when we are doing combat operations cyberspace is a domain that we pay very close attention to, because there are combat operations that take place in cyberspace, different than we have ever thought of before.

So it is fueled by that. There is no question about that.

Sir, I would hesitate to even predict where it is going to end up, because I do think it is complex. I do think it is a sense of people wanting their freedom, and my hope is that it settles down and we reach a point where it is a leavening effect—a leveling effect across the Middle East and things turn out in favor of a good order of discipline.

Mr. CULBERSON. I know all of us as Americans share the sentiment, and anyone on the world that are hungry for freedom and individual liberty, that is a marvelous thing and a good thing that we all support and sincerely hope that is the direction these revolutions take, and that we see a freer, fairer, more democratic structure emerge in those Middle Eastern countries that are going through this revolution.

And in watching it take place, and again, hearing your testimony confirmed that a lot of it is, you know, social media and the ability of people to transmit instantly and talk to each other in real time has had a transformation effect.

I am reminded of the last letter Thomas Jefferson ever wrote, when he was unable to attend the 50th anniversary celebration of the Declaration of Independence signing, a few weeks before his death—he died, of course, exactly July 4th at 1 o'clock in the afternoon, the exact time they presented the Declaration to the Continental Congress.

Mr. Jefferson wrote, in his last letter, he said that the Declaration and the light of science, that—he was convinced the Declaration would roll around the world and liberate people all over the planet. And he said in words that are very—I think are applicable to what we are seeing today—he said the light of science has opened the eyes of mankind, generally, to the palpable truth that half of humanity is not born with saddles on their back, nor the other half booted and spurred, ready to ride them, and that he was absolutely confident that the light of liberty would eventually free

everyone on earth. And I am convinced that social media and the Internet is absolutely going to make that possible.

POTENTIAL IRANIAN INVOLVEMENT IN MIDDLE EAST

I wanted to ask, and then talk a little—very briefly, about the effect of the C.R. on the logistics chain and the problems that you are having making sure we get our men and women properly quartered and cared for and that your warfighters, in particular, are given the support they need. But before I ask you that, I did want to ask you all very quickly about the—before I do that let me do ask you about the effect of the C.R., these continuing delays in our ability to pass an appropriations bill.

Could you talk to us a little bit about the—excuse me, I did remember what I wanted to ask you. The effect of Iran—have you detected any influence of the Iranians in some of these revolutions? To what extent can you talk to us about the Iranians' involvement in trying to stir a lot of this up?

General AMOS. Chairman, I can't speak to that. I have not seen anything that would—I mean, I read the same newspaper as I think probably everybody in this room has read, but I don't have—I haven't seen anything of evidentiary material that would indicate that.

Mr. CULBERSON. Admiral.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. And I would agree, sir. I think that, you know, there is always a great interest because of the sects that are involved that Iran would be there, but nothing—

Mr. CULBERSON. Or the Muslim Brotherhood.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Right. But I think in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in—

Mr. CULBERSON. Yes.

Admiral ROUGHEAD [continuing]. They are assimilating—appear to be assimilating into the evolving political structure there.

Mr. CULBERSON. So to summarize very quickly, it is your opinion this does appear to be a genuinely popular uprising that is fairly widespread, and it is a sincere effort of people to liberate themselves?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir.

EFFECTS OF A CONTINUING RESOLUTION

Mr. CULBERSON. That is always good news.

Very quickly, and then let me turn to Mr. Bishop, ask about the effect of these continuing resolutions on your logistics chain. If I could ask each of you, and Admiral, beginning with you, sir, talk to us about the urgency of this committee ensuring that key pieces of your military construction budget get approved as rapidly as possible and what the delays are doing to the Navy.

And then, General, if you could talk to us about those delays on behalf of the Marine Corps and your warfighting—your warfighters overseas, and so we can communicate that to our leadership and hopefully get those pieces of the bills that you would most need done quickly.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. I think in the case of the continuing resolution there are several areas where it is affecting us. Clearly, with the limitations on the amount of funding and new

start authority and the ability to increase numbers over previous years—the restrictions on that—we are really hampered in the building of our future force. There is no question about that.

We cannot go forward, for example, with additional purchases of an advanced airborne early warning aircraft, guided missile destroyers, and this year we intended to build two Virginia-class submarines that are now held back by the continuing resolution.

But we also have 26 military construction projects that are likely not going to be executed if we were to go through with the full year Continuing Resolution. If we simply go to the end of time where, toward the end of March, there are six military construction projects that will not be executed.

And we also have some military construction projects that are in Bahrain, which are important for our operations there. I know that there may, at times, be some reservations about military construction overseas, but as a force that deploys and operates overseas those facilities are key to our forward operations, and in addition to the safety and security of our people. So those are some projects that are held up.

But on a personal level, we are now beginning to impact our people in very real ways. It is our desire and our policy in the Navy to inform our sailors, about 6 months before they transfer, where they are going. Because of the constraints that we have on the funding we now wait 2 months before they transfer, which means that there is, in today's economy, likely no way they are going to be able to turn a house, if they own it, or the spouse is going to be able to get a job in the new location. So we are almost forcing people—forcing families to live apart because of the constraints that we face there.

If we continue on the C.R. when it comes time to begin to put people into the war colleges and send them to the post-graduate school, and things like that, those orders are going to be held up, and what will then happen, whether it is the new construction of ships and airplanes, whether it is the new construction in military construction, or the ordering of our men and women to new assignments, all of that will then—well, we in—you know, to use a Navy term, will bow wave into the next fiscal year. So the budget that we are talking about today, we very well may have to open it up again to go in and make those adjustments because of all this stuff that we have carried over.

So on the future of the Navy, on the current operations of the Navy, and most importantly, on the lives of our people, the C.R. is having a negative effect.

General AMOS. Chairman, I would be happy to. First of all, I would like to acknowledge that the House, with passing H.R. 1, went a long ways to helping try and alleviate what is going on, and I want to thank you, on behalf of all of us, that you worked so hard to try to pull this together. And we are anxiously awaiting the mitigation and the reconciliation between the Senate and the House.

So we appreciate that. Thank you.

But today, as I had mentioned in my opening statement, we have about \$2.3 billion at risk, \$63 million—63 projects of MILCON projects—13 BEQs, 5,000 spaces. That is significant.

In the—probably about 2003, 2004, Congress turned to the Marine Corps and said, effectively, “Get your BEQs in order,” he told the Commandant, who was General Hagee at the time. Because we had been—as I said in my opening statement, not mortgaging this, but we were cutting Solomon’s baby in many different ways, trying to buy—ensure our readiness, make sure we modernized, and then the war hit.

And the bill-payer for a lot of that was the barracks that our young Marines were living in. So you could easily go to places like Camp Pendleton or Camp Lejeune and find 50-year-old barracks, in some cases no air conditioning, very little heat—pretty abysmal places—gang heads and that kind of thing.

So General Hagee set out on a path in 2003 to get the Marine Corps’ BEQs straightened out by 2012. The war broke out. We began the plus-up of the Marine Corps in 2007 and we moved the completion of that project out to 2014.

Congress has been terrific to us with giving us money for BEQs. We have spent a significant amount of money building BEQs, and if you were to go to any of our bases today they are under construction.

The reason this is critically important to us this year is this is coming close to completing that BEQ Modernization effort that Congress directed the Marine Corps to do. These 13 BEQs will house those eight infantry battalions that I talked about earlier. That is a lot of BEQ spaces for our young Marines.

MV-22 and Joint Strike Fighter facilities are not coming under contract this year, and yet we have Joint Strike Fighter airplanes arriving at Eglin Air Force Base this year. Next year we will have 14 Joint Strike Fighters—Marine Corps Joint Strike Fighters—at Yuma, Arizona. The year after that we will have another 15 coming to Buford, South Carolina.

And it takes about 2½ years to build an aircraft hangar. These Joint Strike Fighters, because of all the technology and the high classification of the systems, both external and internal to that airplane, cannot be housed in a regular hangar at Buford or Yuma or—it requires special power and it requires a security clearance, an area that is completely secure.

So we need to get started on these. We need to get them under contract this year.

So those are some of the impacts. We are also going to lose about just a little over a quarter of a billion dollars in our procurement accounts, which are—we are buying high mobility rockets right now, HIMARs, that we are shooting in Afghanistan. I checked the other day and we are down to about 27 percent of what our 100 percent requirement is that we normally keep in stock. We are down to about 27 percent.

So there are impacts to this, Chairman. And I know you are working hard on it and I want to thank this committee again for your great efforts.

Mr. CULBERSON [continuing]. Recognize that other members who are going to follow me need to go to their other hearings, and at this time I would like to recognize the gentleman from Georgia, our ranking member, Mr. Bishop.

CR IMPACTS ON MILCON

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, basically what I hear you saying is that having a limited C.R.—2-week C.R.—really puts leg irons, if you will, on our military posture, on your plans, and on your ability to do what you need to do in order to further your mission and support our troops. Is that right?

General AMOS. Sir, you are 100 percent correct. In its simplest terms, if—and I know that H.R. 1 solves the MILCON—I mean, it helps the MILCON; I understand that. But if this is not settled between both the houses then we will—the likelihood of the Marine Corps ever regaining those 13 BEQs is highly unlikely.

In other words, we will not have—we can't roll that into next year. So you are 100 percent correct, sir.

Mr. BISHOP. So that will inconvenience those Marines. Of course, Marines are never inconvenienced; they are always adaptable and always ready to deal with whatever the situation requires. But our effort to accommodate them and to give them what they really need will be compromised tremendously, is what you are saying.

HOME PORT ASHORE

Let me move to your general plans for Homeport Ashore initiatives. Your current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the deficit for the E1–E4 ranks by 2016 based on a policy calling for two sailors per room with 55 square feet each of living space. Can you kind of walk us through how that program has evolved and how we went from a 2008 target date to a 2016 target date?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, I can. And Homeport Ashore began essentially in 2001, when we wanted to get our more junior sailors off the ships and we set, as an objective to your point, 2008. Since that time we have been operating the Navy very hard.

We have deployed at a very significant rate. Today, for example, which is a very common day in the Navy, we have 65,000 sailors deployed, about 40 percent of our ships.

And so as we have dealt with the budgetary pressures that date continued to slide. At the time, at the beginning we also had a larger square footage objective.

When I became the CNO, knowing that we weren't on path to where we needed to be the important thing for me was to be able to get the sailors off the ships, and so I could do that faster with the 55-square foot than I could with the 90-square foot, and that is what put us on the path to get the Homeport Ashore in place by 2016. We are balancing all the other requirements at the Navy, but that is how it has played out, and I am committed to making that happen.

Mr. BISHOP. What is the unfunded deficit for the Homeport Ashore program for the barracks, in terms of spaces and in terms of dollars?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. What we have in this budget is \$81 million that will continue to drive us toward that, and at the same time we are doing the Homeport Ashore we are also trying to get ourselves up to the Q1, Q2 level in the barracks, and we are putting about \$195 million a year in the FYDP to do that, to bring us up.

One of the objectives of this year is to add some more spaces in Norfolk, Virginia, and that is what the project is this year for that.

Mr. BISHOP. But you had really said that, in the past, that you were going to have a master plan to eliminate all of the inadequate barracks by 2020, subject, of course, to funding constraints. Do you have that plan in place now?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. We have laid in the funding that we believe will get us there, and it is for all of our homeports to get us there. Part of the issue that we deal with is that in some ports we are short and in some ports we are over, and so when you add the total together we are dealing with that, but we do have some imbalances in some of the home ports that we are in, so we—in some places we actually have excess in a particular port but that can't help us out in the ports that are short.

MARINE CORPS RELOCATION TO GUAM

Mr. BISHOP. Yes, I want to pass on the time to my colleagues, but I just have a couple questions for General Amos, briefly.

Sir, you have expressed, in the past, some concern about the cost of the realignment from Okinawa to Guam as well as the ability to train the forces in the Pacific. Do you currently feel that your concerns are being addressed?

REALIGNMENT OF FORCES

General AMOS. Sir, that was actually my predecessor, General Conway, that made that comment last year. I do know there is a great effort underway right now within the Department of Defense and OSD to reconcile what the real cost will be.

As you know, the total cost was forecast to be, I think, \$10.6 billion, of which our United States was \$4.2 billion. So I know there is an effort underway right now to determine what are the real costs with regards to the alignment.

Mr. BISHOP. That was an agreement that was existing, and of course, the ruling party changed in 2009, and I understand that there are some efforts to renegotiate the arrangement. Is Japan still living up to that agreement and are there environmental concerns that would present some infrastructure problems for going forward with that project right now?

General AMOS. Sir, I don't know of any environmental issues that are going to hold us back. As you remember, the original agreement between our two nations—between Japan and the United States—was signed in 2006, the agreed to implementation plan, and that is the track we are on right now, and that moves Marines up—gets them out of the southern areas of Okinawa and moves them up towards more of the central and the northern part of Okinawa, and we are still on track for that.

Mr. BISHOP. Isn't there an infrastructure problem in terms of water and sewer, waste water systems, that the island can't accommodate it currently and the EPA estimates it will be, like, \$1.3 billion to do that?

General AMOS. Sir, there is not on Okinawa, but on Guam—they are working on Guam—on Guam they are working their way through that right now and, you know, what is—again, that is part of what is the total cost—is it more than \$4.2 billion for the United

States? And I can't give you a solid answer right now because that effort is underway as we speak.

Mr. BISHOP. So that means that your target is probably—the 2014 goal is probably not really realistic?

General AMOS. Well, sir, as you remember, the construction was supposed to start. It is all triggered with what happens on Okinawa. Is the Futenma replacement facility built? The landfill has not been signed by the Governor of Okinawa yet.

We were supposed to have begun construction in 2007 and complete by 2014. It would appear that since that has not happened that the situation is certainly pressurized, and I would hesitate to even predict, but it is certainly pressurized by the fact that we have not begun construction yet and it is 2011.

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Bishop.

I recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Carter.

MAYPORT MILCON PROJECTS

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And welcome to both of you. We are really proud to have you here and proud of what you do for our country. Thank you for what you do.

Admiral Roughead, last time we met we have talked a lot about the transition of Naval Station Mayport into a nuclear capable home port, and a GAO—and the rest was made by the Navy and kind of a built-out schedule—GAO reported recently that, or stated that the Navy's estimate for the one-time military construction cost could be as low as \$259 million down from the Navy's original estimate of \$536 million. We have already seen the first two Mayport projects, dredging and pier upgrades, come in approximately 20 percent under budget.

Last year we had a conversation with Mr. Crenshaw and this subcommittee where you stated the only reason these projects were spread out over 6 years was because of budgetary constraints. Considering we continue to struggle with fiscal year 2011 budget and Secretary Gates expressed his concern about operating under a C.R. for the remainder of the year, can I suspect that this remains true that you feel like you need to spread it out over 6 years?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I think as we look at the costs—you know, my—we are always looking at where we can make adjustments in our military construction—there is no question that the continuing resolution could affect what monies may be available for the future. But I think the plan that we have laid in is a viable one; if circumstances were to change and opportunities were to present themselves we might be able to make some adjustments, but the C.R. is not helping us out in that regard.

Mr. CARTER. And in fact, we were discussing whether we have a long-range C.R. or a short-range C.R., the truth is a C.R. is a problem, period, for the Department of Defense, at least according to what they tell us. Your contract authority, the way you basically handle your logistics and your contracting, we need an appropriations bill for defense, is what we need to get done. Would you agree with me on that?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Wholeheartedly, sir.

Mr. CARTER. Yes. I think where I come from we agree on that, too.

You know, I wanted to tell you about something we did at Fort Hood that might be helpful as you look down the road and try to deal with Mayport. We were able to combine basically two phases on a hospital build that had been planned to do in Phase 1, Phase 2, and we were able to combine two phases simultaneously, and we have already estimated that this saves several hundred million dollars by the fact that we can get everybody to work at once.

And I don't know the layout that you are dealing with or whatever, but I would at least make a suggestion that it is working for us at Fort Hood, and so maybe the Navy ought to look into whether combining phases might not only speed the project along, but more importantly, utilize the construction people at multiple locations on the site, which is something that generally happens when you are building a big operation—

Admiral ROUGHHEAD. Yes, sir. I will definitely look into that, sir, because, you know, we—I have seen in, for example, in another shipyard that we have in the Navy if we combine two phases and do them simultaneously we avoid three phases and \$8 million.

GUAM INFRASTRUCTURE

Mr. CARTER. You save a bunch of money.

Admiral ROUGHHEAD. But I will definitely—that.

Mr. CARTER. And General, just real quickly, because I know we have got time constraints and my time is about to run out, I have heard at least a conversation with our senator from Texas—one of our senators from Texas—that they are concerned about that you—that may have actually construction logistic issues besides the fact that you have got infrastructure issues on Guam. Have you all done studies on the difficulty of getting materials and people on the site when construction begins and done any creative thinking on that?

General AMOS. Sir, we absolutely have. We started that probably in earnest I would say probably about a year ago, maybe a little bit more than a year ago, and it became a function of capacity. It was realized just how much construction can take place. What is the throughput? What is the capacity of the workforce on Guam to accommodate the construction?

And there was an effort to identify where are the construction workers going to live? And you know, where will they go home to at night? And where will they bathe? And how will they be fed?

So all that has been looked at. There are some gross figures for that right now, but as I said to Congressman Bishop, they are working the details of that right now. That becomes part of, "Okay, what is the real cost of Guam?"

But, sir, they are. It becomes a physics thing. It is time and space and capacity.

Mr. CARTER. No criticism of Guam, but I have been to Guam and it is kind of out in the middle of nowhere, so I very much appreciate those issues and congratulate you on forward planning.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

FAMILY HOUSING, CHILDCARE AND SCHOOLS

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Carter.

Ms. McCollum.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you—

I want to ask about family housing. You touched on it a little bit, that family housing—some of it is on base; some of it is off base. I understand the satisfaction, from what I heard from the gentleman from the Navy last week who was here from the inspector general—excuse me, he was reporting on the Navy—was saying that there is a lot of satisfaction with off-base housing. And so if you could comment on that a little bit.

Schools—and are you involved in Impact Aid and following what happens with that with the schools at the school districts where there are military families—that they receive some federal dollars? That hasn't been raised for a long time and any comments you might have on school and schooling.

And I never thought—Mr. Jones, who works with me, is a Marine Corps brat, and I am an Air Force brat—our mothers would never—couldn't dream of us having a discussion with the two distinguished gentlemen about childcare at the time that they moved us all around the country and the world. So with childcare slots are you pretty much—again, is that on base, off base? Because the federal childcare right here, right now, if one of our staff is even thinking of getting pregnant they often put themselves on the list so that they are available for childcare.

So if you could just kind of talk about daily life on base, off base, and what some of your—what do you see in the future for these two services that you are representing? Because things have changed a lot in 20, 30, and even 10 years with family life.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, ma'am. And thank you for your interest in our families.

I maintain that our sailors have never lived as well as they live today, thanks to the support of this committee and the Congress. There are many reasons for that. One is the compensation that our sailors receive.

But more importantly, it is what has been provided for them. If a young family or even a young sailor wants to invest and—in their own home we encourage that. But in our Fleet and Family Service centers we have financial counselors to make sure that they are making those investments wisely.

In fact, I have been very pleased with how responsible every—our sailors have been in these economic times during a period when there were very attractive financial constructs being presented that later on turned out to be less than attractive. But our sailors have made wise investments and so they have bought into, you know, the American dream, if you will.

But the biggest thing, I think, that has changed the quality of life for our families, particularly those that live on base, is the public-private housing venture. The quality of the homes, the care with which those homes are maintained, and the promptness with which they are maintained has been absolutely extraordinary.

And, you know, I go back to my early days in the Navy and it would have been unheard of to be able to walk into a sailor's home

today and see the size, the quality, and just how modern things are. So that has really changed how our sailors live. And we have also used a couple of pilot programs to do two pilot programs for single sailors in the public-private venture, and they are absolutely extraordinary facilities as well.

In the area of childcare, we—as we close out this year we will have added another 7,000 spaces for childcare. When you go to those facilities they are extremely well-designed, well-staffed.

One of the things that we are finding, because of the pace with which we are operating and more of our families having to be dual-income families, that we are having to expand the after-hour and kind of the pre-hour, and even 24-hour childcare, because, you know, no longer does a young family have the luxury of saying, “Well, I have to leave work early today so I can go pick my child up.” They may not have a job the next day if they do that too often.

So we have put a lot of effort into that and I think we are in great shape with respect to childcare. Wait lists are down and we are meeting the targets that have been set for us. So quality of life is great.

The other area I would say we have made some great progress in are in our naval hospitals. The medical care that we enjoy is extraordinary. And so the quality of life for our people, from compensation to where they live to where their children are taken care of is the best I have ever seen.

With regard to Impact Aid, I know that is an issue from time to time but it is not something that has come up frequently recently. But I will take that for the record and get back to you on that.

General AMOS. Ma’am, the housing situation for us in the Marine Corps is just exactly what—it mirrors what the CNO has said. I have never seen anything as nice.

You don’t have to travel any further south than about 28 miles on—south on I-95 to go to the Marine Corps base at Quantico, and they replaced, I think, 440 of the old units that I grew up in, and there is not an old one down there. They are beautiful townhomes. We would buy these things if we had enough money privately to be able to do this.

So about 99 percent—I was just looking at my list of figures—99 percent of CONUS base—continental United States base—housing—military housing for the Marine Corps is privatized. We have three kinds of housing. We move out in town and we rent or we buy in town; then we have the privatized housing, which is a public-private venture; and then we have some government housing.

Where I live at Marine Barracks Washington at 8th & I is government housing. Iwakuni—Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni—is government housing. But they are very few and far between. And I tell you, the folks that are in them absolutely love them.

I think we are doing the right thing on that. We have very, very few inadequate houses. I mean, the number is down, like in the single percentile, and we are fixing those or tearing them down.

Childcare: We have—as a result of 9 and 10 years of war and the graciousness of Congress we have built an awful lot of childcare centers. I can come back to you and tell you precisely how many, but in the last—between last year, 2010, and this year, 2011, we will have built six brand new childcare centers.

I cut the ribbon on one at Twentynine Palms not too long ago and it is absolutely beautiful. It is a recognition that, just as Admiral Roughead said, we have dual-income families.

We suffer or we work our way through the same challenges of keeping them open, coming open early, staying late. But I will tell you that we do one other thing in some of the areas where we—even though we have built, I think—my guess is we have probably doubled the amount of childcare centers at Camp Pendleton, the same thing at Miramar.

It is not enough. Truth of the matter is we are probably 80 percent of need across the Marine Corps.

But there is recognition that in some cases, like Camp Pendleton and at Miramar, there are off-base childcare centers that perform just fine. In many cases they are very close to where the family lives.

We subsidize those. So in other words, we pay a subsidy so that that military member—that Marine—doesn't have to pay beyond a certain amount. We pay a certain amount and then if they want a more robust childcare then they pay above that. But we go to great lengths to try to accommodate that.

Ms. MCCOLLUM. Thank you.

Mr. Chair, you started off by saying things are changing today, you know, by the hour.

And General Amos, in your testimony you made a critical statement. You said that you believe that Congress—I am paraphrasing. I took from this that you need to believe that Congress needs to hear loud and clear.

On page two of your testimony and I quote and you say, "As we look ahead we see a world of increasing instability, failed or falling states, and conflict characterized by poverty, unemployment, urbanization, overpopulation, and extremism, and competition for scarce resources." And you go on to make other great points.

DEVELOPMENT AID VS MILITARY AID

But my time being limited, I just came back from Yemen. I spoke at the war college there a couple of weeks ago. And all those things are just ready to go one way or the other in Yemen—either opportunities for freedom or an opportunity for chaos like we won't know in the—especially with Somalia. And, you know, that whole thing about Barbary pirates that might not be put to rest.

So my question is, one of the things that we struggle with as appropriators is—I served on the Foreign and State Operations Appropriations for a while, and the House right now is focused on cutting investments that alleviate poverty, that work towards agriculture development, voluntary family planning, water and sanitation in many of these Middle East countries. And I would like to have you address all of us just a little bit about what your statements and how you feel that we need to hear loud and clear that the military thinks that development aid should try to be used before military aid and we put a soldier in harm's way.

General AMOS. Congresswoman, I spent—thank you for the question. I had a little bit of an advantage when we wrote that. I spent a year and a half working very diligently to try to determine what we thought the future security environment was going to be.

There is a lot more detail behind that. I mean, almost months and months and months of travel and talking to folks to determine what we thought the world would look like for the next 2 decades. And so what you have are the wave tops.

I believe it. I think if you look at Europe, Europe is a declining population—the central part of Europe. And yet you look at any of the areas around the littoral areas that the naval forces operate on there is a growth in population, a growth of young men, predominantly.

There will be areas where there will be unemployment. There will be states that are trying to control their borders and will be struggling to do so. There will be groups of people that will have state-like weapons, and I think you saw that with Hezbollah several years ago and you see it today.

So that is the world we are going to operate in, and I think I would echo the recent comments by our Secretary of Defense when he said, be careful as we apply and we step forward to apply military power. The interesting thing is that from the military side of the house we are probably the most conservative with regards to when the application of military power is applied.

So I will tell you, each case is different. Each country, each nation will require different aspects of help.

But I am in complete agreement with you. I think we just—we need to proceed carefully.

And there is recognition that there is help that the military can give in the future in many of these kinds of cases. It can be medical; it can be dental; it can be training—just training forces to protect their own nation, what we call foreign internal defense. So there are things that we can do to help nations begin to recognize their own sense of stability in the future.

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you.

As I understood Ms. McCollum's questions it is—of course, I think everyone agrees it is always better to try diplomacy, and to the extent that American foreign aid can alleviate misery overseas that is always a noble, good cause. I have personally found, through experience with an organization in Houston started by a friend, Malcom Morris, at Stewart Title, Living Water—profound effects of clean drinking water, to the extent that you all's subcommittee that—can focus on providing clean drinking water to these desperately poor communities, it is transformational—liberates women, kids, and does more, probably, to fight AIDS and disease than almost anything else we can do. And the bad guys—it is very difficult for them to steal it.

So I look forward to working with you on that, Ms. McCollum. Something I strongly support is doing as much clean drinking water as we can.

In an environment, though, however—the reason for the C.R. is, of course—I want to make sure we clarify for the record—the reason for the C.R. is a very profound and sincere difference of opinion based on core principle from—those of us in the new majority are deeply and profoundly concerned, were hired by the voters in this last election to try to get spending under control and control the debt. So we will do our very best.

And I think this committee is different, however. All of us in this committee work arm-in-arm without regard to party to ensure that we are giving our men and women in uniform the safest, securest living quarters, the very best possible health care, to make sure that your logistical chain is not interrupted.

So I know we will all be working—all of us in this committee—to help persuade our leadership to—if we are going to continue the CCRs at least break out our piece of the bill and get you the help that you need to make sure that there are no air bubbles in that logistics chain to our men and women on the front lines and that you get the BEQs taken care of, General, and that you get your critical needs taken care of in the Navy as well.

SHIPBUILDING AND MULTIYEAR PROCUREMENTS

It is distressing to hear, Admiral, that our ability to build two Virginia-class submarines per year is threatened by the continuation of C.R.s when the Chinese are building so many subs, and as vital as submarines are.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I would also add that not only is the ability to build the two submarines a year threatened by the C.R. but it will tend to unravel a multiyear procurement that would enable a much better price across several years.

Mr. CULBERSON. Well, we will all be working to try to get our piece of the bill done in a permanent way as soon as possible.

I want to recognize at this time the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Austria.

OPERATION AND CONTRACTING UNDER A CR

Mr. AUSTRIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And General Amos and—excuse me—Admiral Roughead, thank you for your service to our country. Thank you for being here.

I would also like to just echo what the chairman just said. I appreciate you commenting today about the impacts of the current C.R. on the operation and contracting ability of the Navy and the Marine Corps. It is critical that we get either a defense appropriations bill, in my opinion, or some type of C.R. that includes the language, General, that you made reference to in H.R. 1 to be able to proceed with the new start ability.

EFV CANCELLATION

Just to kind of feed on what the Chairman just said, in Ohio, Admiral, I know—you know, one of the areas that is impacted is the ability to be able to service and purchase warships, and in Ohio we have 160 submarine industrial base suppliers who employ highly skilled wage manufacturing workers. And I am sure with the Marine Corps it is the same thing.

And my fear is that if these workers cannot continue to work that, you know, they could be laid off, seek employment elsewhere, and because they are highly skilled it would be very difficult to rehire such employees on the civilian side. So I want to also just put my two cents in saying that I do—I also believe that it is a high priority that we give DOD the new start authority needed to con-

tinue important programs and projects that are vital to our national security and local economies.

Let me move over—let me start, General Amos, with you on the Marine Corps side, because one of the issues that have come up, and there has been confusion, I think, in Congress as well regarding the amphibious assault vehicle. General, when the Marine Corps' budget was released less than a month ago the Marine Corps official that was making the presentation said that the initial operating capability, the IOC, for the new amphibious vehicle, known as the amphibious combat vehicle, will be in the year 2024.

And I know you stated that you intend to end this program as well, but also I believe I read somewhere where you also wanted to drive a prototype of this vehicle during your tenure as commandant. And so there has been some confusion as far as statements that have been made by the Marine Corps, at least in some of the members of Congress' eyes, and there are concerns as to what direction we are really headed over the—in the future of replacing the 40-year-old amphibious assault vehicle. So if you could comment on that I would appreciate it very much, and help clarify—

General AMOS. I appreciate the opportunity, and I apologize for any confusion. I think I will clear it up here.

I recommended to the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of Defense late last fall that we cancel the Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program. I did that because the cost was onerous.

I get asked often what has changed. General Amos, did you just wake up one morning and figure out that it was expensive? No, actually I became the Commandant of the Marine Corps on October 22nd and I am responsible for the fiscal readiness, the combat readiness of the Marine Corps, and the fiscal stability of our Corps.

So I took a look at the cost of the program. I took a look at the operations and maintenance cost that was projected in the future. And then I took a look at things like reset, things that we have appeared before other committees and said, "We have a \$10.6 billion bill when we come out of Afghanistan to reset the Marine Corps," and that is just to take the equipment and fix it and get it renewed.

I have got a \$5 billion bill just to reconstitute the Marine Corps, to get the whole Marine Corps back up to its—so I looked at all of that and then I looked at the 2½ decade-old Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle program and I said, "This is a bad business deal."

Mr. AUSTRIA. And how much money has been invested in that? How much—

General AMOS. We have \$3.2 billion in that program, and I regret—and I am embarrassed to tell you that. I am well aware of that. We will not lose all of that because the capabilities and the knowledge points and all that has gone into the development of that vehicle for the last 2½ decades will apply. Some of that—not all of it, but some of it—will apply to where we are headed.

But that vehicle was not going to be fully operational capable until 2026, so that was going to be a 4-decade-old program that was going to break the back of the Marine Corps financially. So I recommended to the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the Navy agreed. The program has been terminated.

And so where are we today? This gets to the—my tenure as the Commandant, and if left to the acquisition timeline that would—what I would call standard timeline, then the new amphibious combat vehicle, the replacement of what I am talking—of the one we just cancelled—would be out there a long ways away. And I threaten to throw something that anybody that is in my staff that says, “Sir, this is not going to IOC until the 2020-something-or-other,” and I say, “Wrong.”

I have got 3½ years left as the Commandant. I think we have a good model with the MRAP program, the way that the acquisition community turned on its head to change the way we do business.

Now, we went at that pretty aggressively and that was very expensive. I think we can take a little bit more measured approach. But my sense is this, Congressman, and I have the support of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Navy and all the acquisition folks—excuse me, the AT&L folks and ASN-RDA, research and development, that we will push the acquisition timeline on this thing.

We will take something probably a little bit more measured than the MRAP, but way, way more aggressive than the current acquisition cycle. I told them that I wanted to have a vehicle—I wanted to have a program of record in 3½ years when I give this job up that I can touch and that I can get in the vehicle and I can drive it into the water, and that is the direction I am going. This program is going to be personally micromanaged by the highest level of the Marine Corps.

Mr. AUSTRIA. General, I think the concern that we have, or some of us have, is that you are doing away with a program without a firm—or a replacement for the 40-year-old vehicle that is in place right now. And unless I misunderstood you, unless you have a firm plan or a new project in place, you know, that is one of the concerns that we have is a lot of money has been invested and a lot of time has been invested in—

General AMOS. I do understand that, Congressman. It became a function of, when do you do this? When do I try to get myself back to being solvent in my budget process?

So we put out a—what we call a request for information out to industry about 4 weeks ago, and it went out saying, “This is what we are looking for. Will you come back to us, industry”—we gave industry 60 days to come back and say, “This is the art of the possible.”

Industry comes back and does this. We also have a parallel effort going on with a couple of significant engineering universities in our country to talk about physics of what we are looking for. So all that will come to bear probably in about the next 4 weeks, and then we are going to sit down and put out what we call—we will refine the requirements; we are not going to admire that. That will take less than 60 days.

And then we are going to put those out in what we call an RFP, a request for proposal. And that begins the official process.

We are going to accelerate this, Congressman. I guess in 3½ years you will give me a letter grade on how we have done, but this is very, very important to me.

Mr. AUSTRIA. General, I appreciate that and I certainly want to talk some more about that with you and your staff if I could.

F-35 ENGINES

But because of limited time, Admiral, I would like to ask one more question of—another controversial issue with the F-35s. You know, it has been stated by the U.S. Navy and Department of Defense officials that over the past few budget cycles, by having two competing engines of the F-35 that require two sets of everything—things like two different sets of spare parts, two different sets of shipping containers, different tools, dual training maintainers, et cetera—and Admiral, I know you have argued in the past that keeping two engines for the F-35 in the decks of aircraft carriers would not be advisable as space is at a premium, I think is the words that you used, and therefore you could—you were opposed to the one-engine camp—or it put you in that camp of one engine.

But I think when I look—when we—when I look at this and I look back to the early days of Operation Freedom—Enduring Freedom in 2001 the Navy was responsible for maintaining, I believe, nine different type model series engines that could be utilized on a carrier, and all these engines required its own set of unique support equipment—hand tools, intermediate level maintenance, known as I-level training. It was very cumbersome, and I think that argument would make sense for the legacy aircraft, but I would look at the F-35 a little bit different now that you are responsible only for maintaining five different type model series engines, that now the F-35 is—you have the interchangeable engines that enjoy 100 percent—and I—commonality, and hand tools, and support equipment, and shipping containers.

And so I want, you know, just to get your thoughts and your—when you make—when some are making that comparison with the F-135 and F-136 being interchangeable.

Mr. CULBERSON. If I could very quickly—forgive me for interrupting—we are going to vote probably between 3:15 and 3:30. There is a whole series of votes. So in the interest of time I will not do any follow-up questions; I will submit all those for the record.

So if y'all could just keep your answers as brief as you could and we will move right on to try to give everybody a chance to ask questions before the vote series starts and before the first vote ends, I hope.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And the additional engines that are one the aircraft carrier, for every air frame we carry one type of engine. The F-35 would be different; we have two.

So the numbers of airplanes and types of airplanes are different that we carry on the carrier. They are not all going to be F-35s. So having the two engines, two support structures for one particular airplane is just—is not where we want to be, particularly engines of the size that we are talking about here.

And it is just a much leaner process for the way that we operate our naval air force and the way we go to sea. And it is not just on the aircraft carriers, but it is on our large amphibious ships as well.

Mr. AUSTRIA. Yes.

And I will yield back because of time. Thank you—

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you very much.

And, I believe, Mr. Farr.

Mr. FARR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I just want to take one issue of a point you said: I don't think the voters sent us here to put the nation at risk. And these 2-week C.R.s—and I am very proud that both of you commented on how risky it is for us to run a nation 2 weeks at a time with no certainty as to future ability to commit anything, and I hope that this is the last 2-week C.R. we ever see in our lifetime.

NPS CENTER FOR CROSS-CULTURAL EDUCATION

I do have a very serious question, and I want to know—and I have great appreciation for both of you, being great leaders in your field and it is just a privilege to have you both here. But I have a very serious question of General Amos.

What year did you graduate from Carmel High School and was it your class that lost the football streak—winning streak that my class started and nobody ever lost a game until—class came along?

General AMOS. Congressman, I have pictures of us carrying out the shoe over there at Pacific Grove and dragging it over to Carmel where our championship team went undefeated. By the way, they just did it again last year.

Mr. FARR. That is right. And you and I were there. What year did you graduate?

General AMOS. Sir, if I tell you that everyone is going to think, "How did you become the Commandant? You are so old." 1964.

Mr. FARR. Well, I am a couple years—you and I were in school together.

Mr. MORAN. This is so important we have got it on the record, you know? [Laughter.]

Mr. FARR. Look, don't underestimate the power of our community. We have, out of that community, Leon Panetta at CIA, General Amos in the Marine Corps, Sam Farr in Congress, Barbara Menic, head of USGS, and Ben Jealous, president of the NAACP. Not good for a small—not bad for a small little community.

Anyway, General, I really appreciate your comments in your record about seeing the world of increasing instability and pointing out its poverty, unemployment, and all those things that I was in the Peace Corps trying to solve. But I wonder, have you been to the Naval Postgraduate School and seen what they are doing in the area there on the Center for Cross-Cultural Education?

General AMOS. Congressman, I was out at the PG school here—this was probably just before Christmas, about a month and a half, 2 months after I became the Commandant, and I made that trip for two reasons: one, as I was preparing for this job I—taking a look at the environment we were actually going to operate in and it became clear to me that we needed more foreign area officers, we needed more regional area officers, we needed more folks with language expertise. That is one piece of it.

And then I wanted to take a look at the Postgraduate School and then what their graduate—what the Master's Degree educations were focused in. Because my sense was that we are repeating what

we had done the year before. And so I have not been to that specific piece of the Postgraduate School but I am a fan of it. We are working through it now.

Mr. FARR. Well, what I would like you to do is, you have created—the Marine Corps has created the Center for Advanced Operational Cultural Language—for Learning. The Naval Postgraduate School has its center there also. And we need to have more collaboration between NPS—and in fact, they were ahead of the Marine Corps in creating this.

But I think it would—the collaboration would—between NPS and the CAOCL would safeguard your resources and ensure that, you know, that you get the best bang for the buck. Both training centers are excellent, but we want to leverage the regional expertise that you have at NPS.

By the way, for this committee you—we do construction of language buildings at the Defense Language Institute, and just as a commentary, the Commandant of the—command of that school has always told me that the Marine Corps is the first to send soldiers there for a new language, and they are really—the Marine Corps is very language-sensitive and I am glad that we have such a great institution to train them. It is a Defense Language Institute so every service sends people there.

General Amos, I also—a question, actually, for Admiral Roughhead.

The Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction—it is a remarkable center because it brings together the nongovernmental agencies and other civilian types—U.N. and State Department USAID. And I wondered—the Navy had sent officers there to get a Master's Degree, and this is the only place in the world you can get this kind of a Master's Degree. As long as we are doing counterinsurgency and trying to get very smart about this stuff I think you are setting that up at the school was a wise decision.

But this program has never been POMed; it has always had to be earmarked. And I wondered in—whether it can get around to being POMed. And a lot of the money coming for it is coming from third party supporters, from people who take these short courses.

And do you think that it is—I know we are in tough budget situation, but this is—in light of Commander Amos' comments about how we need to—this is what we are looking at in the instability of the world that these trainings teach us how to stabilize and to reconstruct. When will the Navy create a subspecialty code designation for stabilization and reconstruction so that the clear positions can be achieved in this area?

Admiral ROUGHHEAD. Yes, sir. One of the things I am quite proud of is the increase that we put into our foreign area officer program. We are taking it to 400 officers. This year I named the first flag officer foreign area officer, which I think is important for the viability of that community so that we can have leadership and community management.

We find value in our foreign area officers being able to take the courses that are there. That said, much of what we do as FAOs, as we call them, is not necessarily in the reconstruction process itself, so I think there is a lot of value—

Mr. FARR. But that is a different program at NPS. The FAO program is phenomenal and you are doing a great job with that and—

Admiral ROUGHEAD. But my point being is that I think that that institution, as you said, is much sought after by other agencies and I would like to look at ways to fund it with a combination of resources from all the other activities that are using it.

Mr. FARR. Well, I think if we can get it into—one of the differences here is this specialized training in stability ops is that we don't have MOSs for them, and it is very difficult to take people—and I have talked to so many soldiers and airmen and Marines in theater who tell me they would love to go back. They have now had this cross-cultural experience; they really want to make a career of this.

But they tell them, come back and get a Master's Degree at the Naval Postgraduate School—where do they go after that? There is no real—the closest thing is an FAO and this is not an FAO's position so much, because these people are in the field and the FAOs are in the embassy.

And I think it is—you have both pointed out the necessity to us to get a lot smarter in this area. You have got the programs but you haven't POMed them or you haven't found titles or—MOSs for people with those credentials.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I would say that most of our billets in the Navy are really at sea. And while I think there is a great awareness of the need for those sorts of dimensions of it for us in the Navy to have reconstruction experts, I would submit that that is more the purview of the ground forces, where they operate in country, as opposed to the Navy, which is primarily at sea.

Mr. FARR. Well, in all due respect, I mean, you do—you just commented on the FAO program, and I was just telling you the value of that program. A bunch of us were in Indonesia 2 weeks ago today on the USS *Reuben James*, which was in the Port of Jakarta, and just the day before two officers had arrived from the Naval Postgraduate School, and I just went up and they were just—they couldn't speak enough of the training they got there. It was the best thing that ever happened in their careers.

And what you see is that there is a keen interest in this but still in big Navy and big Marine Corps we have not given these people the—what does MOS stand for—military occupational specialty.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir. And I think as we—as I look at the specialties that we generate in the Navy, the military operational specialty for onshore reconstruction is not necessarily a field where the Navy will find itself habitually employed. I think there are facets of it, clearly, that our foreign area officers and even regional experts may need to have, but to have the MOS for the Navy I would submit that that falls more under the purview of the ground force.

Mr. FARR. And yet in your testimony you listed areas of specialty missions that you need on ground for—that even though it is a—the school is governed by, or under your premise it teaches all the services—

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir, and—

Mr. FARR [continuing]. Marines, and others are at the school.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. But I think there is a difference between an MOS and then knowledge in the various areas. And then the question is where do we spread our scarce resources?

Mr. FARR. Okay. Well, I am going to pursue this. We will do it perhaps in my office. Because I really do think that both of you have pointed out that we are in an increasingly instable world, and the problem is that Americans are so isolated in their ability to understand languages and cultures—and culture understanding is absolutely critical. As we know, we have done a lot of dumb things overseas just because we were so unaware of cultural values.

And the more we can train the forces that are going to be there on the ground and are trying to stabilize, and—I know, you know, 10 years ago—not even that—8 years ago you would have never—people in this Congress would have criticized anybody in the military for trying to stability ops because they would say, “Oh, that is nation-building.”

But we have moved beyond that and we realize that is security. That is security. That is what you leave behind.

And we can get into these countries but we have a hell of a job getting out. And you two do a great job in the services of doing the military stuff really well. This is a new frontier, and I think that we need to develop the skills for the new frontier and put them in people in uniform.

So I will continue to hack away at this.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. Yes, sir.

Mr. CULBERSON. Thank you, Mr. Farr.

NNMC-WALTER REED CONSOLIDATION

Let me recognize the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Moran.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, the National Naval Medical Center—premier military hospital in the world. It has undergone enormous transformation. It is relevant to our military construction appropriations bill.

Are you copacetic about what is going to happen in September of this year when it is supposed to open up and everybody is supposed to sing Kumbaya and work with Walter Reed and navigate the transportation situation?

Admiral ROUGHEAD. I give great credit to those who have been involved in bringing the project together. We will complete the requirements that BRAC has set forth. And I see the staff coming together as we speak, and Bethesda or the new Walter Reed will be ready to take care of patients then, sir.

Mr. MORAN. You think so? Well, let's hope so. Let's hope that you are right, Admiral.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION PROGRAMS

General Amos, I want to congratulate you on the number of—the decline in the number of reported sexual assaults last year. According to the data that was given to my office the number of incidents declined from 331 in 2009 to 310 in 2010.

But the data is somewhat puzzling. The number of restricted reports, which allows a victim to disclose the details of the assault confidentially and doesn't trigger an official investigation, nearly doubled; the number of unrestricted reports, which does trigger a

formal investigation, actually declined by nearly 17 percent, from roughly 300 to 250.

My fear is that our Marines are suppressing reporting sexual assaults to their superiors and are otherwise avoiding the formal investigation process. I think maybe we could get some comment from you briefly on how the Marine Corps is handling cases of sexual assault and reassure this committee that our Marines are not afraid to report these incidents up the chain of command.

General AMOS. I was encouraged by the decline of the unrestricted reports. I want to be clear to the committee that one sexual assault is one too many. That is our goal, to get to zero sexual assaults.

This is a systemic issue across the United States of America; it is just not within the military. But we own our backyards and we are responsible for it, and we are going to try—we are working very, very hard to reduce this down to zero.

I don't have the—it would just be surmising why the restricted reports increased. I will tell you that my sense is, and what I am hearing from feedback for our I.G.—inspector generals that go out and talk to our Marines out in the fleet—is that they are more comfortable in coming forward when an incident happens.

My sense also is that oftentimes—and this is predominantly our females, although there are males that are sexually assaulted—are willing now to report the issue or report the incident or the crime, which is a—I think is a good sign.

In other words, they have confidence in the leadership that they can come forward. They just don't want this to become public knowledge. That is my sense.

Mr. MORAN. Yes. That is my sense, too. It raised a bit of suspicion when the restricted cases are going up, the unrestricted cases are going down. You figure, well, the word passes, let's restrict the investigation and then we will come forward.

So I understand that. And as long as you are cognizant of that, because to some extent that is a—you know, that is a problem.

General AMOS. I am. And if I could just pile on here and not drag this out, but to think that—another thing that just really stood out to me, about 2009 we began an aggressive—we, the Department of the Navy—began aggressive training our prosecuting attorneys, training our investigating—and it takes a unique skill set to ensure that you do this thing the right way.

SUICIDE PREVENTION PROGRAMS

And just looking at the 2009—if you take a look at the court marshals and non-judicial punishments and the other administrative actions and discharges, in fiscal year 2009 we had 49. In 2010—in fiscal year 2010—we had 154. So a 300 percent, I guess, improvement, or—

Mr. MORAN. Well, in the—

General AMOS [continuing]. To protect our young Marines.

Mr. MORAN. That is very good.

The last question is—and I think you might expect this because we have talked about this before—is suicides. And both in the Navy and the Marine Corps the highest number of suicides was in 2009. There has been some improvement since then, but—of

course, the Marine Corps is a lot smaller than the Navy and the Marine Corps has a disproportionate number of suicides, as I know you are very aware of and concerned about, General.

It did spike at 52, which is just about the number that the Navy had, 46. I think it would be useful to get your response on the record with regard to suicides, both before, during, and after deployment. So perhaps both of you might respond for a bit and that would conclude my question.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. If I could, thank you, sir. In 2009 we had 46; in 2010 we dropped down to 38 because of intervention. But I will also tell you that this past month, February, we had the worst month we have ever recorded, so—

Mr. MORAN. Oh, you did? Oh.

Admiral ROUGHEAD. But ours are not tied to deployment. Ours are more a matter of personal problems. And the commonality that exists is a personal problem, you mix alcohol, and you put a gun in the room, and the risk of suicide goes up.

Our process—we are stressing the importance of intervention, the importance of detecting changes and then not simply standing by and questioning whether there is a change but actually going to a supervisor, going to the individual. And we are not taking our eye off this one.

Mr. MORAN. Good. Thank you, Admiral.

General.

General AMOS. Congressman, you are absolutely right. In 2009 the 52 took our breath away. We went after this aggressively as a leadership issue, and last year we were at 37. Now, that is a significant decrease.

We are not happy at 37. It is like sexual assaults—one is too many. But this is leadership at the noncommissioned officer level and the junior officer level and we are going after it aggressively.

I echo what CNO said. It is typically—the factors are a relationship issue, a legal issue, you throw some alcohol or some drugs in there and then all of a sudden you have got the recipe for a disaster.

Mr. MORAN. And it is almost always they are shooting themselves—usually a gun?

General AMOS. Well, for us it is—I mean, I have got the exact numbers of how many people take their lives by guns and hanging and this kind of thing, but it is not always a gun for us. But we handle guns; that is our nature in the Marine Corps, so Marines are comfortable with that.

But I will tell you that we are making great progress on this fight. And right now today we are fewer today than we were last year at this same date. So I am encouraged.

Mr. MORAN. Good.

Mr. Chairman, we have got a vote on. Thank you for the opportunity to ask these questions.

These are two—I mean, I know all of us have said it. We all think that these are two remarkable men who lead our Navy and Marine Corps. We are blessed.

Thank you.

Mr. CULBERSON. And important questions, Mr. Moran.

We thank you both for your service, and it is a source of great pride for us to be able to support you. I know in the interest of time, because we are in the last 5 minutes of—4 minutes of this vote, I am going to submit all my questions for the record.

Mr. Bishop, any further questions?

Mr. BISHOP. Same here. We will submit our questions for the record.

Mr. CULBERSON. Again, thank you very much, Admiral Roughead, General Amos, for your service. It is our privilege to help you, and I know this entire committee is committed to ensure that your piece of the—that the military construction piece of this bill get done as soon as possible so we can get you out of the C.R., we hope, ASAP.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Chairman Culberson for General Amos follows:]

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 1. Last year, General Conway expressed some serious concern about both the cost of the realignment from Okinawa to Guam, as well as the ability to properly train your forces in the Pacific. General Amos, do you feel that concerns about the relocation are being addressed?

Answer. There is currently an effort underway within the Department of Defense and OSD to reconcile what the real cost will be. As you know, the total cost was forecast to be, \$10.6 billion, of which the United States share was \$4.2 billion.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 2. General, do you believe that the timeline for the relocation can be achieved?

Answer. (CMC stated response) Construction was supposed to start but it all depends on what happens on Okinawa. Is the Futenma replacement facility built? The landfill has not been signed by the governor of Okinawa yet.

Construction was supposed to begin in 2007 and be completed by 2014. Since that has not happened, the situation is certainly pressurized by the fact that we have not begun construction yet and it's 2011.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 3. What issues would not allow the relocation to occur?

Answer. The relocation is contingent upon tangible progress towards the completion of the Futenma Replacement Facility.

The May 28, 2010, Joint Statement of the U.S. — Japan Security Consultative Committee, signed by Secretary of State Clinton and Secretary of Defense Gates "reaffirmed that, as provided for in the Guam Agreement of February 17, 2009, the relocation of approximately 8,000 III Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) personnel and their approximately 9,000 dependents from Okinawa to Guam is dependent on tangible progress toward the completion of the replacement facility. The relocation to Guam will realize the consolidation and return of most of the facilities south of Kadena."

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 4. Does the current construction plan for Guam fulfill the increased demand associated with USMC aviation?

Answer. Yes. The Guam Joint Military Master Plan includes planned Marine Corps aviation MILCON requirements on Guam.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 5. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes numerous references to the need to increase the "resiliency" of U.S. bases overseas, including the "hardening" of key facilities. The Air Force includes funding in unspecified "resiliency" measures in Guam; however, the Navy does not appear to make any similar commitment for Guam. What, if any, will be the impact of this QDR policy on the construction in Guam, both for the realignment and non-realignment Navy and Marine Corps MILCON projects?

Answer. The Department of the Navy (DON) does not have a "resiliency" and "hardening" policy. DON is developing a policy that will cover more than "resiliency" and "hardening" of facilities.

The USMC Realignment projects on Guam have been scoped and priced based on the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) 4-010-01 Department of Defense Minimum Antiterrorism Standards For Buildings and on the MCON/MCNR Project Cost Development & Review Guidelines - September 2010. UFC Design Strategies for the facilities and exterior sites include maximizing building standoff distances, minimizing hazardous flying debris, providing effective building layouts, limiting airborne contamination, providing mass notification, and facilitating future upgrades. According to the MCON/MCNR Project Cost Development & Review Guidelines, an ATFP outside cost is part of the supporting facilities while the inside ATFP cost is determined as one percent of the construction costs for low-rise or 2.5 percent for high-rise buildings. If conventional construction stand-off distances cannot be achieved, an additional "ATFP Premium" cost item is included for building hardening or enhancements.

Once DON issues policy related to "resiliency" and "hardening", the actual impacts to construction on Guam would most likely yield higher construction costs.

Futenma Replacement Facility

Question 6. The U.S. has consistently taken the position that the realignment in Okinawa is contingent on progress toward the Futenma Replacement Facility, currently planned for Camp Schwab. Some people on the Japanese side have suggested that the Futenma Replacement Facility could be moved off of Okinawa or even out of Japan entirely. Is there an operational requirement for the Marine Corps to have an air station on Okinawa?

Answer. Yes. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is a critical doctrinal component of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) on Okinawa. All MAGTF components must plan, train and operate together as a team to maintain readiness and the ability to respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and other contingencies in the region.

Futenma Replacement Facility

Question 7. What would be the impact if this activity were moved to mainland Japan, or to the area of Guam?

Answer. There are no US Government plans to move the Futenma Replacement Facility off Okinawa.

Family Housing

Question 8. The Department of Defense shifted its definition of inadequate family housing from one based on the amount of needed repairs to one based on a condition quality rating. How has this affected your number of homes classified as inadequate, as well as your timetable for eliminating inadequate housing?

Answer. This has not affected either the number of Marine Corps homes classified as inadequate or the timetable for eliminating the inadequate housing. For all the homes identified inadequate based on condition quality rating, the amount of repairs required to restore the unit to a Q1 rating also exceeded the threshold for inadequacy under the old definition. Additionally, there were no homes that exceeded the old level of repair threshold that did not receive an inadequate quality condition rating of at least Q3.

Question 9. In your testimony you discuss the three-part housing strategy that the Navy is pursuing. Can you explain this strategy and how it differs from previous your previous housing strategy?

Answer. Our strategy has not changed. As in past years, our family housing strategy consists of the following prioritized triad:

Reliance on the Private Sector. In accordance with longstanding DoD and DoN policy, we rely first on the local community to provide housing for our Sailors, Marines, and their families. Approximately three out of four Navy and Marine Corps families receive a Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) and own or rent homes in the community. We determine the ability of the private sector to meet our needs through the conduct of housing market analyses that evaluate supply and demand conditions in the areas surrounding our military installations.

Public/Private Ventures (PPVs). With the strong support from this Committee and others, we have successfully used PPV authorities enacted in 1996 to partner with the private sector to help meet our housing needs through the use of private sector capital. These authorities allow us to leverage our own resources and provide better housing faster to our families. Maintaining the purchasing power of BAH is critical to the success of both privatized and private sector housing 97% of the Marine Corps world-wide family housing inventory is privatized. Maintaining an adequate rental stream from BAH is essential to the continued successful operations, maintenance and long-term recapitalization of our privatized family housing inventory.

Military Construction. Military construction (MILCON) will continue to be used where PPV authorities don't apply (such as overseas), or where a business case analysis shows that a PPV project is not feasible.

For the Marine Corps, our budget requests \$26M for the revitalization of 76 homes in Iwakuni, Japan.

Question 10. Is your budget request of \$75 million for family housing construction adequate to continue to address improvements that need to be made to Navy housing to raise the current "Q" rating?

Answer. Navy question to answer.

Post-Afghanistan Security Environment

Question 11. This past fall the Marine Corps conducted a detailed force structure review to develop a mix of capabilities for the Marine Corps' role in Post-Afghanistan security environment. Can you inform the Committee what challenges confront the Marine Corps and what the review revealed?

Answer. The environment has changed dramatically in the last two decades, shifting from a competition between superpowers to a world of increasing instability and conflict, characterized by poverty, competition for resources, urbanization, overpopulation and extremism. Failed states or those that cannot adequately govern their territory can become safe havens for terrorist, insurgent and criminal groups that threaten the U.S. and our allies. Characterized by inherently unpredictable hybrid threats that combine irregular and conventional capabilities in a highly lethal manner, this environment demands a flexible, adaptable, and versatile military force that is ready and capable of being forward-deployed and forward-engaged, building partnerships, and immediately responding to crises or contingencies. Responding to a wide range of crises in a timely manner will require regionally-focused headquarters and forces that are both forward-postured and immediately deployable with a minimum of strategic lift. Sea-based forces, in particular, will be invaluable for discreet engagement activities, rapid crisis response, and sustainable power projection.

Addressing these challenges, the 21st century Marine Corps' force structure must provide a strategically mobile, *middleweight force* optimized for rapid crisis response and forward-presence. It must be light enough to leverage the flexibility and capacity of amphibious shipping, yet heavy enough to accomplish the mission. Larger than special operations forces, but lighter and more expeditionary than conventional Army units, we must be able to engage and respond quickly — often from the sea — with enough force to carry the day upon arrival.

The imperative for the Marine Corps is to preserve capabilities developed since 9/11, expand our engagement efforts, respond to crisis, and still be able to project power for the most dangerous threat scenarios. To that end we will accept a degree of risk by reducing our active component capacity for conducting multiple, major sustained operations ashore, relying on an "operationalized" reserve component to mitigate that risk. Of necessity, our force structure represents many judiciously considered factors and makes pragmatic trade-offs in capabilities and capacities to achieve a posture that creates opportunity and provides an operational stance that enables flexibility and rapid response. The resulting force structure described in this report:

- reduces the end strength of the active component of the Marine Corps from 202,000 to approximately 186,800 following the completion of Marine Corps operations in Afghanistan;

- provides a force optimized for forward-presence, which facilitates both ongoing engagement activities and rapid crisis response;
- provides readiness for immediate deployment and employment;
- re-shapes organizations, capabilities, and capacities to increase aggregate utility and flexibility across the range of military operations;
- properly balances critical capabilities and enablers;
- creates an operationalized reserve component without any reductions in reserve force structure; and
- creates opportunity for more closely integrated operations with our Navy, Special Operations, and inter-agency partners.

Post-Afghanistan Security Environment

Question 12. What military construction unfunded requirements were identified?

Answer. A thorough doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, education, personnel facilities, and cost review and assessment is currently being conducted in order to finalize the Force Structure Review and determine if there are any unfunded military construction requirements.

Energy Programs

Question 13. General Amos, in your testimony, you too said that the Marines were investing "more resources than ever before" in energy efficiency programs, including an experimental forward operating base run entirely on renewable energy. In the 2011 RAND study, the author states that *"any concepts that require delivery of a carbon containing feedstock appear to place a logistical and operational burden on forward-based tactical units that would be well beyond that associated with delivery of finished fuels"*.

Answer. Our objective in driving energy efficiency in our battlefield operations is to reduce the burden, of 'liquid logistics' on our forces, making them lighter and faster. Whether the fuel is fossil fuel, or alternative liquid fuel, we want to reduce the burden on our Marines.

In our experience, locally sourced alternative fuel has potential to offset demand for petroleum at the tactical level. Reduced demand for fuels that must be trucked to the battlefield means fewer convoys, and fewer Marines at risk on the road

Late last year, we began experimenting with biofuel on a small scale to run power generators at Camp Leatherneck in Afghanistan. We used a common Afghan resource—cotton oil—combined with JP-8. Early results show that it can reduce the Marines need for imported fuel by 20%, and reduce costs, while simultaneously demonstrating to the Afghans that they can power their own economy with fuel grown indigenously. This project has run its course and has provided lessons learned.

Question 14. In your experience with the forward operating base, did the conversion to alternative energy and the additional training required by Marines to operate the equipment mean that these energy independent FOB's would be impractical on a larger scale?

Answer. Over the last year, through our Experimental Forward Operating Base process, we've evaluated capabilities at Twentynine Palms, and then on the battlefield in Afghanistan with India Co. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment. The capabilities that we fielded —small scale solar solutions; man portable solar battery rechargers, hybrid-solar generators, plus energy efficient lighting and shelters—proved easy to employ. While it is critical to train Marines on new equipment prior to sending it forward, this equipment required minimal additional training. Feedback from Marines is that these systems _____ the GREENS (300W continuous power solar), SPACES (man portable solar battery recharger), LED lights, and tent liners—are easy to use, and relative to gas generators, low maintenance.

Most of the systems we evaluated are targeted to support the requirements of patrol and Company-level operations. They have helped our Marines operate lighter, and with less reliance on resupply. This experience has shown us that these systems are indeed practical, and moreover, enhance our capabilities.

Our forces today are widely dispersed across the battle space; a Company today may cover an area of even 50 square miles or more, manning multiple out posts. By reducing the demand for fuel and batteries at these bases, we reduce mission risk, and increase commander's options. We are now looking at deploying these solutions broadly to our small FOBs over the coming months.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Chairman Culberson for ADM Roughead follows:]

Navy Barracks — Homeport Ashore Evolution

Question 1. The Navy's current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the Homeport Ashore deficit for the E1 -E4 ranks by 2016, with 2 sailors per room, each with 55 square feet of living space. Initially, Navy aimed at eliminating the deficit for the E1 -E3 ranks with the FY08 program. Also, at 55 square feet, this policy does not meet the DOD standard of 90 square feet. Can you walk us through how the Homeport Ashore program has evolved, and how the Navy went from a 2008 target date to a 2016 target date?

Answer. The Homeport Ashore (HPA) program was initially established in 2000 to provide housing ashore for all our junior sea duty Sailors by 2008. Subsequently, Navy rebalanced risk in our budget to prioritize funding for warfighting readiness and adjusted our Homeport Ashore goal accordingly to provide housing ashore at the Interim Assignment Policy standard (55 square feet per person) by 2016.

Navy Barracks — Eliminate Inadequate Barracks

Question 2. The Navy's current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the Homeport Ashore deficit for the E 1-E4 ranks by 2016, with 2 sailors per room, each with 55 square feet of living space. Initially, Navy aimed at eliminating the deficit for the E1-E3 ranks with the FY08 program. Also, at 55 square feet, this policy does not meet the DOD standard of 90 square feet.

What is the Navy going to do about barracks across the board? During last year's hearing you stated that you expected to put together a master plan to eliminate inadequate barracks by 2020, subject to funding constraints. Do you have such a plan now? What are your known finding constraints?

Answer. Our FY12 unaccompanied housing program is focused on completing Homeport Ashore by 2016, and achieving an "adequate" (Q1/Q2) rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2022. In support of Homeport Ashore, our FY 2012 budget requests funding for one bachelors quarters in Norfolk and we have programmed the final three Homeport Ashore construction projects in FY 2013 and FY 2014. Our FY 2012 budget also increases our investment in improving the condition of our barracks from \$125M to \$195M annually through the FYDP. This investment reflects the transition Navy made in PB 12 from eliminating Q4 barracks by 2020 to supporting OSD's goal of attaining 90 percent "adequate" (Q1/Q2) barracks. We will not meet the Secretary of Defense's goal for achieving an adequate rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2017; however, our investment strategy will allow us to meet the Secretary's goal by 2022. We continue the development of a detailed master plan in support of our unaccompanied housing program for future budget cycles.

Family Housing Strategy

Question 3. The Department of Defense shifted its definition of inadequate family housing from one based on the amount of needed repairs to one based on a condition quality rating. In your testimony you discuss the three-part housing strategy that the Navy is pursuing. Can you explain this strategy and how it differs from your previous housing strategy?

Answer. The Navy has relied on a three-part housing strategy for a number of years. This strategy prioritizes housing options as follows:

1. Reliance on the Private Sector
2. Public Private Venture
3. Military Construction

We make every effort to house our Sailors in the local community first. We conduct Housing Requirements Market Analyses in communities near our installations to identify the availability of safe, suitable, and affordable housing for our Sailors and their families. Where the community is unable to support the housing needs of our force in CONUS and Hawaii, we look to our Public-Private Venture partners to provide housing; we have privatized approximately 97 percent of our family housing units in the U.S. We rely on MILCON finding for bachelor and overseas family housing.

QDR Impact on Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 4. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) makes numerous references to the need to increase the "resiliency" of U.S. bases overseas, including the "hardening" of key facilities. The Air Force includes funding in unspecified "resiliency" measures in Guam; however, the Navy does not appear to make any similar commitment for Guam. What, if any, will be the impact of this QDR policy on the construction in Guam, both for the realignment and non-realignment Navy and Marine Corps MILCON projects?

Answer. The QDR directed an increase to the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure by a variety of means. The Navy's two MILCON projects in the PB12 FYDP (CVN Capable Wharf and X-Ray Wharf) will provide supporting infrastructure that directly enhances operational capabilities of U.S. forces in the Pacific. While these two pier projects cannot be hardened in the same manner as a hanger facility, they will be designed to include seismic and anti-terrorism/force protection criteria as well as utility system resiliency.

Navy Barracks — Homeport Ashore Unfunded Deficit

Question 5. The Navy's current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the Homeport Ashore deficit for the E 1-E4 ranks by 2016, with 2 sailors per room, each with 55 square feet of living space. Initially, Navy aimed at eliminating the deficit for the E1-E3 ranks with the FY08 program. Also, at 55 square feet, this policy does not meet the DOD standard of 90 square feet. What is the outstanding, unfunded deficit for Homeport Ashore barracks, both in spaces and dollar terms?

Answer. All of our remaining Homeport Ashore (HPA) projects have been programmed in the PB12 FYDP. In FY12, FY13 and FY14, we will fund \$304M to eliminate the remaining 2,872 spaces at an Interim Assignment Policy standard.

Navy Barracks — Facility Sustainment Rate

Question 6. The Navy's current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the Homeport Ashore deficit for the E1 -E4 ranks by 2016, with 2 sailors per room, each with 55 square feet of living space. Initially, Navy aimed at eliminating the deficit for the E1-E3 ranks with the FY08 program. Also, at 55 square feet, this policy does not meet the DOD standard of 90 square feet. What is the Navy's current facility sustainment rate?

Answer. In FY12, Navy funded facility sustainment to 80 percent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Facilities Sustainment Model. Although the overall facility sustainment rate is 80 percent, the sustainment rates for individual categories of facilities vary.

Current Mission Infrastructure Risk

Question 7. When we look at your overall MILCON request, one thing stands out. A large portion of your budget is devoted to supporting the combatant commanders overseas, accommodating new systems, eliminating "deviations" in nuclear weapons security according to the new standards, and Homeport Ashore. The upshot is that only 17 percent of your MILCON request is addressed to new starts meeting "Other Navy Priorities" — in other words, MILCON to bolster your existing shore-based infrastructure and the missions it supports. Are you taking a risk in your "current mission" infrastructure?

Answer. We balance risk across the Navy to provide the most capability within fiscal constraints. We continue to provide the necessary shore infrastructure for Fleet operations, and our FY12 MILCON request makes targeted investments to increase warfighting capability, enhance nuclear weapons security, support energy initiatives, and improve Sailor quality of life. We are taking risk in other areas ashore, which will result in additional maintenance, sustainment, restoration, and modernization requirements, and higher total ownership costs over the lifecycle of our facilities. Accordingly, our future shore readiness; particularly the recapitalization of our facilities infrastructure, remains at high risk

Navy - Current Mission Infrastructure Risk Offset

Question 8. When we look at your overall MILCON request, one thing stands out. A large portion of your budget is devoted to supporting the combatant commanders overseas, accommodating new systems, eliminating "deviations" in nuclear weapons security according to the new standards, and Homeport Ashore. The upshot is that only 17 percent of your MILCON request is addressed to new starts meeting "Other Navy Priorities" — in other words, MILCON to bolster your existing shore-based infrastructure and the missions it supports. Are you offsetting this risk with an increase in facility sustainment, restoration and modernization accounts?

Answer. We balance risk across the Navy to provide the most capability within fiscal constraints. Our FY12 budget request includes \$2B for the sustainment, restoration, and modernization of our shore infrastructure. While this represents a slight increase over last year's request, we took deliberate risk in our facilities sustainment posture, funding facility sustainment to 80 percent of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Facilities Sustainment Model, to maximize our support for warfighting readiness and capabilities. We have minimized operational impacts and ensured the safety of our Sailors and civilians by prioritizing projects that address facilities with the lowest quality rating first.

The Navy Energy Program Goals

Question 9. The Navy has some robust shore energy goals in the next five years to include improve energy security by identifying shore energy supply infrastructure vulnerabilities. Can you inform the Committee what other types of energy goals the Navy is aiming towards?

Answer. Navy's PB-12 shore energy goals are to reduce consumption 50 percent by 2020 (per square foot on 2003 legal baseline), while providing reliable, redundant, and resilient energy to Navy Tier I/II Critical Assets by 2020.

Achieving these goals for consumption reduction and critical asset energy security will position the Navy to:

- (0 Most efficiently achieve SECNAV Energy Goals for Alternative Energy Ashore and Net-Zero Installations
 - Achieve regulatory compliance for Shore Energy and water management
 - Reduce Navy's Scope 1 and 2 Green House Gas emissions 34 percent by 2020 (on 2008 baseline) in accordance with OSD's goals under Executive Order 13514
 - Enable vital support from mission critical facilities, despite potential man-made or natural impediments to grid energy supplies

The Navy Energy Program Deployable Energy Strategies

Question 10. The Navy has some robust shore energy goals in the next five years to include improve energy security by identifying shore energy supply infrastructure vulnerabilities. What are the strategic details of the program? Please provide some examples of deployable energy strategies.

Answer. The Navy's Shore Energy Strategy is to ensure energy security and regulatory compliance through three key, deployable components:

Efficiency First

- Increase the energy efficiency of current facilities and utility systems as the most cost-effective way to reduce energy consumption and increase impact of current and future renewable energy generation sources
Invest in energy management systems and personnel to provide leaders with building-level transparency of energy consumption to further drive efficiency beyond infrastructure related improvements

Renewable energy and sustainability

- Integrate mission-compatible and cost-effective renewable energy systems
- Ensure all new construction and major renovation projects meet High Performance and Sustainable Building Design and Construction standards (Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEEDS) or equivalent)

Transform the Navy Culture and Behavior

- Evolve Navy Energy Culture by directly utilizing enabling technologies, like advanced meters and annual energy audits, to link consumption to behavior at the individual, command and functional levels

The Navy Energy Program Success

Question 11. The Navy has some robust shore energy goals in the next five years to include improve energy security by identifying shore energy supply infrastructure vulnerabilities. What successes has the Navy already been able to achieve?

Answer. Through prior-year MILCON and third-party financing, the Navy has achieved a 15.8 percent reduction in its energy intensity (consumption per square foot) since 2003; Some specific successes are noted below.

1. The Navy leverages programs like the OSD Energy Conservation Investment Program (ECIP (MILCON)) to invest over \$20M annually into viable renewable energy and efficiency projects
 - Prior year ECIP projects featured photovoltaic electricity, solar pool and domestic water heating, Ground Source Heat Pumps (GSHP), boiler heat recovery upgrades, control system improvements, as well as facility energy and water efficiency improvements. Each project must have a positive lifecycle return on investment.
 - The current ECIP projects under design and construction include wind turbines at Pacific Beach (NAVSTA Everett) and San Nicholas Island (SNI). The SNI turbine projects will feature the latest Office of Naval Research energy storage technology to enable increased energy security and reduced reliance on barge-delivered diesel to complete the mission.
2. The Navy utilizes Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs), such as the NAS Oceana Efficiency Projects, which replaced fossil fuel consumption with renewable energy, put 42 buildings on ground source or sanitation line geothermal resources, and closed two base steam plants. The specific accomplishments of the NAS Oceana Efficiency Projects are:
 - Oceana I: saves 55,360 Million British Thermal Units (MBTUs) per year and placed 470,000 square feet of buildings onto Ground Source Heat Pump (GSHP) systems.
 - Dam Neck Annex: saves 244K MBTU/year by utilizing seasonal heating and cooling from the Hampton Roads Sanitation Division (HRSD) Atlantic Treatment Plant effluent; thus providing GSHP systems without drilling and reducing HRSD's effluent temperature gradient to the Atlantic Ocean.
 - Oceana II: saves 155,950 MBTU/year and 19,574 kilo-gallons in water annually.

Although scheduled to complete in June 2011. It recently opened six months early.

Energy Program — RAND Study

Question 12. Admiral Roughead, in your submitted testimony, you spoke to the energy efficiency initiatives that the Navy is pursuing for the future. In a 2011 RAND Corporation study said that *"the bio-fuels pursued by the Navy could not be made commercially viable in the short term and would not reduce emissions from current levels."* Additionally, the report stated that the *"Department of Defense consumes more fuel than any other federal agency, but military fuel demand is only a very small fraction of civilian demand, and civilian demand is what drives competition, innovation, and production."* The federal government only accounts for 2% of the nation's energy use, the Department of Defense accounts for 98% of that. What incentive is there, then, to spend money on energy efficiency initiatives that ultimately don't look to have any tangible impact on both our Country's energy use and the Department of the Navy's energy use?

Answer. The RAND Corporation study accurately states that the Department of the Navy's switch to biofuels, in and of itself, will not reduce the nation's total energy consumption by a significant margin. The Department of the Navy should nonetheless pursue energy efficiency initiatives and the use of alternative fuels in order to achieve significant cost savings, guarantee energy supply and reduce operational risk.

Benefits of our approach include:

- **Cost savings.** Increasing our use of alternative energy sources helps us achieve a level of protection from energy price volatility. For every \$10 increase in the cost of a barrel of oil, the Navy spends an additional \$300 million dollars a year. Operating more efficiently saves money by reducing the amount we spend for fuel. Savings can be reinvested to strengthen combat capability. The cheapest barrel of fuel afloat or kilowatt-hour ashore is the one we will never use.
- **Guaranteed Supply.** Our reliance on energy can be exploited by potential adversaries. Efficiency and alternatives may be our best countermeasure. Energy efficiency increases our mission effectiveness by expanding our range and endurance, and reducing our need for logistics support. Efficiency improvements minimize operational risks of that logistics tether, saving time, money, and lives. Alternative fuels provide the Navy an 'off-ramp from petroleum,' mitigating the risk to a volatile and ever more expensive petroleum market.

- **Early Adopter of Technologies.** The military has often led in the development of new technologies where there was a compelling military use, even if the civilian use was ultimately greater (ex. GPS, the Internet). The operational use of alternative fuels by the Department of the Navy will be hastened by collaborating with federal agencies and private industry at every step of the research, development, and certification process. The alternative fuel program establishes the Department of the Navy as an early adopter for investors in a nascent industry that could significantly enhance energy security, and thereby national security, in the mid- to long-term.
- **Fossil Fuel Dependence.** The Navy recognizes that our dependence on fossil fuels and foreign sources of oil makes us more susceptible to price shocks, supply shocks, natural and man-made disasters, and political unrest in countries far from our shores.
- **Combat Capability.** Making our ships and aircraft more efficient improves their fuel economy. We can increase the days between refueling for our ships, improving their security and combat capability. We can also extend the range of our aircraft strike missions, allowing us to launch our aircraft farther away from combat areas. Increasing our efficiency and the diversity in our sources of fuel improves our combat capability strategically and tactically.

Inadequate Family Housing

Question 13. The Department of Defense shifted its definition of inadequate family housing from one based on the amount of needed repairs to one based on a condition quality rating. How has this affected your number of homes classified as inadequate, as well as your timetable for eliminating inadequate housing?

Answer. Prior to the change in the definition of inadequate family housing, the Navy had less than 800 housing units classified as inadequate, and was on track to meet OSD's requirement of 90 percent adequate family housing by 2012. When the definition changed approximately 2,900 additional units were classified as inadequate (Q3/Q4), for a total of 3,700 units at the end of FY10. Navy's FY12 FYDP provides funding to meet OSD's requirement of 90 percent adequate (Q1/Q2) family housing by 2015.

Family Housing Budget Request

Question 14. The Department of Defense shifted its definition of inadequate family housing from one based on the amount of needed repairs to one based on a condition quality rating. Is your budget request of \$75 million for family housing construction adequate to continue to address improvements that need to be made to Navy housing to raise the current "Q" rating?

Answer. Yes. Our FY12 budget provides funding to reduce our "inadequate" (Q3/Q4) family housing inventory from 36 percent to 10 percent of government-owned units by 2015, without displacing families. Our family housing program continues to provide Sailors and their families suitable, affordable, and safe environments in community, privatized, or Navy-owned housing.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Flake for ADM
Roughead follows:]

Earmarks

Question 1. As you may know, Congress has sworn off earmarks for at least the next two years. Will this change the way the Navy and Marine Corps prioritize their military construction projects?

Answer. No. The Department of the Navy will continue to use its existing approach to developing its MILCON program. All funded projects are valid requirements deliberately programmed within fiscal controls.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Flake for General Amos follows:]

Earmarks

Question 1. As you may know, Congress has sworn off earmarks for at least the next two years. Will this change the way the Navy and Marine Corps prioritize their military construction projects?

Answer. No. The Navy and Marine Corps will continue to prioritize military construction projects on the basis of infrastructure requirements given available resources.

Earmarks

Question 2. There has been a lot of discussion on reducing the level of active duty forces, and beginning in 2015, the Marine Corps is expected to begin drawing down its active duty component by *as much as* 20,000.

What impact will this have on the Marine Corps' current and future military construction program?

Answer. At this time, we do not anticipate any changes to our current MILCON projects. Once decisions are approved on future force structure, we will reassess our facility requirements and make adjustments as necessary. End strength decisions will guide future plans to remove facilities reaching their designed service life from existing inventory allowing the Marine Corps to realize savings in sustainment costs.

Although the Force Structure Review detailed recommendations are not complete, the FY2012 Military Construction program is consistent with a planned force of 186,800 or 202,000 as the projects address either long-standing facilities and infrastructure requirements/plans or new programs not impacted by a reduction in force.

Earmarks

Question 3. Recent news reports have highlighted a request made by General Petraeus, echoed by Secretary Gates, to reprogram hundreds of millions of dollars appropriated for Humvees to purchase systems to enhance intelligence capabilities on the battlefield in Afghanistan. However, concerns about this request have been raised because it appears the Marine Corps is potentially interested in procuring a new Humvee with expanded capabilities.

Could Congress approve the reprogramming of funds, while also leaving the door open for the Marines to purchase Humvees with expanded capacity in the future?

Answer. Thank you for your continued support in assisting the Marine Corps to ensure that we have funding aligned where we need it. The reprogramming in question (PA 11-10) addresses a number of urgent needs for forces in Afghanistan. One portion of the reprogramming sought to provide funds to develop a Wide Focal Plane Array Camera that the Marine Corps is developing for our Shadow unmanned aircraft. As originally written, this initiative was funded using the HMMWV funding in question. Due to the urgency of this request the Marine Corps has worked with OSD to identify alternate sources of funds that would be amenable to the defense committees.

Earmarks

Question 4. It has been reported that Congress may approve the majority of funds to be reprogrammed, while retaining the remainder so that any of the armed services can procure Humvees with expanded capabilities. But the Marine Corps' request for information *is* not a request for funds - would these funds simply remain available until they were requested to procure the Humvees?

Answer. The Marine Corps is considering a HMMWV Recapitalization and Modernization Program which will improve the performance of the current USMC fleet of HMMWVs, currently comprised of A2 and Expanded Capacity Vehicles (ECV), allowing them to be utilized in current and future combat operations. A Request For Information (RFI) was released to industry to seek information from industry sources that would be capable of performing HMMWV sustainment and payload/protection/mobility upgrades. The intent of the program is to use a systems approach to improve crew survivability, retain payload capacity, restore automotive and mobility performance, and improve reliability of the fleet. However, the HMMWV funding in the reprogramming is excess to any currently known USMC HMMWV requirements.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Yoder for General Amos follows:]

Marine Data Center — Kansas City (KCITC)

Question 1. What are the plans regarding the lease on the building currently housing the Marine Data Center (KCITC) located at the Kansas City, Missouri Bannister Federal Complex?

Answer. We are currently leasing space in the Kansas City Bannister Federal Complex and working with the General Services Administration to renew our lease which expires in September)12. We anticipate extending the lease through September 2017. This will allow us enough time to develop a long-term solution, obtain necessary funding, and execute a decision.

Marine Data Center — Kansas City (KCITC)

Question 2. Why are the Marines considering moving the data center to another location?

Answer. We are exploring various options for acquiring suitable facilities to permanently support Marine Corps information technology organizations. It is uncertain at this time whether the current interim facility is suitable as a permanent solution to our facility needs.

Marine Data Center — Kansas City (KCITC)

Question3. What factors will be taken into consideration when deciding the future location? Will cost be a factor?

Answer. Cost, while significant, is not the single most important consideration. The ability to retain and recruit qualified information technology personnel is equally important. Other factors taken into consideration include facility cost, workforce relocation and transition costs, and suitability of the facility to meet information technology security and force protection requirements.

Marine Data Center — Kansas City (KCITC)

Question 4. Will the process be transparent and allow for local stakeholders to participate in the discussion?

Answer. The public and local stakeholders will be afforded an opportunity to participate in and provide their views and comments.

Marine Data Center – Kansas City (KCITC)

Question 5. What will the decision process look like?

Answer. Senior Marine Corps leadership will be presented with recommended options and the best option that meets mission and cost factors will be selected. Currently, requirements are under review internally and are expected to be presented for consideration to the Marine Corps leadership by spring 2012.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Nunnelee for General Amos follows:]

Energy

Question 1. In your testimony, you discuss the Marine Corps being more efficient in how you use, produce, and acquire energy - could you discuss this in more detail?

Answer. I recently signed our Expeditionary Energy Strategy and Implementation Plan which calls on the Marine Corps to increase our energy efficiency on the battlefield by 50%, and cut in half the fuel used per Marine per day by the year 2025. To achieve our 'efficiency' goals, we are pursuing three courses of action: increase energy efficiency in our equipment, systems and platforms; increase the use of renewable energy to make our operations more self sufficient, and finally to change the way we think about energy—to value it as a critical combat enabler in the way we man, train and equip our forces.

Changing our mindset about energy central to our strategy—we know that technology solutions alone will not get us to where we need to be. Our approach is to look across the organization—the DOTMLPF spectrum—to identify areas for change, be it Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and/or Facilities. Concurrent with the development of our strategy, we are preparing the formal requirements documents to define the capabilities we need to increase our efficiency across this spectrum. This report is due out in the coming months.

With regard to the equipment we buy, we are defining new requirements to demand greater energy efficiency and performance, along with our combat effective capabilities. We are updating existing requirements to affect near term purchases and to push efficiency into our legacy systems. For example, we have driven efficiency through the following: Statement of Need For LED Lights; Statement of Need for Shelter Liners; Statement of Need for 500kW Micro-Grid; Statement of Need to Operate GENSET on Vegetable Oil; Urgent Statement of Need for SPACES Improvements and Increase Numbers.

We are also developing an Energy Performance Key Performance Parameter to drive efficiencies into our acquisitions. Notably, we issued the GBOSS Capability Development Document Energy Efficiency Key Performance Parameter.

Our investments in current programs and new areas put us on track to achieve our energy efficiency goals for 2025. As a starting point, we anticipate an Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) savings of 100,000 to 150,000 BBLS of petroleum over the FYDP.

- o Implementing mobile electric power sources to achieve 17% fuel efficiency improvement, beginning in 2010 (Army funded development/USMC funded procurement)
- o Fielding Enhanced Efficiency Environmental Control Units (E3CU) to achieve 10-30% power efficiency improvement, beginning in 2012. Next generation family of ECUs will begin entering service in 2014.

- Implementing deployable renewable energy alternative modules and ground renewable expeditionary energy systems (*SPACES and GREENS and On-Board Vehicle Power*)
- Implementing improved environmental control units in vehicles and trailers (e.g. *MRAPs/LAVs*)
- Developing hybridization and other fuel economy improvement ECPs for MTRVs to reduce the total ownership cost.

Looking at the long term, we aim to be the leader in expeditionary energy capabilities for the US military. Current Science & Technology investments, via the Office of Naval Research (ONR), and the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL), to drive future capabilities include:

- Improved power density in battery, chargers, and power adaptors for highly mobile forces.
- Advanced integrated solutions for electrical power generation and distribution.
- Lightweight Power Systems for Dismounted Marine Squad Applications.

USMC Barracks

Question 2. Renovated barracks greatly improve the overall quality of life for those enlisted personnel- what is the Marine Corps doing in terms of barracks renovations?

Answer. The FY12 budget continues our push to eliminate Marine Corps BEQ space deficits. The BEQ initiative is made up of two main pillars: (1) elimination of our space deficit and (2) elimination of the inadequate and substandard spaces.

- Inadequate barracks are eliminated and replaced via the Military Construction program and through Sustainment / Restoration / Modernization projects.
- Substandard barracks are repaired and modernized to an adequate condition via Operations and Maintenance funds.
- To keep new BEQ's from deteriorating, the Marine Corps is committed to funding whole room barracks furnishings on a seven-year replacement cycle, and prioritizing barracks repair projects to minimize the backlog of repairs.
- The Marine Corps has consistently sought to fund 90% of the sustainment requirement for barracks per the DoD Facility Sustainment Model; actual funding during prior years has exceeded this percentage. The Marine Corps goal is to achieve a 2+0 standard for E1-E5 bachelor Marines by FY 2014.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Ranking Member Congressman Bishop for General Amos follows:]

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 1. General Amos, in the past, you expressed some serious concern about both the cost of the realignment from Okinawa to Guam, as well as your ability to properly train your forces in the Pacific. Do you feel that your concerns are being addressed?

Answer. (CMC Stated response) Sir, that was actually my predecessor, General Conway, who (Lade that comment last year. I do know there's a great effort underway right now within the Department of Defense and OSD to reconcile what the real cost will be. As you know, the total cost was forecast to be, \$10.6 billion, of which the United States share was \$4.2 billion.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 2. General Amos, as you know the ruling party changed in 2009 and many were concerned that Japan would seek to re-negotiate the agreement. Is Japan still living up to their agreement?

Answer. The original agreement between Japan and the United States was signed in 2006, so we are on that track now to move Marines out of the southern areas of Okinawa and moves them up towards more of the central and the northern part of Okinawa.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 3. General Amos, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) estimates a \$1.3 billion requirement for short term (5 years) repairs and improvements to Guam's water and wastewater systems. What is the state of infrastructure on Guam now?

Answer. (CMC. Stated response) On Guam they're working their way through that right now and again, that's part of the total cost -- is it more than \$4 2 billion for the United States and I can't give you a solid answer right now because that effort's underway as we speak.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 4. General Amos, the 2014 goal seems even more unrealistic now; will we see that goal slip?

Answer. Construction was supposed to start but it all depends on what happens on Okinawa Is the Futenma replacement facility built? The landfill has not been signed by the governor of Okinawa yet.

Construction was supposed to start in 2007 and be completed by 2014. It would appear that since that has not happened, the situation is certainly pressurized by the fact that we have not begun construction yet and it's 2011.

Futenma Replacement Facility

Question 5. General Amos, the U S has consistently taken the position that the realignment in Okinawa is contingent on progress toward the Futenma Replacement Facility, currently planned for Camp Schwab. Some people on the Japanese side have suggested that the Futenma Replacement Facility could be moved off of Okinawa or even out of Japan entirely. In your estimation, why does the Marine Corps need an air station on Okinawa?

Answer. Yes. The Aviation Combat Element (ACE) is a critical doctrinal component of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) on Okinawa. All MAGTF components must plan, train and operate together as a team to maintain readiness and the ability to respond to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions and other contingencies in the region.

Futenma Replacement Facility

Question 6. What would be the impact if this were moved to mainland Japan, or to the area of Guam?

Answer. There are no US Government plans to move the Futenma Replacement Facility off Okinawa.

Futenma Replacement Facility

Question 7. A few news reports have noted that Secretary Gates hopes for a resolution on this issue in the spring, what are your thoughts on a resolution?

Answer. The Marine Corps supports the 2006 Roadmap for Realignment. A resolution on the Futenma Replacement Facility would be well received.

Questions for the Record submitted by Ranking Member Congressman Bishop for ADM
Roughead follows:]

Walter Reed (BRAC) Status

Question 1. Admiral, as you know BRAC recommendation 169 mandated the Walter Reed and Bethesda facilities be consolidated into one location. What is the current status of this project?

Answer. The missions presently performed at Walter Reed Army Medical Center will transfer to Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) on the campus of the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, and Fort Belvoir Community Hospital, both of which are scheduled to achieve Full Operational Capability on 15 September 2011. Additional information on the status of this project is most appropriately answered by the Department of Defense's lead activity for this project, Joint Task Force Medical — National Capital Region (JTFCAPMED)

WRNMMC Operations

Question 2. Admiral, can you explain what operations will be supported at the new WRNMMC so the new members of the subcommittee can get an idea how large this move is?

Answer. Specific information on the transition of the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) onboard the campus of the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda is most appropriately answered by the Department of Defense's lead activity, Joint Task Force Medical — National Capital Region (JTF CAPMED) For the Navy, a successful transition includes the closure of WRAMC and the assimilation of military and civilian WRAMC personnel, Wounded Warriors, families, and support personnel into Fort Belvoir Community Hospital and WRNMMC in a fashion that allows for the continuous, safe, and best practice operation of patient care and Wounded Warrior support.

Walter Reed (BRAC) Relocation Impact

Question 3. Admiral, are there any concerns regarding the impact this relocation could have on the local community?

Answer. The local community, and the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) we conducted for this project, identified vehicular and pedestrian traffic as a potential concern. The President's FY 2011 BRAC budget request included \$20 million for a Defense Access Roads Project to improve pedestrian access between the installation and the local Metro station. The Navy has been cooperating with county and state transportation agencies and other Federal agencies in the identification of other transportation-related improvements. Additional information on the status of this project is most appropriately answered by the Department of Defense's lead activity for this project, Joint Task Force Medical — National Capital Region (JTF CAPMED).

Walter Reed (MAC) Relocation Service Coordination

Question 4. Admiral, how much coordination has there been between the services during this consolidation?

Answer. Navy is working diligently with the Army, the Marine Corps, and DoD's lead activity, Joint Task Force Medical — National Capital Region (JTF CAPMED) to ensure the successful transition of the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC) onboard the campus of the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa

Question 5. Admiral, the QDR makes numerous references to the need to increase the "resiliency" of U.S. bases overseas, including the "hardening" of key facilities. Has the QDR policy had an effect on the construction in Guam?

Answer. The QDR directed an increase to the resiliency of U.S. forward posture and base infrastructure by a variety of means. The Navy's two MILCON projects in the PB12 FYDP (CVN Capable Wharf and X-Ray Wharf) will provide supporting infrastructure that directly enhances operational capabilities of U.S. forces in the Pacific. While these two pier projects cannot be hardened in the same manner as a hanger facility, they will be designed to include seismic and anti-terrorism/force protection criteria as well as utility system resiliency.

Guam and Realignment of Marines from Okinawa Effect on Navy

Question 6. Admiral, what effect will the Guam move have on the Navy?

Answer. The realignment of Marines to Guam has no known impact to Navy infrastructure at this time.

There are currently two wharf improvement projects authorized and/or underway that will provide essential infrastructure on Guam for amphibious and combat logistics force ships that enable Marine Corps operational capability. Additionally, the Navy has two Guam MILCON projects in the PB12 FYDP: CVN Capable Wharf and X-Ray Wharf. While these projects are not directly related to the Agreed Implementation Plan between the U S and Japan, the Navy is ready to support the Marine Corps upon relocation to Guam.

Homeport Ashore Initiative

Question 7. Admiral, your current policy on barracks calls for eliminating the Homeport Ashore deficit for the E 1- E4 ranks by 2016, based on a policy calling for 2 sailors per room, each with 55 square feet of living space. Can you walk us through how the Homeport Ashore program has evolved, and how we went from a 2008 target date to a 2016 target date?

Answer. The Homeport Ashore (HPA) program was initially established in 2000 to provide housing ashore for all our junior sea duty Sailors by 2008. Subsequently, Navy rebalanced risk in our budget to prioritize funding for warfighting readiness and adjusted our Homeport Ashore goal accordingly to provide housing ashore at the Interim Assignment Policy standard (55 square feet per person) by 2016.

Homeport Ashore Initiative

Question 8. Admiral, how does the increased end strength of the Navy affect the 2016 target?

Answer. The Navy considered end strength levels in developing the Homeport Ashore Program, and there is no impact to our Homeport Ashore targets.

Homeport Ashore Initiative

Question 9. Admiral, what is the outstanding, unfunded deficit for Homeport Ashore barracks, both in spaces and dollar terms?

Answer. All of our remaining Homeport Ashore (HPA) projects have been programmed in the PB12 FYDP. In FY12, FY13 and FY14, we will fund \$304M to eliminate the remaining 2,872 spaces at an Interim Assignment Policy standard.

Homeport Ashore Initiative

Question10. Admiral, has the Navy come up with a "final" assignment policy to replace the "interim" one?

Answer. The interim assignment policy remains in effect. We are currently working on a final assignment policy to inform our future budget cycle.

Homeport Ashore Initiative

Question 11. Admiral, what is the Navy going to do about barracks across the board? You have said in the past that you expected to put together a master plan to eliminate inadequate barracks by 2020, subject to funding constraints. Do you have such a plan now?

Answer. Our FY12 unaccompanied housing program is focused on completing Homeport Ashore by 2016, and achieving an "adequate" (Q1/Q2) rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2022. In support of Homeport Ashore, our FY 2012 budget requests funding for one bachelors quarters in Norfolk and we have programmed the final three Homeport Ashore construction projects in FY 2013 and FY 2014. Our FY 2012 budget also increases our investment in improving the condition of our barracks from \$125M to \$195M annually through the FYDP. This investment reflects the transition Navy made in PB12 from eliminating Q4 barracks by 2020 to supporting OSD's goal of attaining 90 percent "adequate" (Q1/Q2) barracks. We will not meet the Secretary of Defense's goal for achieving an adequate rating for 90 percent of our bachelors quarters by 2017; however, our investment strategy will allow us to meet the Secretary's goal by 2022. We continue the development of a detailed master plan in support of our unaccompanied housing program for future budget cycles.

Mayport CVN Homeport Initiative

Question 12. Admiral, the cost to move an aircraft carrier from Hampton Roads to Florida could be far less than the Navy has estimated. According to the Government Accountability Office, taxpayers would have to spend \$258.7 million to \$356 million in one-time costs to base a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier at Mayport. The Navy's estimate was \$537 million, can you explain the difference?

Answer. The major difference between the Navy and GAO estimates is related to the MILCON projects for the Controlled Industrial Facility and Ship Maintenance Facility. Navy's overall MILCON estimate for the two projects was \$296M, compared to GAO's estimate of \$58M to \$154M. The Navy's estimate used different factors for local and national market conditions, evolved forced protection standards, sustainable design requirements, and new construction features, such as hurricane design considerations. Differences between Navy and GAO will be resolved in the coming years as design efforts are completed for the Controlled Industrial Facility and Ship Maintenance Facility, and as project cost estimates are refined for budget year programming.

Mayport CVN Homeport Initiative

Question 13. Admiral, as you know, the Hampton Roads community is very upset that they will be losing a carrier, is anything being done to help the Hampton Roads community with this loss?

Answer. There are no plans to compensate the Hampton Roads community for potential carrier movements. As the largest naval base complex on the East Coast, the Hampton Roads community is essential to long-term Navy force posture and will remain home to a very large Navy population.

Mayport CVN Homeport Initiative

Question 14. Admiral, some people believe the benefits of a second East Coast port are overstated, and the Navy should spend limited taxpayers' money on higher priorities. Can you explain what the benefits of having a carrier in Florida are?

Answer. Strategic dispersal of our aircraft carriers increases our operational flexibility and mitigates the risk posed by man-made or natural disasters to our these forces and our critical nuclear training and maintenance infrastructure. Without a second East Coast carrier homeport, our six Atlantic Fleet carriers would have to transit at least 12,700 nm to the West Coast around South America to access nuclear-capable maintenance and training facilities should a catastrophic event occur in Hampton Roads. The decision to upgrade Naval Station Mayport's conventional carrier capable operational, maintenance, and support facilities to support our nuclear aircraft carriers will mitigate risk and ensure the Navy can meet its national defense obligations should Hampton Roads be disrupted.

Mayport CVN Homeport Initiative

Question 15. Admiral, construction at Mayport will be ongoing for the next 5 years. Is that enough time to get everything down there ready?

Answer. Yes. The dredging project authorized, appropriated, and awarded in FY 2010 is underway and will ensure unimpeded access to Mayport. Our FY 2012 budget requests finding for the Massey Avenue corridor improvements. We plan to request funding for the Wharf F recapitalization in FY 2013, and the remaining three MILCON projects, plus associated Planning and Design finds, are programmed to enable homeporting in 2019.

Mayport CVN Homeport Initiative

Question 16. Admiral, have there been any talks with the community in Mayport regarding improvements off base to support the influx of sailors?

Answer. Yes. Naval Station Mayport and the City of Atlantic Beach are in the initial stages of developing a study on the community support that would be required should the number of Sailors stationed in Mayport increase. The City has willingly taken the lead on this effort to look at the businesses, schools, and housing infrastructure necessary to support the Naval Station. Additionally, the Naval Station has an active public outreach program led by a Public Affairs and Community Planning and Liaison Team. The team is involved in studies of local transportation and infrastructure, and they have briefed local Community Planning/Advisory Committees and local City/County Planning, Growth and Development Organizations. Navy is actively involved in the Mayport community as it prepares to upgrade Mayport to a nuclear carrier homeport.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Farr for ADM Roughead follows:]

Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Funding

Question 1. I'm pleased to hear that you have an Admiral on your staff dedicated to international engagement and that he recently organized a conference to better connect the Navy to humanitarian NGOs.

As was discussed at the hearing, the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies (CSRS) at NPS is the only classroom in the country whose students are a mix of military members from all the services, government officials; and civilians from NGOs and IGOs. Navy participation represents more than 10 percent of the nearly 1200 students who have attended and benefited from these short courses. CSRS could be the gateway to connecting the Navy with NGO humanitarian community since this community is an active participant in CSRS short courses. Please identify the source of resources being allocated for the NGO humanitarian initiative and how much of that funding could be directed to CSRS to assist with this initiative?

Answer. Navy headquarter's resources are not allocated toward Navy-NGO humanitarian initiatives. Accordingly, there is no funding that could be redirected to CSRS. Navy has participated in three annual Navy-NGO Conferences held at facilities that were provided free of charge. Additionally, Navy participates in a bi-monthly civilian-military working group at the United States Institute of Peace.

Regional Education for Non-FAOs

Question 2. I want to compliment the Navy for doing a great job educating Navy Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) at NPS. And I was pleased to learn at the hearing that the number of Navy F AOs will be increasing. As you know, Navy FAOs benefit from both NPS regional affairs degree programs as well as from the advanced FAO course, the Joint FAO Skills Sustainment Pilot Program. But many Navy officers who are not FAOs are deeply involved in matters relating to security cooperation and engagement planning as staff officers at the regional combatant commands and the Navy component commands. Regional experts in the National Security Affairs Department at NPS are eminently capable of preparing these officers for their regionally-focused duties. Why doesn't the Navy send these officers to NPS -- if not for a full- length degree program, then for a shorter period of study -- in order to best prepare them for these important duties?

Answer. Navy sends a significant number of non-FAOs to regional education programs to meet validated requirements. As of the second quarter Academic Year 2011, Navy has approximately 90 officers enrolled in resident, graduate education in the National Security Affairs Department at NPS. More than 70 of these officers are not FAOs. That graduate education will serve these officers and our nation well while serving in assignments at Regional Combatant Commands, Navy Component Commands, and Headquarters Staffs.

[Questions for the Record submitted by Congressman Farr for General Amos follows:]

Cross Cultural Education:

Question 1. You were clearly familiar with the quality education going on at the Naval Postgraduate School, so I'm wondering why in this constrained resource environment, you are not pursuing more collaboration between NPS and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning (CAOCL) which also strives to provide cross-cultural competence for deployed Marines. Collaboration between NPS and CAOCL would safeguard USMC resources and ensure CAOCL delivers the highest quality product possible to Marines deploying for combat operations. Please tell how you intend to leverage the regional expertise at NPS -- expertise that predates the creation of CAOCL -- to support CAOCL activities?

Answer. CAOCL has had an established relationship with the Naval Postgraduate School since inception. The relationship began with the hiring of CAOCL's first Deputy Director from the ITS National Security Affairs faculty. Since this hiring in 2006, CAOCL continues to see tremendous value in their connection to several Departments, Centers and faculty of NPS, particularly in the National Security Affairs department. CAOCL utilizes the Marine Corps' Foreign Area Officers (FAO) and Regional Affairs Officers (RAO), who are predominantly graduates of NPS, as force multipliers to CAOCL's mission. Within CAOCL, these FAOs and RAOs form the core of the active duty Marine staff. These officers have an excellent appreciation for the regional expertise resident at NPS, and they evaluate each CAOCL training and education project for the possibility of benefit from NPS collaboration. In addition, CAOCL leverages FAOs and RAOs assigned around the world to fill critical subject matter expertise, teaching and training roles in support of preparation for Marine Corps global deployments; most recently, CAOCL capitalized on FAOs and RAOs in coordinating training for several III Marine Expeditionary Force units deploying for missions throughout Southeast Asia.

CAOCL and NPS currently partner in several areas:

- Partnership with the Program for Culture and Conflict. Two of the most well-received and highly sought products created and published by CAOCL are its *Operational Culture for Deploying Personnel—Afghanistan* and *Operational Pashtunwali* which were created in collaboration with the NPS Program for Culture and Conflict and its team of researchers. These two products are currently being updated for republication this summer, and CAOCL has made funding available to the Program for Culture and Conflict to contribute to this task.

time, CAOCL has continued to work with the Global Center's staff, participate in meetings and conferences, and work closely with consortium members.

- Collaboration with National Security Affairs Faculty. CAOCL continues to collaborate and "tap" into the NPS faculty in support of Operating Force requirements that lend themselves toward the unique capabilities that are present on the staff at NPS.

- Conferences and Working Groups. CAOCL personnel attend conferences, addressing topics of regional concern, hosted by NPS, with the most recent example being a NATO Building Integrity Conference in February 2011. CAOCL, along with other Marine Corps organizations, routinely extend invitations to NPS faculty to participate and speak at conferences, training events and other venues.

- NPS researchers send a weekly compendium of useful, current sources regarding regional and cultural issues to the CAOCL staff; this material contributes to the creation and revision of CAOCL pre-deployment training products for the General Purpose Force.

We believe that the relationship between CAOCL and NPS is both strong and synergistic. The relationship brings together the strengths of both organizations in a mutually supporting manner. Most importantly, because the relationship leverages the best from both organizations, the Marine on the ground, regardless of where he or she is deployed, is provided the best training and education available in the art of operational culture.

Master's Degree in Stabilization and Reconstruction

Question 3. The National Security Affairs Department at NPS offers a Master's degree program in Stabilization and Reconstruction. Over a three year period starting in 2008 the Navy sent 13 officers to NPS to study in this curriculum. But the Navy decided last year to stop sending its officers to study in this degree program. Considering S&R is a core DOD mission, per Directive 3000.05, this decision is puzzling. Why did the Navy and Marine Corps decide to stop sending its Navy and Marine Corps leaders to NPS to study this highly relevant subject?

Answer. The National Security Studies — Stabilization and Reconstruction curriculum was established in 2006 in anticipation of Fleet requirements for billets with this particular education. However, since then, there have been no Fleet or Navy staff requirements for officers with a Master's degree in Stabilization and Reconstruction. A recently completed review of all officer billets confirmed the absence of a requirement for this highly-focused curriculum. NPS continues to offer Stabilization and Reconstruction courses and officers enrolled at NPS can take S&R courses as part of regionally-focused National Security Studies programs, for which the Navy does have broad requirements. S&R courses are also open to officers of other Services who attend NPS.

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Answer. The Marine Corps does not have a requirement for Stabilization and Reconstruction nor is it a part of the Marine Corps Table of Organization, therefore does not send officers to seek this degree. The Marine Corps has a requirement for, and sends officers to get, Masters Degrees in International Studies to become Foreign Area Officers and Regional Area Officers.